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Abstract
This thesis is about demandingness objections. It is claimed that various
moral theories ask too much of moral agents, and for that reason should be
rejected or modified accordingly. In the first chapter, I consider what this
objection entails, particularly distinguishing it from Bernard Williams’s in-
tegrity objection. The second chapter investigates several attempts to under-
mine the objection. I contend that their arguments for a more burdensome
conception of morality fail, and that accepting their ‘extreme’ view would
leave us unable to explain much of our moral phenomenology. In the third
chapter, I analyse what features of a moral theory make it susceptible to
demandingness objections. Through this discussion I highlight social factors
(the conduct and expectations of one’s community) and psychological fac-
tors as potential candidates for generating the problem. Making use of these
potential diagnoses, in chapter four, I examine (but ultimately reject) the
responses to demandingness objections by Richard Miller and Liam Murphy,
which can provide verdicts sensitive to these features.
In the fifth chapter, I examine the concept of blame and its relationship
to moral wrongness. Noting this relationship and how an action’s difficulty
can affect whether we deem conduct blameworthy, I consider a recent pro-
posal by Brian McElwee, that the difficulty of certain actions explains why
they are too demanding. I reject this proposal, instead regarding difficulty
as providing excuse conditions. However, through the discussion I draw
attention to the fact that sub-optimal behaviour often does not need an
excuse, suggesting that there is no ‘default’ obligation to do the best. In
the final chapter, I offer a way to consider how obligations are generated,
utilising the concept of reasonableness. By incorporating this concept, and
giving it a relativistic analysis, I suggest a theory can avoid demandingness
objections.
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Introduction
In 1972, Peter Singer’s “Famine, Aﬄuence and Morality” issued a challenge
to both common-sense moral thought and the way philosophers regard obli-
gations to the global poor. Following on from a very simple principle, that
“If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, with-
out thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we ought,
morally, to do it” (Singer, 1972, p.231), Singer argues that our obligations
are extensive. This principle has the virtue of sounding, prima facie, ex-
tremely plausible. It becomes clear, however, after some consideration that
the principle inevitably (in any world with such rife amounts of easily pre-
ventable suffering, like ours) entails that we all ought, morally, to devote
enormous levels of our time/money/energies to preventing suffering.
The vast amount of obligations generated is easily seen when considering
typical everyday choices. When deciding what to do for dinner, perhaps I
think it would be nice to try the new restaurant, but then I realise that I
could buy some pasta and cook it myself for much less money, and donate
the rest to a charity, which could use the difference to prevent a child going
blind. It seems undeniable that a child becoming blind is “something very
bad”. It also seems obvious that my sacrificing trying the new restaurant in
favour of a cheap meal at home is not comparably morally significant. This
procedure can then be applied to any luxury purchase one might make.
We are, if we are to accept Singer’s conclusion, committed to an austere
lifestyle, devoid of luxuries except in situations where indulging in them will
not forestall our ability to relieve some of the widespread suffering. Many
find the conclusion that morality requires this much of us to be absurd; this
would just be too demanding. Responses to arguments and wider theories
like this, which take issue with the claim that morality is that demanding,
have come to be known as demandingness objections.
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While current discussions of demandingness often begin with Singer, this
is not a new problem. Sidgwick discussed the accusation that utilitarianism
set up “too high a standard of unselfishness” and that it made “exaggerated
demands on human nature” (1907, p.87). Mill, also defending utilitarianism,
noted the complaint that its standards are “too high for humanity” (1861,
II.19).1 In previous centuries, most people did not have the disposable
income, the requisite knowledge or the ability to assist those suffering the
most. However, technological developments have increased our ability to
help the distant poor, and the world’s wealthy (even those who are modestly
well-off in developed nations) have amassed what would previously have been
regarded as tremendous wealth.
Though historically consequentialist moral theories have been the pri-
mary target for these types of objections,2 there have been several discus-
sions recently of how demandingness could be problematic for other moral
theories. Demandingness concerns are now raised in relation to Kantian
ethics,3 Scanlon’s contractualism,4 “common-sense morality”5 and virtue
ethics.6 The question of how demanding morality is therefore provides a
huge problem for moral philosophers.
Objections of this sort are also not merely problems for academic philoso-
phers. Considerations of overdemandingness permeate many discussions re-
lating to many aspects of human life. Fiona Woollard, for example, notes
that demands typically expressed in the media of new or expecting mothers
are excessively demanding, and identifies this as problematic (2016b). There
are also worries that structural issues in society impose excessive demands
on care workers.7 Overdemandingness is also noted, though not in the same
vocabulary, in popular media with regards to a variety of issues. There are
concerns regarding the demands of being an ethical consumer – trying to
purchase products that do not unnecessarily harm animals or impact the
1References to Utilitarianism will be given in the form “A:n” where ‘A’ is the chapter
and ‘n’ is the paragraph.
2Exactly why this is the case is a difficult and interesting question. It is my contention
that the relative simplicity of these theories as well as the clarity of their verdicts are likely
explanations, though I do not address these hypotheses in this thesis.
3e.g. van Ackeren and Sticker (2015), Pinheiro Walla (2015), Timmermann (forthcom-
ing).
4e.g. Ashford (2003), Hills (2010), Ashford and Mulgan (2012, §8).
5e.g. Fishkin (1982).
6e.g. Swanton (2009).
7e.g. Tessman (2015).
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environment – which is often taken to require too much of people.8 The
ideals of beauty which face women also present another structurally similar
objection, with the expectations seeming to ask too much.9
In this thesis I aim to explore what demandingness objections actually
involve, what makes a theory vulnerable to this type of objection, and how
we should respond to overly demanding theories. In the opening chapter, I
consider several different objections that risk being conflated and all relate
somehow to demandingness. In the second chapter, I examine a variety of
arguments which attempt to blunt the force of demandingness objections, ul-
timately rejecting these efforts. In chapter 3, I investigate several candidates
for features a moral theory could have which might result in overdemand-
ingness. This proves to be difficult because none of the obvious candidates
seem necessary for making demandingness objections. In the 4th chapter,
I look at some specific attempts to respond to the objection in ways that
looked promising considering the findings of chapter 3, but eventually re-
ject these attempts. In chapter 5, I take seriously recent attempts to explain
overdemandingness in terms of difficulty, and though I reject these attempts,
suggest that exposing why they fail may elucidate some of our problems. Fi-
nally, I offer a tentative schema of a moral theory based on reasonableness,
which I suggest can avoid accusations of overdemandingness.
8e.g. Rohwetter (2017)
9e.g. Hinsliff (2017).
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1What are Demandingness
Objections?
“That’s too much, man.”
– Sabrina, Horsing Around1
Demandingness objections are typically forceful when a moral theory,
principle or practice requires a great deal from individual moral agents. The
obvious candidate for a demanding moral theory, and a regular target of the
objection, is act utilitarianism. It is well-noted in the literature that this
was the original target of the objection.2 Act utilitarianism holds that the
best action one can take in any given situation is the one that results in the
greatest utility, or most happiness. When combined with the requirement
to maximise, as is often how act utilitarianism is regarded,3 this becomes
an extremely demanding theory.
We can see how demanding maximising act utilitarianism is by consid-
ering the obligations one would ordinarily be subject to. Kagan depicts this
issue succinctly in The Limits of Morality :
“When I go to the movies I may spend a few dollars and enjoy
myself for an hour or two. The pleasure I get is genuine, and it
1Fictional show featured in Bojack Horseman
2For examples, see Cullity (2009, p.8), Hooker (2009a, p.151),
3Though this is often treated as the standard (as can by seen in many instances where
the maximisation requirement goes unspecified, as in Murphy (1993) and Hooker (1991))
and is actually endorsed by several utilitarians (e.g. Sidgwick (1907), Singer and de Lazari-
Radek (e.g. 2016)), this is by no means necessary to act utilitarianism or consequentialist
positions in general, as noted by Norcross (1997, p.2) and McElwee (2007).
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seems absurd to say that I have done anything wrong. Yet this is
exactly what the claim [maximising act utilitarianism] entails, for
both my time and my money could be better spent: the pleasure
one could bring in an evening visiting the elderly or the sick quite
outweighs the mild entertainment I find in the movies; and the
money itself would have done much more good were it sent to
famine relief – for even a few dollars is sufficient to enable another
human being to survive a temporary food shortage brought on
by drought. If the claim is right, then in going to the movies I
do what is morally forbidden.”
(Kagan, 1989, p.1)
For any state of the world that resembles the way the world is now –
when there are people starving and dying of easily preventable diseases –
maximising act utilitarianism commits agents to extreme demands. It seems
unlikely that one could be justified in purchasing any luxury goods,4 5 so
every agent is likely to be morally compelled to have a very austere life.
Demandingness objections hold that any moral theory which requires this
of moral agents in situations like our own must be mistaken, that “there are
limits to the demands of morality’s requirement that we promote the good”
(Murphy, 1993, p.274).
It should be noted that demandingness objections do not simply reject
a theory because it may lead to extremely high demands (though this is
compatible with everything said up to this point). We could call such an
objection the Primitive Demandingness Objection (PDO). To clarify, I en-
visage this sort of objection as proceeding as follows:
P1: No moral theory should require more than X of an agent in any situ-
ation.
4An exception to this is when the purchase of luxury goods can be expected to increase
one’s ability to help the world’s poor, by giving one more influence over wealthy persons
or enhancing one’s career prospects, which could be instrumental in helping the world’s
poor. Singer makes this point in Practical Ethics (1993, p.223,n.1).
5Throughout this thesis I assume that the aﬄuent westerners are not culpable for
the extreme suffering in the developing world. As Judith Lichtenberg points out, our
complicity in harmful global systems makes this dubious (2010), but as taking this kind
of consideration into account would ‘muddy the ethical waters’, I discuss these matters as
if this was not an issue.
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P2: Moral theory A demands more than X in some situations.
C: Moral theory A must be rejected.
*Where X denotes some degree of sacrifice.
With the tacit premise that moral theories that demand more than they
should must be rejected, this argument is clearly valid, but it still seems both
problematic and unlikely to properly encapsulate the difficulty identified by
people like Murphy and Kagan.
Presumably we accept that there are situations wherein extreme de-
mands are legitimately made of agents. In some extreme situations we would
expect agents to be faced with extreme demands, and it might even be a
fault of a theory if it did not deem that in those cases agents are subject to
very challenging moral obligations.
To illustrate this, Ashford notes that a “moral theory must hold that
there are some situations in which agents face extreme moral demands – for
example, a situation in which the only way of stopping billions of people
suffering an agonizing death was by hacking off your left leg with a fairly
blunt machete” (Ashford, 2003, p.274). We clearly see this as an extremely
demanding requirement, but given the situation, we are still likely to deem
this morally required. If the legitimacy of this demand is questioned, we may
look for far more ordinary cases where morality makes extreme demands of
us. If one becomes a parent – and has not relinquished care to some other
responsible party – it is expected that if the situation makes it necessary,
the parent will take extremely demanding steps to ensure the wellbeing of
the child. This is likely to amount to a considerable amount of time and
effort being expended over the course of many years, a significant financial
cost and, in many cases, the sacrifice of several personal projects one may
identify with.
Similarly, any theory which holds that the act of legitimate promising
confers moral obligation upon the promiser must allow that such promises
could be very demanding. An agent can promise to go to extreme lengths,
and if we think the promise is legitimate, it would ordinarily be expected
that the agent would be under a moral obligation to fulfil this commitment.
Something of the form PDO could still be held and allow that these
demands are legitimate, but only if X is held to be at an extremely high
level, so that none of these obligations would be above that level. Perhaps,
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requiring a person to end her life would be a point where we might suppose
the demand cannot be legitimate.6 We might take issue with this in two
ways.
(i) We might suggest, and quite plausibly so, that there are situations
which will morally require one to sacrifice one’s life.
(ii) We might suggest that theories prescribing demands which fall far
short of this may be objected to because of their demandingness.
The second of these seems the more pressing (as the first could be re-
sponded to by simply adjusting the X-value even higher). It seems that
demandingness objections, properly understood, can be levelled against the-
ories that require significantly less in some cases than sacrificing one’s life.
To illustrate this, let us consider a revised version Ashford’s machete case.
Instead of cutting off one’s leg with a machete to save billions from an ag-
onizing death, doing so would simply cause a brief but significant pleasure
to a group of a thousand.7 If this is claimed to be a moral requirement
under a given moral theory, a demandingness objection may be applicable.
The lesson to be learned here is that the amount that can be legitimately
demanded of an agent is sensitive to the situation they are in.
Accepting that demandingness objections are not simply concerned with
how much is demanded of an agent by a moral theory, we might wonder
exactly what the objection is. Many commenters in the demandingness
literature seem to be making use of different ideas of what the objection is,
which may be quite problematic. In the remainder of this chapter I examine
several types of objection that may be conflated.
1.1 Different types of Objection
Before briefly examining several objections from the literature, it is worth
introducing some terminology which is useful in describing some features
6Hobbes made a claim of this sort; that while moral obligations come from the state,
the sovereign cannot legitimately demand that a citizen forfeits her life (e.g. Leviathan,
1995, XIV).
7Under a simplistic consequentialism, we can manipulate the numbers enough to make
the consequences better if the agent does perform the act. There are other objections that
might be made to this sort of case, such as aggregation related issues (e.g. (Scanlon, 1998,
p.220-240)), but a demandingness objection is also available.
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of demanding moral theories. In Human Morality, Scheﬄer discusses four
types of responses to moral theories which make “unusually heavy demands
on individual moral agents” (Scheﬄer, 1992, p.17). First, it might be denied
that morality is as forceful as the theory suggests; that the demands are too
burdensome and that a less taxing theory should be adopted. This response
denies that morality is as stringent – as able to make demands of such a
magnitude – as the theory suggests. This type of response, it might be said,
denies stringency.
Second, we might claim that the scope of morality is narrower than the
theory claims. There might be cases where it seems inappropriate for moral-
ity to provide a verdict for an action. It would, for example, sound slightly
strange to claim that it is morally permissible to brush one’s teeth (Scheﬄer,
1992, p.20). Another type of example where it might be claimed that moral
justifications or explanations are inappropriate occur when an agent is faced
with a choice where one option is so costly it seems unthinkable. Scheﬄer
gives an example of a man choosing between saving the life of his wife or
a stranger.8 The decision here might seem to lie “beyond justifications”.9
This type of case might be more readily associated with demandingness ob-
jections, because of the heavy demands that could arise from treating one’s
wife’s life equally to the stranger’s here. According to some theories (e.g.
Taurek, 1977), a coin should be flipped (or some other fair decision proce-
dure taken) to make the decision, which does seem to ask too much of an
agent, in a sense. This type of response, which claims a moral theory is
overly moralistic, denies pervasiveness.
Thirdly, one might accept that morality does make the purported bur-
densome demands, but deny that an agent is compelled, all-things-considered,
to acquiesce to these demands. For example, we might believe that what
one ought to do morally is distinct from one ought to do rationally. As this
sort of response rejects the notion that what one morally ought to do always
trumps any other considerations,10 this denies overridingness.
The final response Scheﬄer sees available to a heavily demanding moral
8Scheﬄer borrows this example from Bernard Williams’s Moral Luck (1981, p.18).
9This phrase is used by both Scheﬄer (1992, p.19) and Williams (1981, p.18).
10Dale Dorsey endorses a view of this sort, (e.g. “The Supererogatory and How to Ac-
commodate it”, 2013), which I will consider in 2.4.2. For now, I simply want to claim that
though demandingness objections can be made whatever position one takes on overriding-
ness, if one believes morality is rationally overriding, these objections may hold additional
force.
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theory is to simply accept the burdensome demands. Several authors have
suggested that because of the state of the world, morality should be demand-
ing, and that we are required to act in accordance with it. This response
accepts stringency, pervasiveness and overridingness, but at the cost of vio-
lating our common intuitions about the demands of morality.11
It seems clear that though denying the pervasiveness or the overriding-
ness of morality are reactions to the demands levelled by a moral theory,
these are not objections to the demandingness. If one objects to the perva-
siveness of a moral theory, the objection is not because of how demanding
a purported obligation is, but that there should not be any obligation at
all. The complaint concerns the subject matter of the demand, not its de-
mandingness. An objection about the pervasiveness suggests that a category
error has been committed, as morality has no business making verdicts in
whatever domain is in question.
Denials of morality’s overridingness are also not concerns of demand-
ingness of a moral theory, though these concerns are more likely to have
a bearing, albeit indirectly, upon how demanding we think a moral theory
should be. If we deny that morality is overriding we may say that morally, an
agent should φ, while accepting that all-things-considered, it is permissible
not to φ. According to this view, an agent may be morally blameworthy for
not φ-ing, but not rationally criticisable. Those who hold such a view may
not find demandingness objections as convincing, because the failing to act
in accordance with moral obligation will only be a failing in one particular
domain of human activity, whereas for others (like Kant, for example), it
would be a failure of practical rationality. I will leave this aside however, for
the time being, as it is certainly possible to have demandingness objections
whatever one’s position on overridingness.
Even if we restrict our discussions of demandingness to problems concern-
ing stringency, there are still (or so I shall claim) several ways the objection
can be interpreted.
In recent years demandingness objections have received a reasonable
amount of attention. Since Peter Singer’s “Famine, Aﬄuence and Morality”
made a widely-appreciated case for aﬄuent people being morally required
to do much more for the global poor than they currently are, many have
11Responses of this general type are offered by Singer and Unger, and are discussed in
2.2.1 and 2.3.1 respectively.
9
discussed whether and how we should amend our moral theories in response.
Despite a great deal of attention to demandingness objections in recent
years, I suggest that it is not obvious what the purported problem actually
is. Often a short example is given to demonstrate what the problem is sup-
posed to be, or instances of the problem. To illustrate this, I will give some
examples from prominent figures who have discussed the demandingness
objection.12
When some authors describe the problem, they take pains to emphasise
the importance of personal projects. Tim Mulgan, who has written exten-
sively on consequentialism, and authored one book entitled The Demands
of Consequentialism, writes: “. . . the common objection that Consequen-
tialism is unreasonably demanding, as it leaves the agent too little room
(time, resources, energy) for her own projects or interests. . . I shall call this
the Demandingness Objection” (2001, p.4). Here we might note that Mul-
gan locates the problem in the restriction of one’s personal projects (or
interests).13 Similarly, David Sobel suggests that the problem the objec-
tion purports to identify is that morality “properly understood, should not
take over our lives, at least in circumstances such as we face these days,
but should be compatible with a range of attractive and self-directed lives,
including lives that involve a serious commitment to family, friends, or non-
moral projects” (2007, p.3). Again we may notice an emphasis on personal
projects. I discuss why it might be problematic to regard the objection in
this fashion in section 1.1.1.
Garrett Cullity suggests that there are actually three problems of de-
mandingness. He is a pluralist about morality, and he sees moral demands
deriving from (at least) three sources: a morality of concern, a morality of
respect and a morality of cooperation. Cullity suggests that each of these has
a corresponding demandingness problem (2009, p.12). The familiar problem
of demandingness pertains to concern and is usually introduced in terms of
12For present purposes I will simply assume that those talking about “the demand-
ingness objection”, “the problem of moral demandingness” or “the over-demandingness
objection” are all talking of the same issue. It might be that certain authors have picked
their terminology specifically to differentiate themselves from others in the literature, but
as they make reference to each other, without (as far as I have seen) specifying that they
have a different notion in mind, and thus might be talking past each other, I assume this
is not the case.
13As is mentioned later (in 1.1.1) Mulgan does give a more detailed analysis (2001,
p.25). That analysis does not mention personal projects, but merely ‘unreasonable de-
mands’.
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welfarist theories: “If what morality requires of us is the impartial promo-
tion of welfare. . . it also seems to imply that almost all forms of pursuit of
my own interests are wrong” (2009, p.13). This seems to clash with the
standard thought that any “morality we can have reason to accept must be
one that allows us to lead full and fulfilling lives – lives that are open to and
directed towards the goods that make for a flourishing human existence”
(2009, p.13). This conflict brings out the problem in terms of the morality
of concern.
With regards to the “morality of respect”, Cullity suggests a parallel
problem arises from respecting the autonomy of others. If an agent was
obligated to act in a way that did not curtail any of the positive or negative
freedoms of others to any degree, Cullity suggests we may suffer extreme
demands. From respecting the positive right of others to pursue a career,
for example, we might be forced never to compete with another for a job
(2004, p.16) as this may result in a restriction of their autonomous plans.
Similarly, Cullity suggests that in the morality of cooperation, if an agent
took part in all the cooperative projects one has good reason to, this would
also “leave no time for ourselves” (2004, p.19).14
Liam Murphy, who has also written extensively on demandingness, claims
“the ‘over-demandingness objection’, as I will call it, asserts that there is
a limit to how great a sacrifice morality, or at least a principle of benefi-
cence, can legitimately demand of agents” (1993, p.268). This suggests that
there are certain sacrifices that cannot be obligatory; anything which is more
demanding than the “limit” Murphy mentions.
Brad Hooker, in his chapter in Chappell’s collection of essays concerning
demandingness, describes the objection fairly pithily, stating that “the ob-
jection levelled at act-utilitarianism [the demandingness objection] is that
act-utilitarianism demands more sacrifice than it is reasonable to demand”
(2009a, p.151). This characterisation seems unobjectionable, but perhaps
not particularly illuminating. Later, he goes on to claim “the demandingness
objection to act-consequentialism is that it intuitively seems that morality
14I will not properly discuss the idea that there are different objections relating to a
pluralist conception of the source of moral demands. One reason for this is that Cullity’s
pluralistic analysis of the roots of demandingness seems to be a minority position. Ad-
ditionally, all the problems Cullity identifies will be accounted for in the general form of
the “standard demandingness objection”, which is given in the following section and will
go on to be my primary focus.
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doesn’t demand making contributions constantly for the sake of aggregate
welfare impartially assessed, or for the sake of aggregate welfare impartially
assessed plus equality, or for the sake of aggregate welfare assessed in a pri-
oritarian way” (2009a, p.153). This is certainly more specific, but it is an
analysis specifically catered to act-consequentialism. Hooker discusses de-
mandingness with regards to act-consequentialism and some variations upon
it – and his formulation of rule consequentialism – in several places15 but
does not offer a more general analysis.
Brian McElwee, in a categorisation of different types of objections that
may be conflated with demandingness objections, defines demandingness
objections as the claim that an. . .
“. . . agent is morally obliged to do A should be rejected just
because doing A is too costly to the agent, given the moral con-
siderations at stake, to count as morally obligatory.”
(McElwee, 2017, p.93)16
This exposition holds that the type of objection we are looking for applies
when a moral theory identifies some action as obligatory, but the action
requires too much (time/energy/sacrifice) of the agent. McElwee notes that
while any theory for which this description applies will be too demanding,
sometimes a more fundamental objection will apply. He considers a theory
which requires agents “to spend Saturday afternoon assaulting as many in-
nocent strangers as [they] can” (2017, p.87). While a verdict like this will
often be too demanding (I tend to think I am required to do very little on
Saturday afternoons!) it seems like there is a more obvious problem with this
theory; going round hitting people isn’t even good, or permissible, let alone
obligatory. To distinguish cases like this from instances where the demand-
ingness of the theory is the appropriate complaint, McElwee describes “pure
demandingness” objections as obtaining when a theory states that “doing
A is what is morally best, and what is overall best, but is not morally oblig-
atory because the cost to the agent is too great” (2017, p.90). This pure
15e.g. “Rule-Consequentialism” (1990), “Rule-Consequentialism and Demandingness:
A Reply to Carson” (1991), Ideal Code, Real World (2000).
16This is the analysis I most favour among the literature, though this should come with
the caveat that the ‘A’ in question may be some disjunctive list of actions. It seems clear
that a theory may be overly demanding while permitting choice between several options,
all of which are too demanding.
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objection targets situations wherein a theory correctly identifies the best
action to perform, but incorrectly (or so the objection holds) requires this
optimal behaviour. For instance, we could accept that act utilitarianism
provides the correct evaluation of which act is morally best, but dispute
that the act is thus morally obligatory, and do so purely because the cost to
the moral agent is so high.
Sophie-Grace Chappell importantly notes that “the problem of demand-
ingness is not the problem that morality, or a moral theory can make extreme
demands.”17 It is important to be clear that the objection at hand is not of
this sort because there are situations, like if “a million lives can only be saved
by my self-sacrifice” (2007, p.255) when such demands can legitimately be
made.
Though I think Chappell is correct in this negative claim, her analysis
seems a little strange in other ways. She claims that “the problem of de-
mandingness is not about a theory’s making extreme demands sometimes.
The problem is that some moral theories seem to make extreme moral de-
mands on us, not just sometimes, but always” (2007, p.255). Chappell
suggests that the problem lies in the constant intrusion into our daily lives
imposed by a moral theory, which “threaten important parts of human life”
(2007, p.256). In the following section, I will suggest that this is problematic,
and provide my own analysis of the problem of moral demandingness.
From the variety of comments above we can note that some authors have
highlighted the role of personal projects in demandingness objections. In the
next section, I offer my own analysis of the objection, showing, among other
things, why I think an emphasis on personal projects might be mistaken.
1.1.1 “Standard” Demandingness Objections
Despite all that I have said so far regarding what a demandingness objection
is (or isn’t), I do not regard it as a complicated type of objection. It requires
that a moral theory issues demands upon moral agents. It also needs these
demands to ask too much – to require inappropriately extensive sacrifice
from the moral agents. For an obligation to be inappropriately demanding
(in the way that may generate a demandingness objection), there must be
some amount (of time/energy/sacrifice) that is appropriate to demand, and
17This particular point is in line with the rejection of PDO as a way of understanding
the demandingness objection (detailed in the opening section of the chapter).
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the obligation must demand more than this.
I would suggest that in most instances the appropriate degree is given
to us by pre-theoretic intuition. We just have a feeling that doing a certain
amount is morally required – and that more is not. That the appropriate
amount required is given to us in this way is supported by the way the ob-
jection is often presented. As Murphy puts it, the stringency of the demands
“strike just about everyone as absurd”, and prompts us to think that these
verdicts “just couldn’t be right” (Murphy, 2000, p.6). This does not rely
upon any particular moral epistemology, only that we come to these beliefs
about what is (and is not) required of us independently of theoretic con-
cerns. This pre-theoretic intuition is usually likely to be coarse-grained, so
not always able to provide verdicts of specific actions. We would not expect,
for example, these intuitions to give exact quantities one should donate to
charity every month, but might expect judgments of non-obligation for par-
ticularly high proposed figures, or that more is required than any proposed
low figures. Though I think this is the way the purported appropriate degree
of demandingness usually features, I would not want to rule out any other
method of determining how this might be calculated.
What is important is that the appropriate degree is sensitive to different
situations. We might imagine utopian societies in the future where minimal
or no moral demands are appropriate. In that sort of situation, a modest
requirement (e.g. for a moderately well-off person to relinquish 5% of their
income or a few hours a week) might seem extraordinarily demanding. Al-
ternatively, we can consider situations of an opposite sort, rife with extreme
suffering, where it is appropriate for extreme demands to be made of an
agent.
One further concern is that we presumably want to be able to apply a
demandingness objection to theories even if the overly demanding situations
do not actually (or currently) obtain. If a moral theory is only moderately
(and acceptably) demanding now, but is just as demanding in a utopian soci-
ety, an agent might still rightly object to the moral theory, simply because it
would make inappropriately demanding obligation verdicts in a nicer world.
We typically accept that moral theories should not just provide us with ver-
dicts in the current state of affairs, but also make correct predictions about
hypothetical situations.
For this reason, I would reject Chappell’s claim that “the problem is
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that some moral theories seem to make extreme moral demands on us, not
just sometimes, but always” (2007, p.255).18 Even if the world were one day
to approach a utopian ideal, wherein a maximising utilitarianism would be
minimally demanding we would still think that the theory was subject to de-
mandingness objections, simply because the theory would be so demanding
in less favourable circumstances.
With these considerations in mind, I propose the following general for-
mulation of the demandingness objection (TDO):
D1 We have some reason19 to believe, in a specific situation (or set of
situations),20 that a moral agent is subject to moral obligations of a
certain degree of demandingness.
D2 In these situations (or sets of situations), a moral theory/principle
gives a verdict which demands significantly more than this.
C We have reason to believe that this moral theory should be rejected.21
22
18We might accept this claim if it is restricted to the world today. For most rela-
tively aﬄuent people in the western world, the extreme demands we face (according to
maximising consequentialism, at least) are ubiquitous. Chappell may have intended this
qualification, but it is not made explicit.
19This might seem like a particularly weak claim, as we have some reason to believe
all sorts of things. The strength of a specific objection will depend, however, upon how
good the reason is. A weak reason to believe obligations are of some weight will make a
weak objection.
20Demandingness objections often operate from multiple situations because the extreme
demands are created by iterating many seemingly small demands. These are paradig-
matic instances where the objection takes hold (e.g. Kagan (1989), Hooker (1999), Mulgan
(2001), Bourbaki (2001), Cullity (2004)).
21The strength of the conclusion will depend on how strong our reasons are in the first
premise.
22This evaluation is similar to the form provided by Mulgan when considering the
objection specifically towards consequentialism (2001, p.25). Mulgan analyses it as:
“1. Consequentialism makes demand D;
2. D is an unreasonable demand for a moral theory to make; therefore,
3. Consequentialism makes unreasonable demands”
This would be one instance of the analysis I have provided, where the moral theory
in question is consequentialism and the reason to believe the degree of demandingness
one is subject to (or not subject to) is its unreasonableness. My formulation is adapted
slightly to allow for mistaken demandingness objections (where, though it might appear
to the contrary, morality really is that demanding) and to allow for a variety of reasons
for thinking that a theory is excessively demanding.
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While TDO is available in any cases that meet this criteria, it will not
always be appropriate. If the theory in question requires actions that are
morally irrelevant or even impermissible (like McElwee’s Saturday afternoon
example), other types of objections will be more suitable. A demandingness
objection is particularly appropriate when the verdict provided in D2 cor-
rectly identifies an action which is morally better than the alternatives (or
a set of actions morally better than the alternatives).
An Aside on Projects
It might be noted that my analysis, provided above, makes no mention of
personal projects. Some might find this surprising, considering how per-
sonal projects featured prominently in the descriptions of the objection by
Mulgan, Sobel and (as will be discussed later) Miller.23 I hope to demon-
strate, however, that the sacrifice of personal projects is neither necessary
nor sufficient for a demandingness objection to be available.
Consider an objection that is based upon the sacrifice of personal projects,
which I will term Project Demandingness (PD):
P1: Morality should allow a person to pursue personal projects to a signif-
icant degree.
P2: Moral theory X does not allow the pursuit of personal projects to this
degree.
C: Moral theory X should be rejected.
What exactly “personal projects”24 is taken to mean might be somewhat
difficult to define, but for the time being, we can simply accept that these
are non-moral activities25 which enrich the lives of individuals.
If the demandingness objection is taken to be of this structure then
it must be the case: i) that every instance of a demandingness objection
23Miller devises his own principle – the principle of Sympathy – in response to Singer,
for the express purpose of allowing agents to partake in more personal projects (2004,
p.359). This is discussed in section 4.1
24As will be noted later, Bernard Williams talks extensively about personal projects,
as well as commitments, which he views as a special type of project.
25By this I mean activities undertaken where moral concerns are not a constitutive
part of the agent’s intention — though they are likely to cause the agent happiness, which
will make them instrumentally good under many moral theories.
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involves the restriction of one’s personal projects, and ii) that every moral
theory that does not allow pursuit of personal projects to a sufficient degree
is vulnerable to this objection. I dispute both of these claims, arguing rather
that a restriction of one’s personal projects is neither necessary nor sufficient
for a demandingness objection to be made against a moral theory.
Let us first consider when a demandingness objection to a moral theory
should exist. A theory must issue some demands. It isn’t the demands
themselves – that is, the content of the demands – that will be problematic
however, but how demanding they are. The same requirement might well
differ in how demanding it is for different moral agents to satisfy. It may
be demanding in terms of how difficult it is to fulfil, or how much an agent
may need to sacrifice (time/energy/options/proportion of resources). To
constitute an objection, we must also stipulate that the amount demanded
is inappropriate, otherwise, the demandingness of the requirements would
be no problem for the theory.
With these considerations in mind, we can now consider two ways PD
may fail to describe demandingness objections. On one hand we may exam-
ine whether there are demandingness objections which may be made in cases
requiring no sacrifice of an agent’s personal projects. On the other, we might
see whether we may find cases where a moral theory may demand a signifi-
cant sacrifice of one’s personal projects where a demandingness objection is
not available. Of the first type, let us consider Noble Susan.
Noble Susan: Susan is a remarkable person. She is extremely selfless and
all her personal projects are extremely noble, to the extent that the
best acts she may perform in any situation involve pursuit of these
projects. She cares a great deal about eradicating poverty, for ex-
ample. A maximising form of consequentialism is likely to deem her
morally obliged to spend inordinate amounts of time, and almost all
her resources, on relieving the suffering of the world’s poor. Though
she may be truly committed to this cause, it would seem mistaken to
say she was morally obliged to do this much. Here then, we appear to
have an agent never having to sacrifice any of her personal projects,
but demanded by the moral account to do something extraordinary
(what we would most likely view as supererogatory).26
26A case of this general sort is described briefly by Scheﬄer, who describes someone
whose project “simply was to bring about the best state of affairs” (1982, p.22).
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This type of case does seem to lend itself towards a demandingness ob-
jection. The requirements purportedly placed on Susan seem inappropriate
even if it is the case that she wants to do these things. Of the second type
of case we may consider Zombie Apocalypse:
Zombie Apocalypse: Fred is a gardening enthusiast. Growing different
plants, reading about gardening and looking at or smelling plants are
his favourite things to do. He spends over 80% of his waking life doing
gardening-related activities, and when he sleeps, he usually dreams
of gardening. It is safe to say that gardening is Fred’s top priority
personal project. Unfortunately, one day there is a zombie apocalypse!
Zombies are everywhere, and Fred knows the only way his two children
will be able to survive is to hide in his basement for a considerable
amount of time (enough to let all his favourite plants die!). He will
have to sacrifice all his gardening-related fun for the foreseeable future,
but we probably think this is morally required of him.
Applying PD to this case, it seems that Fred should be morally permit-
ted to engage in his gardening, and thus that any theory prohibiting that
should be rejected. However, it seems obvious that giving up his gardening
endeavours is required in this situation. It is clear that most moral theories
require Fred to sacrifice his projects here, and that this requirement is not
overly demanding. Thus, there are cases wherein a theory may require that
an agent relinquish one’s projects and such a theory need not be overly de-
manding. We do not have to seek examples which are quite so extravagant
for cases of this sort. If we think one can acquire legitimate moral obliga-
tions by promising, and these obligations may prohibit pursuit of personal
projects, this would be sufficient.
If arguments of these types are accepted as demonstrating either a de-
mandingness objection or a Project Demandingness (but not both), we must
accept that the sacrifice of personal projects is neither necessary nor suffi-
cient for a demandingness objection. It is obviously the case that in many
situations, according to moral theories which seem inappropriately demand-
ing, an agent will also have to sacrifice personal projects. However, as I
hope to have demonstrated in this section, the connection is not essential to
demandingness objections.
I propose that one explanation for the role of personal projects in the
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discussion of demandingness objections is the influence of Bernard Williams,
which I discuss in the following section.
1.1.2 Williams’s ‘Integrity’ Objection
Bernard Williams is regularly noted as having brought attention to a dif-
ficulty relating to demandingness for utilitarianism. In Utilitarianism: for
and against he makes complaints about utilitarianism on two major grounds;
its difficulties in catering adequately for justice, and the notion of integrity
(1973, p.82). It is with regards to the latter that Williams’s objections
concern (or are purported to concern) demandingness.
Leading up to his discussion of integrity, Williams provides two cases he
believes utilitarianism gives strange verdicts for. In the case of George (1973,
p.97), a chemist with few job opportunities is presented with the possibility
of working for a laboratory conducting research into chemical and biological
warfare. Though George is reluctant, he is informed that if he does not take
the job, someone who is extremely enthusiastic about developing weapons
and lacking in scruples will get it. Thus, it seems George could prevent more
powerful weapons being created and further deaths resulting by taking the
job.
In the second case, a botanist named Jim has accidentally ended up in a
strange South American village during an expedition (1973, p.98). Twenty
Indians are tied to a wall. Jim is informed that they had protested against
the government and were to be killed to dissuade further protesters. Because
of Jim’s arrival as an honoured guest to their land, however, he is offered
the chance to kill just one of the Indians himself. If he does so, he is assured
that the other nineteen will be released to mark the occasion. If he does
not, the killing of all twenty will go ahead as planned.
Because utilitarianism, as presented by Williams, ignores any special
importance given to one’s particular role in causing a state of affairs, the
verdicts utilitarians arrive at in both of these cases are supposed to be
extremely obvious. George should take the job, and Jim should kill the
Indian. Because the states of affairs brought about by these acts are much
better than the alternatives, utilitarianism suggests that the correct choice
is so clear that no serious deliberation need be undertaken. The fact that it
would be Jim doing the killing does not enter as a consideration, and neither
does George’s doing the development of the biological weapons. Williams
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holds this as an important reason why utilitarianism is wrong; these factors
should come into consideration. Williams concedes that in the case of Jim
and the Indians, the verdict is “probably right” (1973, p.117). The issue
is not with the ultimate verdict, but with the deliberation process and the
agent’s relation to it.
Utilitarianism, as broadly construed by Williams, leaves many open ques-
tions, which an advocate of the theory may develop in various ways. The
commitments he does ascribe to it are that it is a form of “consequential-
ism” and “eudaimonism” and that it is“direct” (1973, p.79). Eudaimonism
is the view that what is desirable (and all that is desirable) in itself is hap-
piness. Williams leaves open exactly how this should be thought of; some
may suggest pleasure, others satisfaction, or some other particular notion.
He uses the “economists’ phrase” utility to pick out that property being
valued by the theory. A theory’s being ‘direct’ entails that the concern of
morality is individual actions, rather than rules or practices. (It might be
noted that this does mean that rule utilitarianism, by Williams’s account,
is not classified as a form of utilitarianism.)
The notion of consequentialism, it turns out, is much more complicated
than might at first be supposed. As Williams is eager to point out, “no
one can hold that everything, of whatever category, that has value, has it
in virtue of its consequences” (1973, p.82). This, of course, would lead to
a vicious regress. We must then accept that something has value in virtue
of something other than its consequences. An obvious option here is to
consider states of affairs as bearers of value/desirability, the degree to which
they are valued/desirable depending on the sort of consequentialism we are
considering (so, for utilitarianism, happiness).
Williams introduces the notion of the right action, which he sees as
important to consequentialism.27 He holds this notion to involve maximising
for consequentialists; the right action will be that which results in the best
consequences (again, according to the criteria of the particular theory). This
will commit a utilitarian to the following claims:
27This is a claim I would dispute. For versions of consequentialism that allow many
options (ones which do not require maximising), though there may be a best action, this
is not the right action. We may consider scalar approaches, where there are no right or
wrong actions (e.g. Norcross, 1997), or satisficing alternatives where above some standard
there will be many permissible actions (e.g. Slote 1984). The notion of the right action
implies that all other possible actions are wrong (so presumably forbidden).
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I. In a given situation S, the moral agent did the right thing by doing A.
entails
II. The state of affairs P is better than any other state of affairs accessible
to her.
Where P is a state of affairs caused by her doing A.
This entailment distinguishes consequentialism from alternative moral
theories. Kantian moral theory, for example, would deny this entailment.
The categorical imperative would forbid breaking promises, for example,
even if doing so would lead to a state of affairs wherein fewer people broke
promises.
What an agent has an obligation to do thus depends on what state of
affairs is brought about by her actions. The notion of the state of affairs
brought about by the action here is one that includes the action, and what
utility that involves, including the utility gained by the agent (though this
only counts as much as the utility gained by any other agent would). We
can note now how negative responsibility plays such a big role. It does not
matter whether a state of affairs consists in what an agent does, is produced
by what the agent does, is allowed by the agent, encouraged by the agent,
etc. (1973, p.93). Whether the bringing about of a state of affairs requires
that an agent acts or omits to act does not matter.
Whatever the criterion the form of consequentialism judges as valuable,
like promotion of happiness for utilitarians, it must value some projects,
other than the general project of bringing about maximally desirable states
of affairs. Among these might be first order projects: “desires for things
for oneself, one’s family, one’s friends, including basic necessities of life. . . ,
objects of taste” as well as “pursuits and interests of an intellectual, cul-
tural or creative character” (1973, p.110). Without valuing some first-order
projects, at least indirectly, a form of consequentialism “would have nothing
to work on and would be vacuous” (1973, p.110).
In our everyday lives, we also value second-order projects (those which
involve other projects). Williams suggests that in order to be at all palat-
able, any form of consequentialism must also value such projects (and not
simply the general utilitarian second-order project of maximising first-order
projects). Among such projects would be those that “flow from some more
general disposition towards human conduct and character, such as hatred of
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injustice, or of cruelty or killing” (1973, p.111). Projects of this category are
described as commitments, and we may be involved in many, like a “cause,
an institution, a career, one’s own genius, or the pursuit of danger” (1973,
p.112).
Even if a utilitarian does account for commitments (by rightfully recog-
nising that these are sources of happiness), they still fail, according to
Williams to do so appropriately. As their commitments can only affect the
evaluation of their actions as one unprivileged set of commitments among
many, the agent may be alienated from their own commitments. Their com-
mitments play no special role in moral deliberation. This no longer treats
the agent as a person, but rather “just a representative of the satisfaction
system who happens to be near certain causal levers at a certain time” (1981,
p.4). It is this lack of a special role for individual moral agents’ projects and
commitments that Williams sees as problematic for utilitarianism. He sees
this as an affront to individual integrity.
Exposing the Differences
It might already appear clear, given what has been said in the previous
subsection, that the objection to utilitarianism presented by Williams given
above, is distinct from TDO.28 In case that is not the case, here I shall
attempt to delineate the objections, as well as give some explanation as
to why the objections may be conflated. This is important because (as is
discussed in section 1.2) these objections may warrant different responses,
and some authors do regard Williams’s objection as a demandingness ob-
jection. Chappell, for example, describes Williams’s integrity objection as
“his version of the demandingness objection” (2007, p.255).29
28That Williams’s objection is different to the demandingness objection has been noted
before. Conly distinguishes between two ways the demands of a moral system can be
“dangerous”; they can demand too much sacrifice (loosely, the demandingness objection)
or they may alienate a moral agent (1985, pp.78-281). Railton also discusses a similar
objection to Williams under the name of alienation (1984). Mulgan also notes that these
objections are logically distinct (2001, p.16).
29Braddock, similarly sees Williams’s objection as a demandingness objection (2013,
p.169). Ashford also seems to regard the integrity objection as related to the demanding-
ness objection, but seemingly because loss of integrity is such a significant demand (2000).
Liam Murphy regards Williams’s objection as a combination of both the demandingness
objection and the alienation objection: He claims there is “first, the claim that these
theories are too demanding: it is too frequently morally impermissible to pursue projects
and relationships. And then there is the second claim that to the extent that we are
permitted to pursue our projects and relationships, impartial morality alienates us from
22
As what has been discussed so far – with particular emphasis on the deci-
sion procedure and how it fails to take the individual and their projects into
account – seems quite different to what is usually referred to by demand-
ingness literature, that this objection is seen as related to demandingness
might seem peculiar. One relation may be found in Williams’s discussion of
integrity. He claims that, when thinking of someone like Jim in the case of
the Indians, it. . .
“. . . is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come
in from the utility network which the projects of others have in
part determined, that he should just step aside from his own
project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utili-
tarian calculation requires.”
(1973, p.116)
So here we have a demand made on him by utilitarianism, which is
unreasonable – absurd even. Even here though, we must note that it is
not the verdict (or how demanding it is) which is absurd. As Williams
concedes that Jim’s killing one Indian is (probably) the right decision, it
can’t be the verdict – that Jim should kill the Indian – that is wrong here.
It is the alienation of an agent from their own actions and projects, which
utilitarianism (in Williams’s account) requires that he cites as problematic.
One reason we may take pains to distinguish demandingness objections
from alienation objections (which I do concede provide a difficult challenge)
is that we seem to be able to pull these objections apart.
Demandingness without alienation:
We might think that the case of Noble Susan (from section 1.1.1) is one
where a demandingness objection is available, but which does not feature
alienation from one’s commitments.30 However, it must be remembered that
the alienation objection focusses on the lack of consideration for an agent’s
own projects qua their projects. Even here the agent’s projects are offered
them” (1993). I take Williams’s claim to be more of the second sort, and disentangling
that is the focus of this section.
30The goal of alleviation of suffering —featured in the Nobel Susan case — would cer-
tainly count as the type of personal project which is also a commitment under Williams’s
terminology.
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no special place in her thoughts. It may be considered fortunate for her that
the best action available to her happens to align with her commitments, but
she is still hostage to utilitarian calculation. Susan could still complain that
her projects being hers have no relevance to the calculation.
In order to provide an example of a demandingness objection where there
is no alienation objection, something more extravagant might be needed. We
might consider an agent without any commitments. It must be remembered
that commitments are those projects “with which one is more deeply and
extensively involved and identified” (1973, p.116), so this would not be the
same as an agent being without preferences or tastes. Still, such an agent
would probably be a bit strange; one accumulates commitments as a natural
part of life. To illustrate something of this sort, take Soap Opera Sally:
Soap Opera Sally: Sally suffers from a soap-opera style amnesia (where
she does not remember who she is or anything about herself, but has
a normal grasp of language and everyday activities). Sally has no
impetus to discover what she was like before. After a chance encounter
with Peter Singer in the recovery room, and proceeding through her
utilitarian calculation, she discovers that she is required to commit
vast energies to relieve the world’s poor.
This still seems like too much is being demanded, and that a demand-
ingness objection can be made. Clearly she is not being alienated from any
of her commitments, however, as she has none.
Alienation without demandingness:
It also seems that we can create cases wherein an agent is alienated from her
commitments, but a demandingness objection is not available. One might
suggest that the cases of Jim and George could be such cases, but as it might
be thought by some that the obligations on these are too demanding, I will
try to provide a clearer case.
Lucky (?) Lucy: Imagine Lucy, who is in the (admittedly rare) situation
wherein doing exactly what she would have wanted to do is the opti-
mal action. Perhaps she is living in some utopian society which makes
no or minimal demands, or has found herself in a situation where, for
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the time being, she cannot affect the lives of anyone else in any signif-
icant way. She performs her calculations, and results after consulting
the utility network inform her that she should do precisely what she
wanted to do prior to her calculations.
This seems like a good situation for Lucy, but if the decision is given unto
the agent via the various complicated sums from the “utility network”, not
because of any special relationship she has to the type of action, alienation
worries seem to persist. This may still, as Williams puts it, alienate her “in
a real sense from [her] actions and the source of [her] action in [her] own
convictions” (1973, p.116).
One might respond that the mere process of thinking about things im-
partially, not counting one’s own interests as special, is itself demanding.
This does not seem convincing. Perhaps we may consider this situation,
but wherein all the options available to one are fairly pleasant, and the
calculation fairly simple. The calculation is not (by stipulation) epistemi-
cally demanding,31 and thinking about the matter impartially hardly seems
demanding. The process, however, may still divorce one from one’s own
desires/projects/commitments, which is crux of the alienation objection.
As these examples have shown, it is difficult to pull these two objections
apart because not considering one’s projects (or not considering them as
having any special relationship to one’s actions) in decision procedures will
strike one as demanding, and doing anything particularly demanding is likely
to detract from one’s ability to partake in one’s personal commitments, and
thus cause some alienation. This latter alienation however, need not arise
from a lack of special consideration in one’s decision procedures, thus not
be of the sort Williams is concerned with.
If what I have argued in the preceding sections is correct, it might be
wondered why some writers on demandingness have understood Williams as
making a demandingness objection. I suggest three answers to this question.
Firstly, Williams has clearly had an influence on many authors in the de-
mandingness debate. Personal projects or commitments now feature promi-
nently in most discussions of demandingness, and this may well originate in
Williams’s comments on these matters.
31Epistemic demandingness and its role (or lack of) in relation to general moral de-
mandingness will be discussed in section 1.1.3.
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Secondly, several people have misunderstood the purpose of Williams’s
examples. Several people who discuss Jim and the Indians concern them-
selves with asking whether or not Jim should kill the Indians, and think
the objection to utilitarianism lies in that it says he should.32 If this was
the type of objection Williams was making, then it could fit the form of
a demandingness objection as described earlier. However, as noted in the
previous section, that is not the case.
Finally, people may have been given the impression that Williams’s ob-
jection is one of demandingness by a passage in Utilitarianism: for and
against mentioned earlier. Williams writes, of moral agents like Jim and
George, that it “is absurd to demand of such a man, when the sums come
in from the utility network which the projects of others have in part de-
termined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision
and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires” (1973,
p.116).
I suggest that this passage could be misleading as it explicitly mentions
the demands faced by the agents, and also is phrased in a way that permits
misunderstanding. Williams himself agrees that – at least in Jim’s case –
the agent should “step aside from his own project”, but contends that he is
not required to just do this, acknowledging and submitting to the utilitarian
calculation, as this is to divorce him from his actions. This is clarified in
the following sentence, where Williams asserts that to submit to utilitarian
calculation as a disinterested party is “to alienate him in a real sense from
his actions and the source of action in his own convictions” (1973, p.116).
1.1.3 Epistemic Demandingness
There are several issues which may be considered to pose problems for moral
theories that fall under the general heading of ‘epistemic demandingness’.
These problems may obtain when a moral theory requires that agents go
through a particular epistemic procedure or accept certain beliefs. I shall
briefly discuss two of these, suggesting that they need not be considered at
length here.
Firstly, we may consider a moral theory which is extremely cognitively
32In Chappell’s analysis of Williams’s integrity objection, she notes that R.M. Hare
and Ted Honderich are among writers who have fallen victim to this particular mistake
(Chappell, 2007, p.256, footnote 3).
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demanding to actually live by.33 A moral theory may be mentally strenuous
to actually adopt, if for example it requires a large amount of calculation to
discover what one ought to do (or may do, or may not do), taking so much
energy that we would have to spend all our time calculating and perhaps still
not be able to reach the appropriate verdicts. Mill mentions opponents of
his who make this type of objection, who claim “there is not time, previous
to action, for calculating and weighing the effects of any line of conduct
on the general happiness” (1861, II,24). Mill does intend his theory to be
practicable, so defends on those grounds, claiming that over the course of
time we have had time to understand what acts promote happiness. Whether
or not we agree is immaterial to the question at hand, as the discussion here
is about the correctness of moral theories, not of how they may best be
implemented. The issue Mill had in mind only acts as an objection to the
claim that we can use the moral theory at hand in our day-to-day lives.
Scheﬄer also responds to this criticism, considering the accusation some-
times levelled against utilitarianism, that “utilitarian agents must always be
monitoring their circumstances to make sure that no major opportunity” to
promote the good slips by without their notice (1992, p.36). Utilitarians
may respond to this in several ways, such as “appealing to the distinction
between the utilitarian account of right action and the utilitarian account
of optimal deliberation” (1992, p.37), which may differ. We could accept
that a moral theory may be correct, but it would be better either to live
as though it was not, or adopt a simplified decision procedure by which
we may approximate it for practical purposes. Even act utilitarians often
recommend thinking in terms of rules, because doing so will ensure more
widespread understanding and/or result in better consequences (e.g. Singer
and de Lazari-Radek 2010, p.55).
With this type of thought in mind, we can form two distinct objections:
1. That there is no decision procedure that could be appropriately action-
guiding, i.e. that any calculation that could point towards right actions
would require a greater more evidence and/or more computational
capacity than we possess.
2. That there is some correct decision procedure the theory would en-
33Braddock notes that this is one interpretation of what could be meant by the claim
that a theory “demands too much” (2013, p.170).
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dorse, but that procedure is too demanding.
In the vein of the first type of manoeuvre, James Lenman considers the
problem of foreseeing distant consequences. Not only, it seems, is the fu-
ture we would bring about by specific actions uncertain, but we are actually
clueless about the long-term effects. This raises the difficulty that a con-
sequentialist about a theory of the good could not simply suggest that a
different decision procedure would promote that good, as we are not in a
position to even make reasonable predictions (2000, p.349). To illustrate
this, Lenman considers the fictional example of Richard, who lived over two
thousand years ago. Richard was a bandit, who raided towns and killed the
inhabitants. In one such town, he left alive a woman called Angie. Angie,
however, happened to be a distant ancestor of Hitler, so, it seems Richard’s
non-killing of Angie becomes a terrible wrong from a consequentialist po-
sition. Particularly with actions that determine whether someone lives or
dies, our actions are obviously ‘identity-affecting’ – they change which per-
sons live in the future. When these are considered, our actions clearly have
massive causal ramifications.
If our actions have massive causal ramifications, which we are completely
unable to predict, it is difficult to see how we would be able to properly
evaluate the moral significance of any action (on a consequentialist picture).
If that is the case, it is difficult for a consequentialist to then suggest any
suitable decision procedure which is likely to result in the best (or even good)
consequences. The difficulty for the consequentialist then becomes apparent,
that in order to be in a good position to think their actions are good, they
must perform what seems to be an impossible deliberative process.
This type of objection, from what Lenman calls the Epistemic Argument,
highlights difficulties agents may have in arriving at an epistemic position
that would allow them to promote the good. While there are questions that
consequentialists must face here, it should be noted that these do not concern
how demanding the theory is. Lenman’s complaint is that consequentialism
is incompatible with a decision procedure that can identify right actions
(or even gesture towards better actions) rather than how demanding those
actions might be.
For this reason, this is not really a problem of demandingness. It does
not contend that the theory makes demands which are too hard, but rather
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that we can not know what demands it would make.34
Now the second problem, that making decisions the way that a theory
would recommend, even acknowledging that this might not require thinking
in terms of the theory itself, might require more cerebral effort than we think
is appropriate. If we consider this type of objection, however, it simply seems
like a version of TDO given in section 1.1.1, but where what is demanded is
going through a type of thought process.
The problems discussed in this subsection, thus pose either no real prob-
lem in terms of demandingness, or are easily subsumed under a more stan-
dard analysis.
1.2 Different Objections and Different Types of
Responses
In the previous sections I have introduced several objections that could
be made, all which relate to demandingness in some way. While it is a
plausible reading of what some of the descriptions of overdemandingness, the
‘Primitive Demandingness Objection’ does not get off the ground, because it
fails to appreciate that different situations may legitimately demand different
amounts from an agent. ‘Project Demandingness’ similarly fails because it
does not appreciate that some situations legitimately require one to abandon
her projects.
Of objections that do provide problems for theories, I discussed TDO,
Williams’s integrity objection and some concerns relating to epistemic re-
quirements. As the epistemic problems seem either to not concern explicitly
to a theory’s demandingness, or seem to be captured by TDO, these too can
be disregarded for current purposes.
It is important to distinguish between the two remaining objections –
TDO and Williams’s integrity objection – because the problems require
different responses. To illustrate this we may consider the example of agent-
centred prerogatives. I contend that utilising agent-centred prerogatives can
provide a theory with the means to reply adequately to integrity objections,
but not to demandingness objections.
34This is a serious worry for consequentialists, and one which a response is needed for,
but this is not the question at hand.
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1.2.1 Agent-centred Prerogatives
Samuel Scheﬄer made use of agent-centred prerogatives in order to respond
to the view that there is discrepancy between the way consequentialism gen-
erates obligations – in a strictly impersonal way – and how “concerns and
commitments are naturally generated and sustained from a person’s point
of view quite independently of the weight of those concerns and commit-
ments in an impersonal ranking of overall states of affairs” (1982, p.14). So
agent-centred prerogatives would allow an agent to “assign a certain propor-
tionately greater weight to his own interests than to the interests of other
people” (1982, p.20).
As he later described it, agent-centred prerogatives mean that an agent
is. . .
“. . . permitted to perform his preferred act (call it P), pro-
vided that there was no alternative A open to him, such that
(1) A would produce a better overall outcome than P, as judged
from an impersonal standpoint which gives equal weight to ev-
eryone’s interests, and (2) the total net loss to others of his doing
P rather than A was more than M times as great as the net loss
to him of doing A rather than P.”35
(1994, p.169)
This manoeuvre allows us to get the expected verdicts in several cases.
For example, we might consider organ donation cases. If an agent is aware
that someone else’s life could be saved (or significantly prolonged) by her
donating a kidney or part of her liver with very low risk to herself, it looks
like this would plausibly be the best thing for her to do.36 However, most
people do not see this as required. Agent-centred prerogatives can explain
this by allowing the agent to assign a significantly greater weight to her
own interest. Though donating the organ would produce the best outcome
overall, the loss to the other person would be not greater than the loss to her
35Where ‘M’ is a multiplier indicating how much an agent is allowed to privilege one’s
interests.
36Given that there are over 5,000 people on the waiting list for kidneys in the UK, and
that 250 people on this list die every year (statistics from http://www.giveakidney.org/
why-we-need-more-donors/, accessed January, 2018), most healthy people are in this
situation.
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(the risk of complications and the slightly lower quality of life which might
be incurred) multiplied by the agent-centred weighting.
It should be noted that these prerogatives are allowances, rather than
requirements. An agent is permitted to give her own interests or projects
a greater weight when deliberating, but not required. They provide agents
with options to act in a morally sub-optimal way. Agent-centred restric-
tions37 on the other hand are restrictions which are “at least sometimes
impermissible to violate in circumstances where a violation would prevent
either more numerous violations, of no less weight from an impersonal point
of view, of the very same restriction, or other events at least as objection-
able, and would have no other morally relevant consequences” (1982, p.80).
One example would be the Kantian restriction on lying,38 as it is not deemed
permissible to lie in that picture even if doing so would prevent more lies
in the future. Scheﬄer rejects these restrictions, claiming they would be
problematic, as they would commit an advocate to the position that “it is
sometimes impermissible to produce the best state of affairs” (1982, p.22).
Scheﬄer reacts in this way because the conventional (maximising) con-
sequentialism does not permit any actions which promote a non-optimal
outcome, and supposes that this can be avoided if one’s own interests are
given a greater weighting. Importantly, the prerogatives will allow agents to
“permissibly pursue their own projects and commitments” but “not permit
one to pursue one’s own projects at all costs” (1982, p.21).
Theories involving a use of agent-centred prerogatives purport to escape
Williams’s integrity objection because by their very nature they allow for
the special relationship between an agent and her projects. Their projects
can (if the agent so chooses) count for more in their deliberations.
We might suspect that a similar tactic could work against TDO. If an
agent is allowed to give their own interests special treatment, in a situation
where they may have had to donate an extremely demanding amount, after
a theory is amended with agent-centred prerogatives, this obligation would
be reduced or eliminated. If we still thought the burden was too high, we
could change the weighting until it seemed low enough.
However, Garrett Cullity points out that moves like this, which deny the
37Shelly Kagan refers to agent-centred prerogatives as “agent-centred options” and
agent-centred restrictions as “agent-centred constraints” (e.g. (Kagan, 1989, ch.1)). I will
retain Scheﬄer’s terminology.
38e.g. Kant’s “Of the Alleged Right to Lie from Philanthrophy”.
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impartiality of morality, might not be effective (2004, ch.6). Though they are
successful in appropriately reducing some extremely demanding obligations
(like the organ donation case discussed above), if we consider obligations
that are very easy to discharge, it runs into a problem. Consider a situation
wherein an agent can save a life (or perhaps many lives) at a negligible cost.
Presumably we accept that the agent should act in this situation, or at the
very least, that there are some situations like this where this is required. The
explanation for this, according to the advocate of agent-centred prerogatives,
must be that an agent is not permitted to assign their own interests a weight
so much greater than the interests of others as to make it permissible not
to act in such situations.
However, as we have seen, very burdensome demands often accrue by
iterations. Donating the means to provide a malaria net for one child in the
developing work may not be hugely demanding, but when there is another
child, and another, these individually negligible obligations accumulate.
If an extreme demand is generated by an iteration of similarly small
demands,39 no plausible weighting to one’s own preferences would prevent
the high demandingness arising (2004, ch.6; 2009, p.14). Advocates of agent-
centred prerogatives must take one of two options. Either they can place a
weighting one assigns to one’s own interests so high that the first instance
of giving is not required or the iteration must continue until a situation
obtains where the originally negligible amount could plausibly be enough,
with the weighting, to excuse not donating. The first of these disjuncts
— making the weighting extremely high so negligible amounts cannot be
demanded — would rule out paradigmatic instances of moral obligation
we would generally accept. Taking this route, assigning an agent’s interests
such an astronomically high weighting that no one else’s interests could affect
their obligations to others would commit one to denying any obligation in
any of the seemingly obvious life-saving cases.
The second option, even with agent-centred prerogatives seems likely to
lead to a Singer-esque conclusion, since the loss of the negligible amount
(the cost of saving a life), in order to outweigh the saving of a life, must
constitute a non-negligible cost to the agent. The problem is particularly
39Cullity accepts that one is obligated to contribute to group projects, and that these
obligations persist even if others are not. As one’s personal share in the group project
(where the group is all aﬄuent people) of saving one life may be extremely small (less
than pennies), it is clear that this requirement would be negligible (2004, ch.5).
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pertinent because it seems like this is the sort of situation which currently
obtains in our everyday lives with regards to the world’s poor.
Whereas it seems relatively easy to account for the integrity objection, by
simply adding to a moral theory a variable to add additional consideration
for an agent’s commitments, no similar solution seems available for TDO.
1.3 Overview
In this chapter I have introduced the notion of demandingness objections and
how they are thought to provide problems for various moral theories. I then
argued that there were potential conflations about what was being discussed,
and discussed different types of objection that might be considered. In
section 1.2, I demonstrated that for the types of objection that might be
thought to provide genuine difficulties for moral theories, different responses
are applicable.
From this point forward, I focus on “Standard” objections.40 One moti-
vation for this is that this seems the one most deserving of the name – it is
the one which specifically concerns demandingness and locates the problem
there. When this objection is appropriate, it might be understood as a pure
demandingness objection.
In the next chapter I consider whether the pure demandingness objection
is successful – whether it successfully locates a problem with the theories it
deems overly demanding.
40Henceforth, any discussion of “demandingness objections” refers to objections of this
sort.
33
2Is the Objection Successful?
Responding to the
Extremists
“The fault, dear Brutus, is not in our stars,
But in ourselves”
– William Shakespeare, Julius Caesar
As discussed earlier, there is a huge intuitive pull to reject a moral the-
ory that seems too demanding. Consider a middle-income western person
who donates (only) 30% of their income and (only) one night a week to
volunteering. The suggestion that this person is morally failing strikes us as
absurd.
A related argument for rejecting extremely demanding theories comes
from the notion of supererogation, the idea that an agent can perform actions
that are good but not required, or beyond duty. The usual examples of
supererogation are instances of heroism, like the soldier who dives on a
grenade to save others, or a doctor who risks their life working in a plague-
stricken city.1 According to theories like maximising act utilitarianism, this
type of behaviour is required of anyone. Acting in that way is merely doing
what one had to do. Viewing these types of actions that way seems to
mischaracterise them considering how we feel about the agents performing
1These are examples given by Urmson in “Saints and Heroes” (1958, pp.202-203) but
have become paradigmatic examples.
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them. They do not seem to be doing ‘good enough’, but rather something
incredible. Clearly, it seems, they did not have to do what they did. This
line of thought seems like common sense, and if correct, seems to entail that
there is something wrong with moral theories that claim people do have to
act in that way.
An obvious response to demandingness objections is to deny that there
is anything wrong about an extremely demanding moral theory. I have ne-
glected this point up until now, but in this chapter I consider motivations
for accepting that morality simply is extremely demanding (or at least it is
when the world is like it is today). I consider the position of some who hap-
pily accept such a claim. Peter Singer and Peter Unger, notable exponents
of this view, might be labelled ‘extremists’. They argue that because of the
state of the world, and the sheer amount of good we could do, that we are
morally required to revise our behaviours to do much more good.
Before looking to the extremists, I first examine an argument by Sobel.
He also claims that the objection fails, i.e. that we should not reject a the-
ory (consequentialism, in his case) on the grounds that it is too demanding.
Unlike the extremists, rather than making arguments that morality is par-
ticularly demanding, Sobel rejects the objection on methodological grounds.
I then examine Singer’s position, before rejecting it and examining Unger,
who has a more rigorous methodology to argue for similar conclusions. Fi-
nally, I give reasons why not only Unger is mistaken in his extremism, but
also general reasons why alternative methods to dismiss demandingness ob-
jections should be disregarded.
2.1 Sobel and the ‘Impotence’ of Demandingness
Objections
David Sobel provides an argument suggesting that demandingness objec-
tions are ‘impotent’, and that moral theories should either be rejected on
different grounds or not rejected at all. In doing so, however, I suggest that
he makes use of a non-standard use of ‘demandingness’, which is problem-
atic for his argument, and that the notion of ‘demands’ are of more moral
significance than he suspects.
It must be understood that his discussion only relates to maximising act
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consequentialism.2 He claims that this objection is useless, as it must “pre-
suppose the truth of prior and independent breaks with Consequentialism”
(2007, p.1). Sobel notes that the structure of the demandingness objection
is obscure, as are explanations as to why it is supposed to have force. Once
the rationale for the Objection is exposed as faulty, Sobel suggests that any
version of consequentialism weakened to accommodate the demandingness
should also be undermined. He proposes to do so by providing the structure
of demandingness intuitions (2007, p.2).
Sobel claims that understanding the “structure of such intuitions” will
be sufficient to demonstrate the impotence of the objection (2007, p.2). He
sees costs to well-being as the most important sacrifice required by conse-
quentialism, though Sobel admits that the costs3 of consequentialism can
also terms of “life projects” or that it “narrows one’s options significantly”.
Sobel also restricts the objection such that the cost of not holding “deonto-
logical rights or libertarian property rights” cannot count.
Sobel provides an understanding of the general form of the Objection:
“Morality, properly understood, should not take over our
lives, at least in circumstances such as we face these days, but
should be compatible with a range of attractive and self-directed
lives, including lives that involve a serious commitment to family,
friends, or non-moral projects.”
(2007, p.3)
Consequentialism, it is then noted (again, this is strictly maximising
act consequentialism) does not permit one to live a life of this sort, thus
should be rejected. Sobel then provides us with an example intended to
demonstrate a problem with this sort of objection. Sally needs one of Joe’s
kidneys to live.4 Joe has two healthy kidneys, and consequentialism claims
2Sobel does see that demandingness objections serve as a motivation for retreating
from this position though (2007, p.1), so problems for the objection here may undermine
some rationale for adopting a less demanding theory, such as Scheﬄer’s move to agent-
centred prerogatives (1982, passim) or Hooker’s move to rule-consequentialism (2000).
3It is notable that even extremely early in his article, when discussing what conse-
quentialism asks of people, Sobel puts this in terms of costs which is the position I shall
later be rejecting.
4Sobel seems to overestimate the damaging effects of donating a kidney – he assumes
that it will result in a significant reduction in the quality of Joe’s life, which does not
seem to be borne out by empirical evidence, as is pointed out by Larissa MacFarquhar in
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he should give one to Sally. However, demandingness intuitions suggest,
the “size of the cost makes the purported moral demand that Joe give the
kidney unreasonable, or at least not genuinely morally obligatory on Joe”
(2007, p.3). But then, Sobel suggests, Sally may complain “about the size
of the cost that a non-Consequentialist moral theory permits to befall her”.
Sobel then asks “Why is Consequentialism too demanding on the person
who would suffer significant costs if he was to aid others as Consequentialism
requires, but non-Consequentialist morality is not similarly too demanding
on Sally, the person who would suffer more significant costs if she were
not aided as the alternative to Consequentialism permits?” The “obvious
answer” offered by Sobel is that we accept that “the costs of what a moral
theory requires are more demanding than the costs a moral theory permits
to befall the unaided, size of cost held constant” (2007, p.3). Sobel seems to
understand the demandingness objection simply as an appeal to costs, or,
more specifically, of costs to the moral agents. This raises the question of
why the costs to moral agents are of more importance than costs to moral
patients.
Sobel’s argument seems to be something like this:
1. The Demandingness Objection requires an acceptance of the premise
costs required by a moral theory are more demanding than
costs permitted (2007, p.3).
2. The Objection does not justify this premise (2007, p.4).
3. If this premise is not justified, it is presupposed, which begs the ques-
tion against Consequentialism.
4. Therefore, the Demandingness Objection begs the question against
Consequentialism.
In responding to this, we might note that in an ordinary – or standard –
use of the word “demanding”, the premise is obviously true, thus not in need
of justification. To establish this, let us think about what makes something
demanding. The types of things that are demanding are those that issue
demands. Obligations can be demanding. A situation can be demanding
her discussion of altruistic kidney donations (2015, p.193) – but we can assume that cases
with relevant features do exist.
37
if it involves demands being issued. Jobs can be demanding if they make
many or stringent demands upon the employees performing them.
All demands also carry with them an assumption of authority; they are
more than mere requests. A boss can make demands of an employee, as
they are in a position where it is legitimate to require certain behaviours.
A government official may send a letter demanding that tax is paid, as
the government has the authority (or at least purports to) to legitimately
require this. Schedules can be demanding because they make demands on
one’s time, but only when the source of the schedule has some authority.
With demands, there is a sense that the act in question must be performed,
according to the source of the demand. Despite the normative authority,
or claimed normative authority, of a demand, an agent may actually reject,
ignore or otherwise fail to comply with a demand. Though it may be bad
for your career, you can reject your boss’s demands. The same is true with
demands of morality. Maximising act utilitarians will believe that many of
us do ignore the demands placed upon us, when we do not give as much as
we could to effective charities. The existence of a choice, whether or not to
acquiesce to these demands seems crucial.
There are, of course, looser uses of the word, by which we may say that
a condition/situation is demanding, in situations where the above does not
apply. We might say “life can be really demanding sometimes”, just to
mean that it can be difficult.5 Perhaps we may say that a person is really
demanding when they merely make requests, or we could say some work
of literature is “a demanding book to read”.6 These would be non-literal
uses of the term though, if they do not refer to actual demands and the
experience of choosing to perform them. Similarly, if one is not able to
ignore/reject/flout the performing of a certain action, then it cannot be
demanding.
Now we may return to costs permitted and costs required. When a cost
is permitted by morality, morality makes no demand that it be prevented.
For example, in a healthcare case, where someone could save the life of
another, but at some extreme cost (sacrificing a limb or an organ) but this
is not required, no one is subjected to a demand. When a cost is required
5This point is also made by McElwee (2017, p.99).
6Singer and de Lazari-Radek make this claim about Sidgwick’s Methods of Ethics to
explain why it is less widely read than Mill’s Utilitarianism (2014, p.viii).
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by morality, on the other hand, a demand is made, impelling someone to do
something. It is thus obviously true that costs required are more demanding
than costs permitted, as costs required do make demands, whereas those
permitted do not.
Sobel can clearly respond to this by asking what is so special about
demands. He does, in fact, note that this ‘Linguistic argument” can be
made, but is useless without any vindication of “the special importance of
the costs that a moral theory requires rather than what it allows” (2007,
p.8). This is what his rejection of demandingness objections comes down
to. Without some independent reason for thinking that demands are of
moral import, the objection can not get off the ground. And, he suggests,
the objection makes no claims about why demands are important. So, the
objection either needs additional support, which would have to come from
premises incompatible with consequentialism, or it simply begs the question.
However, it seems that Sobel simply neglects the intuitive pull that there
is something special about demands in this sense. That this is the case
has a great deal of plausibility. What his challenge seems to require is
some support for the claim that there is something special about demands –
costs required of people as agents – that can justify their having a different
role in moral thinking than costs incurred to patients. This is a peculiar
way of thinking about this. Only a consequentialist (and only one of a
certain sort) would not think there is something special about agents. The
practice of making moral decisions, determining what the moral features of
an individual’s situation are and how they bear on the moral landscape – this
occurs in this minds of agents. Similarly, we regard moral motivation as an
important fixture in our thoughts about morality, but this is only (directly)
relevant to agents. Our reactive attitudes towards people also depend on
this distinction. Praise or blame are properly felt towards agents, as the
persons able to affect the situation, but not towards those who are mere
patients.
McElwee responds to Sobel’s challenge to identify something special
about costs a demand imposes upon agents primarily in terms of reactive
attitudes. He claims that our belief that an action is wrong involves, in part,
a judgment that “it is appropriate to feel blame towards” them, and once
this is appreciated our judgments about obligation must “take into account
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standard patterns of human motivation” (2017, p.99).78
It is the consequentialist who takes an unusual view of these factors,
and must explain why these seemingly important asymmetries are subordi-
nate to a hedonic calculus.9 Of course, Sobel is right that supposing that
demandingness is important for limiting (or forming) obligations requires a
break with consequentialism. But that’s the point : we do think demands
are of a distinctive moral kind!
Of course, we can offer further explanations for why these asymmetries
are important. Alternatively, we can see the overly demanding verdicts as
a symptom of some other faulty feature of a moral theory. Liam Murphy,
for instance, locates the real problem in unfair imposition of responsibility
(2000, p.99).10 Attempts like this to dissolve the objection, however, still
start with the notion that we have a problem; our given moral theory is
too demanding. This itself is enough for an objection of this kind to be
made. That we might suppose the problem is caused by failures of different
theoretical apparatus does not mean there is not a clear problem we are
alerted to by overdemandingness.
Given the asymmetries noted, and the clear intuitive force of demand-
ingness objections, the onus is on people like Sobel to demonstrate why
there isn’t something special about demands. Lacking such an explanation,
the complaint against various moral theories or principles that they are too
demanding retains its force.
Now I turn to a paradigmatic extremist: Peter Singer.
2.2 Singer
2.2.1 Singer’s Arguments for Strong Demandingness
Peter Singer has advocated the adoption of a ‘principle of sacrifice’. Though
this principle seemed extremely prima facie plausible, after some evaluation,
7The conceptual link between obligation and blameworthiness is explored further in
chapter 5.
8Woollard also responds directly to Sobel’s challenge, and focusses more on the “dis-
tinctive structure” of moral demands in demonstrating what makes them special. Given
that an agent must choose to either make some sort of sacrifice or fail morally, it should
be “reasonable to expect an agent to conform to morality” (2016a).
9John Harris makes an interesting attempt at this type of undertaking in “The Survival
Lottery” (1975).
10Murphy’s response to the problem is discussed in section 4.2.
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it becomes apparent that acceptance of this principle would require all of
us who do not live close to the poverty line to radically alter our lifestyles.
Singer’s argument has spawned a vast amount of literature, revitalising the
question of how demanding a moral theory should be.
Singer begins “Famine, Aﬄuence and Morality” by reminding us of the
vast quantities of easily-relievable suffering in the world, focussing on the
famine affecting Bengal at the time he was writing. With this in mind,
Singer provides us with a principle that he supposes we would all intuitively
accept:
The Principle of Sacrifice: 11 If it is in our power to prevent something
very bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of com-
parable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
(Singer, 1972, p.231)
This principle does have the virtue of sounding extremely plausible. It
becomes clear, however, after some thought that the principle inevitably
(in any world with such rife amounts of easily preventable suffering, like
ours) will entail that we all ought, morally, to devote enormous levels of
our time/money/energies to preventing suffering. This is easily seen when
considering any choice between everyday activities. When choosing what to
do for dinner, perhaps I think it’d be nice to try the new restaurant, but then
I realise that I could buy some pasta and cook it myself for much less money,
and donate the rest to a charity, which could use the difference to prevent
a child going blind. It seems obvious that my sacrificing trying the new
restaurant in favour of a cheap meal at home is not morally significant. It is
also difficult to deny that a child becoming blind is “something very bad”.
This procedure can then be applied to any purchase one makes. Whenever
a premium good can be replaced by a cheap alternative, or dispensed of
altogether, the Sacrifice holds that we ought to do so.
Thus with just two additional premises,12 Sacrifice entails a very de-
manding conclusion. The first additional premise concerns the badness of
certain types of suffering. It simply claims that the suffering of those in the
developing world from starvation or easily curable diseases falls into the very
11Henceforth Sacrifice.
12Richard Miller makes the point that these implicit premises are needed to arrive at
the demanding conclusion 2004, p.357.
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bad category. I take this as obviously true. The second additional premise
states that we can prevent this very bad situation by doing something of a
non-comparable moral importance – namely, donating to various effective
aid agencies.
At previous points in history, this could have been questioned. For in-
stance, in his response to claims that utilitarianism is too demanding, Sidg-
wick argued that one could favour actions that increased one’s own happiness
disproportionally to others because of our knowledge of our own happiness.
He claimed this because of our privileged practical and epistemic positions
with regards to our own happiness, that is, “each man is better able to
provide for his own happiness than for that of other persons, from his more
intimate knowledge of his own desires and needs, and his greater opportu-
nities of gratifying them (1907, p.431).13
Richard Price made a similar point in his Discourse on the Love of Our
Country, claiming that even though we should adopt a view of universal
benevolence, we naturally focus on ourselves and our friends/families, as
“we can do little for the interest of mankind at large” (1789, pp.10-12).
However, in the world as it is today, with charities that work effectively to
prevent diseases, provide healthy water etc. we clearly can prevent a great
deal of suffering while sacrificing comparatively little. With our greater
knowledge of the extent of global poverty, and the availability of institu-
tions that can effectively relieve it, we can not able to deny this additional
premise.14
The radical conclusion we are left with is that aﬄuent people – most
people in the western world – should be donating as much as they possibly
can without impoverishing themselves or a dependent, that “everyone has a
duty not to spend money on luxuries or frills, and to use the savings due to
abstinence to help those in dire need” (Miller, 2004, p.358).
As the additional premises are so clearly true, we must either accept
this radical conclusion, or deny Sacrifice15. Most have opted for the latter
13Singer and de Lazari-Radek note that this response no longer seems tenable in their
discussion of Sidgwick (2014, p.323).
14Both of these additional premises – regarding the badness of the suffering and our
ability to prevent it without sacrificing anything of comparable importance – are made
explicit and expressed in a formal version of the argument in Singer’s The Life You Can
Save (2010, p.15).
15Even people like Dorsey, if they do not deny the principle, are committed to the
conclusion that we have a moral duty to act this way, even if they deny that we have
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option, but Singer attempts to justify this principle.
Other than its prima facie plausibility, Singer offers little to defend his
principle. He does, however, illustrate how his principle works by making
use of his famous ‘drowning child’ example:
“[I]f I am walking past a shallow pond and see a child drown-
ing in it, I ought to wade in and pull the child out. This will
mean getting my clothes muddy, but this is insignificant, while
the death of the child would presumably be a very bad thing.”
(1972, p.231)
Singer takes our acceptance of the moral verdict in this example for
granted before defending against to potential disanalogies which might arise
between the drowning child case and the case of our obligations to the global
poor. When the implications of the principle with regard to these disanalo-
gies are appreciated, the resulting moral obligations become extremely bur-
densome.
The first disanalogy concerns distance. In the pond case, the agent in
question is very close to the event, whereas in the case of world hunger, this
normally occurs considerably further away from aﬄuent readers of Singer’s
argument. Singer suggests that there is no morally salient reason why prox-
imity should make any difference. Assuming we are able to help the would-
be-victim just as easily, it should not matter. Because of our commitments
to “impartiality, universalizability, equality, or whatever, we cannot discrim-
inate against someone merely because he is far away . . . ” (1972, p.232), as
surely that does not affect their moral status. Due today’s world being a
‘global village’, due to efficient transport links and the ease and speed of
information-transmission, we are able to help those suffering from a great
distance.
The second potential disanalogy Singer raises concerns the number of
potential ‘helpers’ there are. In the original pond case there is only one
moral agent who sees the drowning child, whereas with regards to the global
poor, there are many in a similar position equally able to help. Here Singer
seems to defend the principle with a modified ‘drowning child’ example.
an all-things-considered duty. Denying overridingness might, however, have the effect of
making this more palatable, as we shall later see.
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Simply adding additional bystanders, Singer notes, does not make it any
more permissible for the onlooker to simply watch the child drown.
Having defended his principle against rejection for those reasons, Singer
moves on to suggesting a change in the way we see giving. Whereas do-
nations to famine relief seem like optional good things to do, perhaps of
a supererogatory sort, Singer claims they are in fact duties (1972, p.235).
This conclusion does seem unavoidable if we accept Singer’s principle.
2.2.2 Rejecting Singer’s Argument
I think there are many good reasons to reject Singer’s principle. Several of
these apply not only to Singer’s argument, but also to the general extremist
position. I engage with some of those arguments in section 2.4. In this
section I respond to issues specifically regarding Singer’s argument.
We might first note that Singer’s argument is a fairly strange one. He
presents us with Sacrifice, the main supporting feature of which is its “un-
controversial appearance” (1972, p.231). He then provides us the example
of the drowning child, for which the principle seems to let us arrive at the
correct verdict. It seems as though we are expected to make the inference
that if we think we have an obligation to save the child, then we should
accept Sacrifice. Leif Wenar actually accepts this inference, claiming that
those “who believe they ought to save the child should endorse the moral
principle” (2010, p.105). But it is obvious that, without any additional sup-
port for the principle, this is a bad inference. There are many principles
which do not entail Sacrifice that would arrive at the verdict that we ought
to save the child,16 and Singer provides no reasons to favour Sacrifice as
opposed to those alternatives.
This hardly seems like the rigour we might expect or desire when con-
sidering a principle which, if accepted, would completely change the way
we view our moral landscape.17 We might, for example, wonder if we can
provide cases where our intuitions go against what Sacrifice would suggest.
If the principle is rejected, the argument fails.
One feature of Singer’s principle we might consider problematic is that
16Miller’s Sympathy principle (2004; 2010), which is discussed in section 4.1, and Mur-
phy’s Collective Principle of Beneficence (1993; 2000), discussed in 4.2, are examples of
such principles.
17This point is also made by Travis Timmerman (2015, p.207).
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it only pertains to actual sacrifice. Often, the morally comparable features
will not obviously be sacrificed by some conduct, but might well be risked.18
Obviously there will be a difficulty for the agent to know whether they are
sacrificing or merely risking sacrificing whatever good is in question. This
is clearly a very important consideration. Consider a modified version of
Singer’s pond case. If the onlooker realises she is a fairly poor swimmer,
and thinks there is a non-negligible chance she too would drown19 this is
likely to affect our assessment of her obligations. Even if she actually would
have successfully saved the child, the existence of risk definitely has the
ability to alter the verdict.
This point is an important one too. We could consider a weakened
principle:
Sacrifice* If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from hap-
pening, without thereby significantly20 risking sacrificing anything of
comparable moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.
If this principle were adopted, however, it would not require — as Singer
suspects that the original principle might — agents to reduce their welfare
up to “the point of marginal utility” (1972, p.234). Even if the bar for what
might count as significant is held fairly high, it seems that leaving oneself
with no savings would — for many at least — impose significant risks of
destitution, which would presumably be of comparable moral significance.
This modification to Singer’s argument, while definitely making it less
demanding, would still (as long as ‘significantly’ is taken to do enough work
to make Sacrifice* remotely plausible) leave an extremely demanding ac-
count of the moral obligations of aﬄuent people.
If it seems unfair to characterise Singer’s argument as captured entirely
by this paper (which, admittedly, is over 40 years old), we should remem-
18This is implicitly recognised as problematic by Richard Miller, whose own principle
— a more moderate alternative to Singer’s proposal — includes the caveat that one’s
duties of beneficence should not “impose a significant risk of worsening one’s life” (2004,
p.359).
19Exactly what this chance would be is difficult to say, but I will take it for granted
that at some degree of risk we accept that she is not required to try to rescue the child
— and perhaps even that she should not try to rescue the child.
20Following Miller, I have used significant risk, rather than any risk at all. Given distant
possibilities, any risk would make the principle extremely weak. This does come at the
cost of some vagueness, as it is a difficult matter to say what might count as significant
risk.
45
ber just how crucial the principle is for Singer in deriving the demanding
obligations (and our re-evaluation of what is required by duty, rather than
charity). In recent works, Singer has still defended this principle (e.g. 2007,
p.476, 2010, p.15, 2015, p.28), so the argument is at least one that he con-
siders to have withstood extensive criticism.
I will now attempt to provide cases that could serve as counterexamples
to Singer’s principle. A good counterexample to Singer’s principle must
include a situation wherein “it is in our power to prevent something very
bad from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance” but we do not think we are morally obligated to do so.
Singer’s opponents could cite the obligation to give substantial aid to the
world’s poor as a counter-example, but this would certainly be question-
begging, and various other types of example seem possible. I provide four
types of cases that are at least good candidate counter-examples to Sacrifice:
Example type one: Obvious division of labour
Consider a small village, before mobile phones became common-
place. The residents are all reasonably well-off - not rich, but
all with some savings - and one, Jennifer, is about to leave for
a big trip she has saved up for. She is very excited and has her
travel booked. She sets out, needing to leave immediately the
morning of her departure, and when she reaches the village gate,
she runs into Frederick, a man from her village who appears dis-
mayed. Apparently Frederick has just been diagnosed with a
horrible disease. Unless he can afford an operation by the end
of the week, he will die. The operation costs 10,000 Crowns and
will guarantee his recovery. Jennifer knows that she actually has
10,000 Crowns on her person, but it is everything she has saved
for her trip. She also knows that the 100 people in the village
can all afford to give Frederick some money, probably at least a
100 Crowns each, though she is not sure that they would.
If Jennifer gives Frederick all her money, she will not be able to go on
her trip, which she has looked forward to for over a year. However doing so,
it seems, would prevent something bad from happening (Frederick dying).
If Jennifer just gives Frederick 100 Crowns (or maybe 500, just in case a few
people in the village are a little short), she won’t have prevented the bad
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thing happening. We know she hasn’t prevented it from happening, as it
could still happen; everyone in the village might uncharacteristically behave
horribly.
Jennifer would readily acknowledge that her trip is not of comparable
moral importance to Frederick’s life. Despite this, it doesn’t seem like she
does anything wrong if she merely helps out with a reasonable share of the
cost for Frederick’s treatment. It might be nice if she did more, but it
certainly wouldn’t be her duty.
It seems that our intuitions about this case will be different to the pond
case because the cost is so easily divisible. The case is designed such that
Jennifer is leaving the village (and in a considerable rush) in order to remove
the option of conferring with her fellow villagers and ensuring compliance
with a fair or adequate donation by everyone. Unfortunately for Singer,
this does seem to be analogous to the situation we find ourselves in with
regard to world poverty and any given individual in the developing world
who might be saved in the near future by an influx of money to an effective
charity. If the amount of money needed to prevent a disease is calculated, it
could be divided (using some fair distribution procedure) among everyone
in the aﬄuent world.
Singer might reply, however, that this example is not a reasonable paral-
lel to the issue of world poverty for two reasons. Firstly, ensuring compliance
over the western world seems impossible (without governmental intervention,
at least), whereas in the friendly close-knit village, it may be expected. Sec-
ondly, the quantity required might be such that large contributions would
be required from everyone anyway, which may not be suitably similar to
Jennifer’s reduction in travel money. As a consequence, though Sacrifice
seems to fail here, a similar principle generating Singer’s desired obligations
in the case of world poverty might better account for our intuitions here.
For example, Sacrifice could be supplemented by a clause stipulating that
one should prevent the bad thing from happening, unless one can partake
in partial compliance with a broader solution (e.g. everyone paying a fair
amount) and expect full compliance from the wider community. A clause
like this might be cumbersome, but maintain the spirit of Singer’s principle,
and similarly generate the obligations of Sacrifice, because, as he rightly
points out, we do not expect full compliance in our current situation (1972,
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p.233).21
Example type two: Clear iterations to big obligations
Consider the following situation: You are informed by a reliable
doctor that a friend of yours will die immediately without your
attention. Your friend is young, well-liked and enjoys his life.
His dying right now would clearly be a very bad thing, and you
can prevent it. Right now, you are told, all you need to do is
go to his side and pay very minimal attention to him to ensure
that he will not die now. Your having to be by his side and pay
minimal attention is surely not of comparable moral importance
to his dying right now, so it seems clear that you ought to help.
However, after helping once, you discover that your friend will
be in this position for the rest of his life. For some reason,
which the doctor explains but you don’t understand, only you
can help. Your friend needs your constant presence (or presence
say, every ten minutes) to remain alive. He cannot be moved
from the hospital, but he still really enjoys his life there, as
his favourite activities (e.g. computer games, or chess perhaps)
are all available to him there. For every time you must make
your decision, however, your decision procedure, if governed by
Sacrifice, will require you to attend to your friend. Every time
you make the decision, your friend dying then would (or at least
we may suppose) be a very bad thing.
Sacrifice seems to require that, through the extended iterations, you
are morally obligated to attend to your friend for the rest of his life (or the
rest of yours). This seems like a wildly implausible conclusion. Though each
individual act is not a big sacrifice – it only asks that you spend an additional
ten minutes there – the commitment required by the cumulative sacrifices
is enormous. We may be reminded of Judith Jarvis Thomson’s discussion
of her violinist. If you wake up strapped to a violinist, who requires the use
of your body to survive for the next nine months, Thomson claims that you
are not obliged to help (though it might be nice to do so). If the example is
21I will not return to considering an option like this, because an amendment like this
will still leave the principle vulnerable to all the other example types given.
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modified however, so that the violinist only requires you to stay in bed with
him for one hour, “you ought to allow him” to do so (1971, p.59). Cases
such as this highlight the difficulty in determining how much one ought to
do. Unfortunately for Singer’s position, iterative concerns like this do apply
to the issue of our obligations to the world’s poor, as it is such iterations
which lead to the radical conclusion.
While this example is equivalent in form to the general iteration worries
mentioned previously,22 I hope this particular example is useful in a number
of ways. Firstly, it seems just as obvious that the conclusion is mistaken as
it does in the case of the radical conclusion. It also should (I hope) be at
least as compelling that you should help in the first instance, as it is that an
agent should refrain from a luxury good in order to send money to famine
relief charities. If I am correct about the strengths of these intuitions, we
should have even more reason to be suspicious of the iteration of obligations.
If we have good reason to suppose an obligation arises in one case, but does
not apply in every following case despite the relevant reasons being exactly
the same, we should be very suspicious of a principle which is consistent
with obvious iterations to big obligations.
I do suspect that the best resolution to this problem is to adequately
define “something very bad” such that the death of an innocent, young,
happy person will not necessarily suffice. In this example, the friend dying
one hour earlier than he would otherwise, for example, might not count as
very bad. While I think this problem might be avoided by properly defining
terms, this was not really even attempted in Singer’s paper.23 This should
at least make us reluctant to accept the argument without a little further
pressing.
Example type three: Presumption24
You discover that an acquaintance of yours has fallen, through
22e.g. section 1.2.1
23In fact, the brief description of what might count as bad do not help in this situation.
He suggests that “suffering and death from lack of food, shelter, and medical care are
bad” (1972, p.231). Though I did not stipulate that the death would involve suffering, we
can amend the example to include as much suffering as would be required to meet that
criterion.
24For this type of example, I am indebted to Rowland Stout, who argued (at a confer-
ence on supererogation in Dublin in June 2014) that presumption differs from supereroga-
tion, not by the type of act committed, but due to the relationship one has with the
recipient.
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no fault of their own, under hard times. They have borrowed
money from a violent loan shark, who may break their legs if
they don’t pay up. You do not know the person particularly
well, and arrived at this knowledge through a series of unusual
coincidences. Perhaps you volunteer for a confidential, listening
and information service for people undergoing stressful situa-
tions, but you have inadvertently discovered who the caller is.
You also know that the person in question has a wealthy, for-
giving and supportive family, who they could (and you think
should) ask for assistance.
Though you could help the person with very little difficulty
to yourself, it would be presumptuous for you to do so, as you
do not know them particularly well. Also, though you know that
you could categorically prevent the bad thing (their legs being
broken), the optimal situation (or so you have surmised and have
a very strong conviction of) is that they return to their family
and seek their support, financially and emotionally, as this will
not only prevent one bad event, but perhaps future issues as well.
I have supposed that you would not be under an obligation to help in this
situation because it’s someone else’s job to do so. It would be presumptuous
of you to help. It could be argued that even if the family could not help out,
it would be supererogatory of you to help rather than obligatory. As it is a
stranger and because one lacks the special relationship (which you know he
bears with others with the ability to help), this may affect the duty (or lack
thereof) one has towards him.
If it is accepted that there are cases wherein one could easily prevent
a very bad thing from happening, but where it would be inappropriate (or
wrong even) to do so because it would be overly presumptuous, Sacrifice
must be rejected (or at least modified).
Example type four: Desert
Another acquaintance of yours has also become tangled with loan
sharks several times in the past. On several previous occasions,
you have bailed him out, despite the fact that he has never been
a particularly close friend. You have done so sheerly because you
knew him and knew that he did not have family or friends who
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could obviously help. The last time this happened, you warned
him not to become involved with such nefarious knaves again
and that if he did you would not help.
While on vacation, several hours away from this acquaintance,
you get a phone call. This acquaintance is in trouble again, and
if he doesn’t get the money, in cash, by the end of the night,
the loan sharks have threatened to break his legs. You could
make it back in time to help, providing him with the cash, which
wouldn’t substantially hurt your wallet or take a colossal amount
of your time.
The fact that this agent has brought the situation upon himself – he
is extremely culpable – seems to diminish anyone else’s supposed duty to
help. While it might be very bad if his legs are broken (some might argue -
perhaps somewhat callously - that this would be justice, rather than a bad
thing), you certainly don’t seem under an obligation to help.
The response to this case that it would not be a bad thing for this person
to have his legs broken might be made by some. However, it might be diffi-
cult to reconcile with other positions (e.g. utilitarianism). The acceptance
of Sacrifice with a specialised notion of what ‘bad’ is might thus require
additional theoretic commitments (or at least rule some out).
In all of the above examples it might be thought that to help would be
good, but not required of the agent in question. This relates to the third
objection, questioning why the sacrifice would be obligatory, rather than
supererogatory. Hopefully, the specific features of the example explain what
about the particular example makes it the case that one is not duty-bound
to help.
I do think these counterexamples cast serious doubt upon Sacrifice. It
is certainly the case that there exist similar variant principles that would
generate extremely demanding obligations to the world’s poor while also
harmonising with our intuitions in these types of example, but this need
not be discussed here. This will be worth bearing in mind after chapter
3,25 the conclusions of which will, if accurate, also provide a motivation to
dismiss Sacrifice. It is enough here to reject Sacrifice as a general principle
of beneficence. I shall suppose that Sacrifice fails to be a satisfactory moral
25These are elaborated further in the final chapter.
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principle. Due to the central role this principle plays in Singer’s generation
of the huge demands, this suggests we should reject Singer’s argument. As
I consider later,26 there are also considerable independent motivations for
rejecting extremely demanding conclusions.
2.3 Unger
Singer attempts to convince us of his position via one apparently obvious
principle. Accepting this, he draws conclusions which then seem counterin-
tuitive. Unger has a similar project, but attempts to demonstrate certain
features of our psychology which he hopes that we all will accept lead us
to make poor moral judgements. Once we notice these, like Singer, he sug-
gests that we will see that the demands of morality are significantly more
extensive than commonly appreciated.
2.3.1 Peter Unger’s Argument for Demandingness
Unger begins by noting what he takes to be a puzzle. This is brought out
in two cases and our intuitive judgements about those cases.
The first case Unger provides is Vintage Sedan:
“Not truly rich, your one luxury in life is a vintage Mercedes
sedan that, with much time, attention and money, you’ve re-
stored to mint condition. In particular, you’re pleased by the
auto’s fine leather seating. One day, you stop at the intersec-
tion of two small country roads, both lightly travelled. Hearing
a voice screaming for help, you get out and see a man who’s
wounded and covered with a lot of his blood. Assuring you that
his wound’s confined to one of his legs, the man also informs you
that he was a medical student for two full years. And, despite
his expulsion for cheating on his second year final exams, which
explains his indigent status since, he’s knowledgeably tied his
shirt near the wound so as to stop the flow. So, there’s no ur-
gent danger of losing his life, you’re informed, but there’s great
danger of losing his limb. This can be prevented, however, if you
drive him to a rural hospital fifty miles away.. . . Now, if you’d
26In section 2.4
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aid [him], you must lay him across your fine back seat. But,
then your fine upholstery will be soaked through with blood,
and restoring the car will cost over five thousand dollars. So,
you drive away. Picked up the next day by another driver, he
survives but loses the wounded leg.”
(1996, pp.25-26)
Unger notes that most people, when confronted with this case, share the
intuition that this behaviour is despicable. Our judgements of someone who
acts in this way are not likely to be favourable.
This is then compared with a second case: The Envelope:
“In your mailbox, there’s something from (the U.S. Commit-
tee for) UNICEF. After reading it through, you correctly believe
that, unless you soon send in a check for $100, then, instead of
each living many more years, over thirty more children will die
soon. But, you throw the material in your trash basket, includ-
ing the convenient return envelope provided, you send nothing,
and, instead of living many years, over thirty more children die
soon than would have had you sent in the requested $100.”
(1996, p.25)27
In contrast to the first case, we do not find this case to promote a hostile
reaction. Despite many more people (thirty, rather than one) suffering a
much greater loss (death, rather than loss of a limb) which could be pre-
vented by a much lower cost ($100 rather than $5,000), the typical intuition
in this case is that the agent in this case has done nothing wrong. We feel
nothing like the disapprobation we feel in the first case. Therein lies the
puzzle. Why would our intuitions judge the conduct in first instance so
harshly, but the second so leniently?
27We might note that the particular figures for how much it actually costs to save a
life are estimated to be significantly higher than this. In The Life You Can Save, Singer
estimated that we could confidently judge that the best charities could save a life for
“between $200 and $2000” (2010, p.103). This would, however, not phase Unger or affect
his conclusion, as he maintains that “it’s badly wrong not to provide vital aid even if it
costs many thousands of dollars to less by just one the number of distant children who’ll
die young rather than live long” (1996, p.145)
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In attempting to show that this puzzle is not easily resolved, Unger ex-
amines several factors that potentially ground asymmetries between Vintage
Sedan and Envelope, and amends the cases slightly for each of these factors
to demonstrate that our intuitions seem to persist. Among the factors he
considers are physical proximity, social proximity, informative directness,
experiential impact, the thought of a disastrous further future and whether
there are multiple or unique potential saviours. Keeping the cases extremely
similar to the original versions of Envelope and Vintage Sedan, Unger then
attempts to remove these factors, (ideally) to show that our intuitions do not
change, and thereby that what our intuitions are sensitive to is something
different.
Unger eventually claims that the factors that do affect our intuitions in
these types of cases are extremely strange, clearly not of moral relevance
and because of this, that we should ultimately reject (or ‘liberate ourselves
from’) these intuitions. The major factors Unger identifies as the culprits
are what he refers to as projective separating and protophysics.
Projective separating is a term Unger uses to describe the way we group
people when we consider certain cases. Typically, and of no moral relevance
(Unger claims), we. . .
“. . . view the world as comprising just certain situations. Like-
wise, we view a situation as including just certain people, all
of them then well grouped together within it. . . viewing all the
world’s other folks as being only in other situations”
(Unger, 1996, p.97)
The upshot of this separation is that when we group one set of people
with a problem separately to another, who do not have the problem, we
deem it unfair – and morally wrong – to impose losses on the group without
the problem in order to aid the group that does.
As well as explaining why we do not negatively judge the conduct in
Envelope – because the children are in a different situation – and why we do
in Vintage Sedan (because we are in the same situation as the ex-medical
student), Unger notes that this explains our responses in other difficult cases.
In Philippa Foot’s original trolley case,28 for example, where an agent can
28In that discussion, she actually refers to a “runaway tram”, but the case is otherwise
the same (1967).
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change the track of a trolley to prevent it killing five, but doing so will divert
it towards one person, the typical verdict that she ought to do so can be
explained by us grouping all the seven in the same situation. Foot notably
attempts to explain the intuition in this case by invoking the doctrine of
double effect.29 However, Unger provides a separate example, like the trolley
case, but which apparently leads most to a different verdict. The case in
question, Yard, also features an empty trolley heading towards five people,
but where it can be stopped by sending another empty trolley to collide
with it. If one does that, the trolleys will both be derailed, fall down a hill
and into someone’s yard “where they will wreak fatal havoc on the yard’s
owner, asleep in his hammock” (1996, p.98).
In the original trolley case, we see all the people on the tracks as grouped
in the same situation, along with the runaway trolley. The trolley there is a
problem for all the people on the tracks. In Yard, however, we see the group
of people on the tracks as in the same situation as the trolley, but the yard’s
owner as unconnected.
Unger attempts to demonstrate just how our intuitions are affected by
this phenomenon with a several-option trolley case, where a runaway trolley
will, without any action from the agent, kill six people. Unger then intro-
duces options at several stages. The options are as follows (and illustrated
in the picture on the next page (1996, p.90)):
A Do nothing, and a trolley hits and kills six people.
B Press a switch, diverting the trolley to the a track with three people
on instead. If you press this, the six people will survive, but the three
will die.
C Press an alternative switch, which will push another trolley, which
would divert a second trolley, with two people aboard, to hit the first
trolley, stopping it but killing the two people aboard this trolley. This
will save six people trapped on the track, but the two people on the
trolley die.
D A fat person nearby is roller skating, with special roller skates you can
control with a remote control dial. You can activate the skates and
29Foot compares the trolley case to one where a judge can frame an innocent person
for a certain crime to prevent riots and was engaged in trying to find what makes this
impermissible, yet the trolley case permissible.
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push the fat person into the trolley. The fat person will die, but the
trolley will stop and the six will be saved.
Unger claims that when confronted with all of these options, people
typically judge that people should choose option D – killing the heavy skater
to save the six. That is to say, they have a positive verdict of someone who
takes option D. However, if people are only confronted with options A and
D, people intuitively think option D is terribly wrong.30
30Unger does note that order effects play a role in this. People have a tendency to
attempt to be consistent in the evaluations, so will often show a reluctance to change
their verdicts of whether D is wrong given only the addition/removal of options. Despite
the differences in verdicts with the differences in presentation, Unger notes the prevalence
of the verdicts he describes (1996, p.92).
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Projective separation can explain this distinction, because when only
confronted with options A and D, the heavy skater appears to us in a totally
different situation to the six people on the tracks. When the four situations
are presented, however, B seems close enough to A, C close enough to B,
etc. so we do not engage in projective separation. Rather, in that case they
are in the same group.
Unger claims that grouping people in our minds is this way is clearly
morally unimportant, and that our being influenced by this type of factor
is a feature of our thinking we should fight against.
The second psychological factor Unger calls our attention to is protophys-
ical thinking. This is the the term Unger gives to a variety of unusual ways
features of movement affect our judgements. He presents five “protophysical
principles” which supposedly distort our intuitions in many cases:
1. When serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify moving a person to,
or into, an object than it is to move the object to, or into, the person.
2. When serious loss will result, it’s harder to justify changing the speed
of an moving object, or changing its rate of motion, than changing the
object’s direction of motion.
3. When there’ll be big loss, it’s harder to justify speeding up an object
than slowing down an object.
4. It’s a lot harder to justify taking an object at rest and setting it in
motion than to justify taking an object in motion and increasing its
speed.
5. Should serious loss result, it’s harder to justify imposing a substantial
force on an object than it is to justify allowing a force already present
(just about) everywhere, like gravitation, to work on the object.
(Unger, 1996, pp.101-2)
Unger again makes use of a variety of examples where our intuitions do
not seem to represent our values to illustrate these principles. To briefly
illustrate, the first of these principles does some work in explaining our
intuitive reluctance to push a fat man (or redirect a fat skater) into a moving
trolley, but our acceptance of merely changing the direction of the trolley.
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Unger also notes that when just presented with options A and C in the multi-
option case, there is a resistance to option C, where one moves people, rather
than just moving objects (1996, p.102,n.15). Option C does violate the first
principle, but because it it does not violate any others, Unger suggests that
one intermediary case (B), is enough for us to overcome that resistance.
While projective separation and protophysical thinking are the main
factors he discusses, Unger notes that there are a wide array of additional
psychological features which seem to divert us from making good moral ver-
dicts. Behaviour with typically negative stereotypes (like pushing someone,
as opposed to causing them to be moved by remote control), with more
psychological distance (where the causal chain between you and the poten-
tially suffering patient is longer) are other such features he mentions (1996,
p.105). He also notes that these features often play in tandem, with ‘fac-
tors of protophysical thinking [doing] at least some of their deceptive work
through encouraging the work of other distorting factors, like the factors of
projective separating” (1996, p.103).
Unger claims that none of the complex set of strange factors are morally
significant. They do however serve to distract us from living morally decent
lives. By being alert to these factors and how they might warp our thinking,
Unger suggests, we can remedy this and realise that even to live a morally
decent life (not even a morally good one) will require much more than is
typically accepted.
2.3.2 Rejecting Unger’s Argument
Tim Mulgan notes two ways we might resist Unger’s extremely demanding
conclusion (2000, p.400). First, we may not share the intuitions Unger
claims are typical. Mulgan claims that the intuitions Unger reports do not
seem to have been reflected among his students. Kamm also rejects many
of the intuitions that Unger sees as revealing the so-called “distortions” in
our moral thinking, particularly noting that she does not share the differing
judgements in Switches and Skates (1999, p.302).31 Ascertaining what are
31Mulgan does not go as far as rejecting the intuition himself, instead claiming that
he has no firm intuitions in this case. It is notable that many of the cases provided,
particularly in Unger’s arrival at the conclusion that projective separation is a significant
factor in forming our intuitions, are extremely unusual cases. If we held a view about our
moral intuitions which suggested they are less reliable in cases people are unfamiliar with
in their everyday lives, this would undermine Unger’s conclusions.
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the typical intuitions in this case is clearly an empirical matter, and I will
not speculate on this here. In what follows, I assume that Unger’s claims
about what intuitions people have is generally correct.
Secondly, we might claim that it does not matter even if they are. Mul-
gan notes that we might respond by suggesting that morality is actually
significantly more complicated than Unger suggests – that whether it is
permissible to send in the ‘heavy skater’ may depend on (the seemingly)
irrelevant options (2000, p.400). While that option might seem appealing,
this would still require a rejection of some intuition, namely the second-
order intuition that an addition or removal of options we are not going to
choose should have no relevance to the permissibility of an action. Unger
does note that this second-order intuition is widely shared, so preserving all
our intuitions might not be possible.
Another issue with Unger’s argument concerns the way he determines
that factors are morally irrelevant. When demonstrating, for example, that
physical proximity does not change our verdicts, he provides a case very
similar to Vintage Sedan, but where the distance is greater, and a case like
Envelope, but the physical distance is greatly reduced. Even if our intuitions
do survive these modifications, however, this does not demonstrate that
these factors have no impact. They may affect our intuitions to a slight
degree, such that they only cause a change in our overall verdicts when they
are combined with other factors.
This might not be a huge problem for Unger. He notes that our judge-
ments seem to track salience, which is relevant to many of the factors he
considers, yet (or so Unger suggests) does not really track our Basic Moral
Values (1996, p.29). So long as our intuitions depend upon considerations
with no real moral significance, Unger’s conclusion remains unthreatened.
Perhaps more seriously, I suggest that Unger’s account fails in the fol-
lowing two ways. Firstly, it fails to establish that the ‘distortions’ really
are morally arbitrary. Finally, it sneaks in utilitarian assumptions, which
‘common-sense morality’ would typically reject.
Defending the ‘Distortions’
Unger relies heavily on the claim that projective separation and protophysi-
cal thinking (as well as a variety of other unusual psychological phenomena)
are morally irrelevant – that they distract us from things that really repre-
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sent our Basic Moral Values. These features do seem bizarre – how could
thinking about people as being members one group rather than another
justify killing or letting die in a situation? A response which I find appeal-
ing, however, involves defending some of the “distorting” factors that Unger
views as responsible for some of our undemanding views. Here we might
claim that even if Unger is correct about typical judgements, and the psy-
chological factors that help explain them, that this still does not seem to be
a problem.
Let us consider projective separation. In the comparison between Trolley
and Yard, the typical intuitions Unger describes condone switching a trolley
from a track with six people to a track with one person, but condemn sending
another empty trolley to collide with it, sending one crashing down a hill to
kill a distant yard owner and destroy his yard.
One way we may defend this ‘distortion’ is based on the degree to which
we value safety. It seems that people who are on a track – even if it is
disused – are in serious danger. The prospect that a trolley could hit them
is at least salient, particularly if a trolley is on its way. The yard owner, far
away and peacefully napping, has no reason to suspect any danger from this
potential source of untimely demise. Because we value the ability to plan
our lives, notably to avoid dangers to ourselves and our loved ones, being
in a situation which seems safe from certain dangers, and relying on those
situations not being changed bizarrely, is important to us. If we can defend
cases like this by pointing to something which does seem morally relevant,
Unger’s insistence that our intuitions are “distortions” seems, at the very
least, less obvious.
Similar justifications can be offered in a typical organ case. Even if one
individual’s organs could be used to save five people, we expect that we
are safe from being abducted and our organs being harvested. If we accept
that imposing a risk upon someone who could have expected to be safe
from that risk is morally significant, we go some way to justifying projective
separation.
One of Unger’s other cases he uses as a comparison to Yard also offers
some defence for this type of view, The Small Missile
“Six Innocents are trapped on a trolley track. . . [but] trolleys
don’t run there anymore. Down the hill from this track and
across the road, there’s someone in his own backyard, sleeping in
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his hammock. Accidentally, one of the army’s very small missiles
has been launched. If you do nothing, your first option, the
missile will land where the six are and, upon impact, it will kill
them. . . . By pushing a remote control button, you can reroute
this missile, but only in a certain way. Now, if you thus deflect
it, then the missile will land in the noted yard and, upon impact,
not only will it kill the yard’s owner, but it will destroy his entire
house and yard. . . ”
(Unger, 1996, pp.98-99)
Unger notes that unlike in Yard, most people share the verdict that
acting, thereby changing the missile trajectory, thus killing the yard’s owner,
is a good thing to do. Unger suggests that the reason for the difference is
that in Yard, we are encouraged by the example to view the napper as
separate from the others, but in Small Missile all the people are similarly
unrelated to the missile.
Unger then suggests that this case diffuses the projective separation,
thereby eliminating “morally irrelevant reasons”. However, I have suggested
that we can defend this ‘distortion’. While the napper seemed safe from
trolleys (particularly compared to the six people on the tracks), he was no
safer from this freak occurrence than anyone else.
This way of thinking can also explain why some of the protophysical
principles seem to hold sway. Consider the final, and possibly most bizarre-
seeming one, that “it’s harder to justify imposing a substantial force on
an object than it is to justify allowing a force already present (just about)
everywhere, like gravitation, to work on the object” (1996, p.102). Forces
that are (just about) everywhere are more easily predictable. Agents have
the ability to plan for these and alter their lives accordingly.
We might then propose this type of justification – that we take as ex-
tremely valuable the ability to predict and plan our lives in typical situations
– a little further. We could, for example, accept that burdens which are very
likely to put into peril agents’ abilities to plan and predict the course of their
lives, carry additional moral weight, i.e. they require considerable more to
be at stake. This might allow us to make the type of manoeuvre that
Brad Hooker deems as promising in response to Unger. Hooker suggests
that there might be a legitimate moral distinction between costs which are
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likely to affect us repeatedly and those which are likely to occur never or
extremely rarely (1999), because of the expected effect of complying with
demands. Our placing a huge value on the ability to avoid certain dangers –
by avoiding certain risks to our bodies by staying away from trolley tracks,
or avoiding certain donation practices which might make us unable to lead
the lives we have planned – seems like something that could be morally
significant.
The types of justification offered here do not seem to explain all cases.
The Switches and Skates judgements, supposedly changing depending upon
the addition or removal of alternatives, remain difficult to explain. However,
the finding that sometimes our intuitions are mistaken is not a revelation.
The claim Unger needs to establish is that our intuitions are systematically
mistaken in ways that have no moral relevance. If what I have suggested
here is correct, projective separation (and even some protophysical thinking)
might be morally justified.
Smuggling in Utilitarianism
Like Peter Singer’s Sacrifice principle, Unger’s Liberationism also seems to
sneak in utilitarian thinking. For example, it assumes that our obligations
should track values.32 To elaborate, Unger’s contention that our obligations
are much more extensive in Envelope is based on two claims, the first explicit,
and the second unstated:
1. The badness that results in Envelope, where we typically do not intuit
that an agent has an obligation to act, is much worse than in many
cases where we do think acting is obligatory. The differences in these
cases do not reflect our true values (Basic Moral Values).
2. If, according to our values, one situation is axiologically worse than
another, our obligations should reflect this.
This second claim, however, is not typically borne out in everyday moral
thought. If we consider something like the doctrine of acts and omissions –
which is accepted in ‘common-sense morality’ – this does not seem able to
cater for our values having such a direct impact upon our obligations.
32In chapter 6 I will suggest further that this might be a problem.
63
Something like the second of these claims is required by the Weak Prin-
ciple of Ethical Integrity, a principle Unger sees as obvious and necessitated
by living a morally decent life:
The Weak Principle of Ethical Integrity Other things being even nearly
equal, if it’s all right for you to impose losses on others with the re-
sult that there’s a significant lessening in the serious losses suffered by
others overall, then, if you’re to avoid doing what’s seriously wrong,
you can’t fail to impose much lesser losses on yourself, nor can you fail
to accept such lesser losses, when the result’s a much more significant
lessening of such serious losses overall.
(Unger, 1996, p.140)33
Frances Kamm simplifies this as the claim that we “should do to ourselves
what we should do to others (or less) to stop greater harm” (1999, p.304).
It implies that, given a situation where I can impose some losses on some
people to prevent great suffering, we can ascertain that I ought to do less
or equal harm (less or equal negative value) to myself if by doing so I can
prevent greater harm (resulting in more value). Obviously, an act utilitarian
will instantly sign up to this principle. However, even this does not seem
required typically under ordinary morality. Kamm notes that some “self-
other asymmetry might be sustainable, preventing us from assimilating what
we should do to others with what we should do to ourselves” (1999, p.305).
There are clearly many asymmetries we readily accept between what an
agent may do to themselves and to others. For example, in any ordinary case,
it seems permissible for me to arbitrarily impose harms on myself, destroy
my property or make bad choices for myself. Realising that I may enjoy a
cup of tea more, I might opt for a cup of coffee nonetheless. This would
be strange, but certainly permissible. However, if I was to arbitrarily harm
another, knowingly make bad choices for them or destroy their property,
this typically would be wrong.
Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar observation about our com-
mitments when we indulge in enjoyable pursuits rather than contributing to
33We might suppose that the caveat “Other things being even nearly equal” does a
lot of work here, and thus that, as a variety of non-utility features could factor into this,
it does not smuggle in utilitarianism as I have suggested. However, even Unger, upon
clarifying this, talks in terms of “losses” and “costs”, seemingly presuming that these are
the real moral currency in play (1996, p.140).
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save lives of distant strangers. We need not say (as Unger suggests we must)
that ‘the lives of the children you could have saved were just worth less than
your evening at the ballet” (2007, p.166). Appiah’s contention is that the
utilitarian axiology is mistaken; that there is no “single thin currency of
goodness” but instead a pluralism of values that cannot be measured the
same way. Even if this value pluralism is rejected, it is another question how
value relates to obligations. That is, if we are not committed to a maximis-
ing utilitarianism, we might fully admit that some course of action is best,
but suggest that it is still an open question whether or not it is obligatory.34
Rejecting Unger
That our intuitions are susceptible to various strange influences is an in-
teresting finding. However, Unger’s argument that his Liberationism is the
only solution fails. I have suggested that the principles Unger notes might
not be quite as arbitrary as it first appears. Clearly, however, these features
will seem morally distorting to those of utilitarian leanings. Despite at-
tempting to rule out the moral relevance of a considerable number of factors
– physical proximity, social proximity, unique or multiple potential saviours,
the role of governments, urgency, and causal amorphousness among others
– Unger does not consider the potential moral significance of our valuing
certain features about our lives.
Ultimately, the way Unger dismisses these ‘distorting’ biases also leads
him towards an extremist view. These ‘biases’ often have the effect of justi-
fying some doing/allowing distinction. In dismissing these as morally irrele-
vant (which, as I have already suggested, is perhaps dubious), this prompts
a more utilitarian evaluation where costs are simply weighed. If we reject
this manoeuvre, the extremist conclusion no longer follows.
2.4 Dealing with Extremists
Singer and Unger are paradigmatic examples of philosophers who would
dismiss demandingness objections, because they would accept that morality
is extremely demanding. I have argued that their efforts to demonstrate this
do not succeed. However, there are several other ways one might attempt
34This type of thought is developed in chapter 6.4.
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to disregard demandingness objections. In the remainder of this chapter, I
briefly discuss and offer responses to some of these.35
2.4.1 Sidgwick
I intimated at the beginning of this chapter that common-sense seems to be
on the side of undemanding theories. However, Sidgwick is an example of
an extremist, but claims that common-sense is on his side:
“Certainly we should agree that a truly moral man cannot
say to himself, “This is the best thing on the whole for me to do,
but yet it is not my duty to do it though it is in my power”: this
would certainly seem to common sense an immoral paradox.”
(Sidgwick, 1907, p.220)
I say Sidgwick is an extremist (or at least that his position seems to
entail extremism) because it seems obvious that requiring the best all the
time will lead to extreme demands (at least right now). This claim of his
does not seem to resemble common-sense. It was noted earlier how odd it
would seem to say that someone donating large portions of their wealth (but
not as much as she can) and regularly volunteering (but not as much as she
can) is morally failing. We see people like this as extremely admirable. One
reason this seems so bizarre is that an evaluation of moral failure seems to
imply blame.36
Singer and de Lazari-Rabek interpret Sidgwick as defending a version
of utilitarianism wherein we separate the connection between blame and
wrongness. This might then alleviate the concern of blaming someone who
does not act as well as she can. She would be doing something wrong, but
might not be blameworthy. Blame, under this picture, is only appropriate
when the process of blaming would have good consequences. Singer and
de Lazari-Rabek give an example of a mother who prioritises her child over
others because of her affection for him (2014, p.332). The love she has for
35One type of extremist I do not engage with here is the sort, like Lisa Tessman,
who deny the ‘ought implies can’ principle, and accept that their are cases of impossible
moral requirements (2015). Several of the criticisms in this section will be applicable
to Tessman’s view, but with regards to Tessman’s position in particular, I agree with
Carbonell’s assessment that we lose a lot if we do not view moral requirement as “action-
guiding, something we can really hold you to” (2015).
36Blame is discussed much more extensively in chapter 5.
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her child which causes this behaviour, they suggest, should be promoted
(and not condemned) even if it sometimes leads to acts which are morally
wrong.
Sidgwick does explicitly endorse the praising of “any conduct more fe-
licific in its tendency than what an average man would do under the given
circumstances” (Sidgwick, 1907, p.493). This would allow for us to praise
the regular donor and volunteer mentioned earlier, and maintain many of
our similar praising/blaming practices.
However, I am unsure whether this manoeuvre is successful. I have two
concerns:
1 They seem to advocate an extremely functionalist ideal of blame – we
should only blame behaviour so long as we want to discourage it and
should only praise behaviour to increase its frequency. While this no
doubt is an aspect of what it is to blame, this does not seem to capture
the full picture.
2 Once wrongness is separated from blame in this way, what remains?
Wrong acts are typically taken to be those which are forbidden. Not
only would this entail that many wrong actions should not result in
blame, but it does not even seem appropriate that the agent commit-
ting the so-called ‘wrong’ – such as a mother prioritising her child –
should feel any moral regret. After all, they may have acted on motiva-
tions which typically produce the most good, so they should continue
to act in this way.
If blame takes this back-seat, its use being appropriate when (and only
when) it will cause the best consequences, we leave conceptual space open
for its being appropriate to blame even those performing heroic acts. If it
so happens that doing so will have optimific consequences, blaming (and
even punishing) someone acting perfectly well will actually be obligatory.37
Hooker also notes that this clashes with our intuitions, which “hold that
whether or not someone is to blame or is to be punished is not really a
matter of whether on this occasion blame or punishment would produce good
37This point is made by Norcross (2006, p.226), who rejects the notions of rightness
and wrongness altogether. Singer and de Lazari-Radek also discuss cases where one ought
to be punished – or at least “encounter a hostile public reaction” – for doing the right
thing, when doing so involves breaching rules that are typically useful (2014, p.309).
67
consequences but instead a matter of whether the blame or punishment is
warranted by the person’s conduct” (2016, p.145). Considering Sidgwick’s
desire to preserve a common-sense view of morality, this seems like a major
flaw. It seems absolutely bizarre to suggest that practically everybody is so
mistaken about when blame and punishment are appropriate.
If we hold that coherence with our intuitions is to be of any guide in
determining what an appropriate theory should look like, a theory with
repercussions this incongruent with our practices must be seen as problem-
atic. Given that Sidgwick saw common-sense as a useful guide, this approach
fails on his terms.
2.4.2 Denying Overridingness
In the previous chapter, it was briefly mentioned that another way to re-
spond to an overly demanding theory is to accept that morality really is
extremely demanding, but add that there are other types of consideration
that matter when evaluating behaviour generally. People like Dale Dorsey
endorse this position, which has the upshot of enabling us to accept the
arguments given by the extremists, but deny — as seems desirable — that
there is anything irrational about not meeting the apparent moral obliga-
tions these accounts.
The general thought is that morality is only one part of human life, and
not the ultimate arbiter of behaviour. Something being morally best is only
one consideration in its favour, and needs to be weighed against other con-
siderations. When considering a theory like maximising act utilitarianism,
for instance, someone denying overridingness can claim that acts that are
not the best in terms of utility are morally wrong, but they are not all things
considered wrong.
Demandingness objections claim that if a theory is too morally demand-
ing, it should be rejected. The move here suggests that moral demands are
merely one constituent consideration of how we should evaluate conduct.
We might say that morally you ought to φ, but all-things considered, you
need not.
Dale Dorsey describes a way that this can account for supererogation
(2013). In his picture, just like acts might be morally forbidden, permissible
or required, they may also be rationally forbidden, permissible or required.
Because he denies that moral reasons have ‘supremacy’ over other reasons,
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like prudential reasons, these compete. Moral considerations are only one
thing to consider among many factors which affect one’s decision. If the
moral reasons are not strong enough, they lose out, and the morally best act
is not required. Supererogatory acts are then understood as not “better than
is morally required, but better than is rationally required” (2013, p.373).
While this provides a neat picture, it does not allow us to properly appre-
ciate a moral failing as something that particularly warrants the judgements
we expect in those cases. When someone does something that is prudentially
good – i.e. good for them – but bad for others, this merits a special type of
criticism.
Dorsey’s account also seems to run the risk of distorting our moral cate-
gories. Consider for instance, a ‘Good Samaritan’ type scenario – you walk
down a country road and see a traveller in need of urgent medical attention.
Common sense might give us verdicts like the following. Just walking by and
ignoring them (or robbing them!) is forbidden. Helping them to a nearby
hospital, or calling for help, might be required. But it seems that in addition
to securing medical attention, offering them money or some of your clothes
to make them more comfortable (embellish the case as you need to to arrive
at the judgement that they do more than they had to) is supererogatory. If
acts were morally graded, supererogatory acts are those that get a figurative
‘gold star’.
According to Dorsey’s picture (particularly when combined, as he thinks
desirable, with a maximising consequentialism) even those middle options
(which were just good enough), if they are better than rationally required,
must also be evaluated as supererogatory.38 This demeans the category,
which is understood as including truly optional acts; not those which seem
clearly required. In short, a picture that denies overridingness fails to cap-
ture our rich moral landscape.
38Dorsey notes an objection of this sort, that his account will “implausibly extend the
category of the supererogatory”, but does not think it a problem (2013, p.377). He does
supplement the view with some additional fixtures that make it more conducive to our
intuitions – e.g. making it a condition that an act is significantly morally better than other
options in order to count as morally good, which is a condition for being supererogatory
– but these do still leave strange categorisations, which he acknowledges.
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2.4.3 Evaluation
In this chapter, I have discussed several prominent arguments in favour of
extremism. If extremism is correct, the demandingness objection is a bad
objection – morality should make extreme demands. I have argued that we
should not accept extremism, favouring instead the moderate position. In
the remaining chapters, I do not argue any more for this position, though I
make a concession to the extremists in the final chapter, suggesting that this
type of investigation informs us about what they should say about moderates
and the intuitions which support a moderate position.
Accepting that the extremists are mistaken entails that the demanding-
ness objection does provide us motivation to reject overly demanding moral
theories. We may wonder what it is about those theories that causes them
to be excessively demanding. I consider several options for diagnosing the
problem in the next chapter.
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3What Makes a Theory
Overly Demanding?
“Where did it all go wrong?”
– Oasis, Standing on the Shoulders of Giants
There are several obvious suggestions we might consider for what makes
a theory overly demanding. Here I shall consider these, as well as some less
obvious candidate properties and discuss whether they have any structural
role in generating demandingness objections.
3.0.1 Aside: Types of Cases
Before discussing the features of a theory which make it vulnerable to de-
mandingness objections, it might first be worth considering the types of
examples this objection yields and what makes the verdict seem too de-
manding in each case. The cases given will all be question-begging to an
extent. For example, the type of case given most so far – an iterative case
like Cullity’s – when taken as a paradigm example of a problem case will
claim that the situation is too demanding. This will of course be rejected
by those who see the objection as misplaced because they think morality
actually is (and should be) extremely demanding.
The main type of case that will be of use is the iterative case. Any
theories which allow for plausibly small demands to be iterated repeatedly
until an extremely high level of demand is reached will face charges of de-
mandingness.
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On top of this, we might consider cases that give one-off verdicts which
seem too demanding. We must be careful here, however, to ensure that what
is objected to in the case is the demandingness of the theory, rather than
some other perceived issue it presents. To illustrate this, we might consider
van Ackeren and Sticker’s example of demandingness in Kant:
“The specific form of Kantian demandingness [they discuss]
comes in the form of the threat that an agent at any time might
find herself in a situation in which she has to sacrifice all of
her non-moral goods. Such a case is explicitly described in the
Second Critique’s gallows case in which an agent is rationally
required to sacrifice his life (he is sent to the gallows) when a
tyrant demands of him on pain of execution that he lies in court.”
(2015, p.85)
In cases like this, where it is suggested that one is not permitted to lie
even about something trivial – and even when doing so might save one’s
life (or even the lives of many others) – it might strike us that the reason
this is so wrong is not its demandingness, but that it gives the wrong ver-
dict of what the agent should do.1 Of course, if one did think telling the
truth was the right (or best) action in this case, but thinks it too demand-
ing to be obligatory, this would be the type of case that would provide a
demandingness objection.
To give a hopefully clearer example, we might think that there are single
actions that might be accepted to be the best action available, but such that
we do not think it compulsory because of the demand it would impose upon
the agent. Suppose that a nearby rescue situation arises and the agent with
the ability to save the victim estimates that there is a 51% chance she could
save him, but a 49% chance she would fail and die in doing so. We might
think we should not blame her for not putting herself at such a risk, even if
it appears to be the best thing to do, and that this indicates that failing to
perform the best act is not morally wrong. A theory that made such acts
requirements would probably appear overly demanding.
1McElwee discusses objecting to a theory on these grounds. He labels this the “The
wrong moral ranking objection” (2017, p.89), which he notes is logically distinct from the
pure demandingness objection.
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Similarly, we might consider how demanding it could be to have some
acts forbidden. In Ashford’s discussion of Scanlon’s contractualism, for ex-
ample, she suggests that in any practically realisable state of the world,
personal air travel will be forbidden (2003, p.299). This is because in Scan-
lon’s account principles permitting actions which have a chance — even a
very remote one — of being harmful may be reasonably rejected by agents
who cannot benefit (or expect to benefit) from those actions (1998, p.208).
Because personal travel can only be expected to be enjoyed by the very rich,
the slight chance that those planes could crash into persons or property who
could not benefit from them is enough for a reasonable rejection. We might
think that a theory which contains requirements to abstain from certain
individual acts could also be overly demanding.
Having given types of cases that are iterative act-requirements, singu-
lar act-requirements and singular restriction-requirements, a fourth category
seems to present itself: iterative restriction-requirements. For such an ex-
ample, we might simply think of cases like the above — say a prohibition
against certain modes of travel — but where it seems an individual instance
would not be extremely demanding. Not making use of a car/plane (or
something else useful) on one situation, it might be supposed, would not be
overly demanding, but if this is repeated ad infinitum, it may impose signif-
icant demands. This is sometimes described as a confinement objection.2
It seems that a theory might be seen as overly demanding if it can
generate any of these types of cases. With this in mind, I will now consider
various features of theories that might make a theory susceptible to this.
3.1 Obligation-Generation
We may begin with a fairly obvious condition. As, under the analysis of
the demandingness objection I provided, the objection claims of a theory
that it “gives a verdict which demands significantly more” than we would
otherwise expect, the theory must demand something. It must actually make
demands. Thus an obligation-free moral theory is immune to demandingness
objections.
We might wonder whether removing obligation-generation from a moral
theory is a tenable manoeuvre, as this seems like such a significant part of
2e.g. Benn (2016).
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what a moral theory does. If a moral theory cannot tell us what we ought
to do in a situation, it raises the question of what we want a moral theory to
actually do. Elizabeth Anscombe, however, in “Modern Moral Philosophy”
claims the notions of “duty” and “obligation” are damaging to moral philos-
ophy (1958, p.1). Thoughts of this nature contributed to the development of
contemporary virtue ethics, but there are other theories which incorporate
this move, even among consequentialists. Alastair Norcross’s scalar con-
sequentialism, for example, also avoids the notion of obligation. Norcross
properly observes that rejecting “the notion that morality issues demands
at all” completely avoids the demandingness objection, and suggests that
this is an attractive option (Norcross, 2006, p.219).
Moral theories that lack an account of obligation, or deny that obligation
is a useful notion, must account for our moral practices and phenomenology,
as well as explaining quite how the theory can be action-guiding. Our moral
practices of blaming seem appropriate if an agent was morally obligated to
perform an action and fails to do so. An agent is at fault because they
failed to meet the requirements of them; for not doing what they had to
do. The moral phenomenology – feeling that one is free to perform or not
perform an action in some circumstances, but that one is compelled to do so
in others – also seems to cohere sensibly with the notion of moral obligation.
We might well think, as Robert Goodin claimed, that a “morality that was
never prepared to make any demands would be a pretty useless morality”
(2009, p.3).
While I acknowledge that entirely removing the concept of obligation
from a moral theory is a possible manoeuvre, which completely avoids the
demandingness objection, and is seen as desirable by some, I will not discuss
such theories any further here. All that must be said here is that though
obligation-free moral theories avoid this criticism, they have difficulties (of
the sort given above) of their own. From here, I will focus entirely on theories
which do accept and invoke some notion of obligation.
Even accepting that a theory’s being obligation-generating is required
for the availability of a demandingness objection, we may still ask just what
type of obligations might be generated, and whether a theory must generate
a specific type of obligations.Imperfect duties in Kant’s moral philosophy,
for example, may be discharged in a variety of ways. This latitude or ‘play-
room’ with regards to deciding how one might act – and still be acting
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morally – may affect how demanding a theory might be.3 When considering
one’s duties of beneficence, it might be less demanding if the demands are
unconfined, for example, if one may choose between spending time with the
elderly, helping at a homeless shelter or donating to a charity.
Kant’s view involves both imperfect and perfect duties. Perfect duties,
like the duty not to steal, permit no exceptions. They “prescribe the ac-
tions we are to take (or omit)” (Baron, 1995, p.30). Imperfect duties like
beneficence may be discharged in perhaps any of a large disjunction of ways
so can be seen as coarse-grained duties. This might be contrasted with act-
utilitarianism, which we might see as typically generating only fine-grained
obligations.4 It seems however that whether obligations are fine-grained or
coarse-grained, they could lead to overly demanding prescriptions. It is im-
portant for Kantian imperfect duties that they cannot simply be ignored;
they must be discharged. So, we may imagine that even with a long disjunc-
tion of possible ways to discharge a duty, each way would involve something
overly demanding. Alternatively, we might look at the iteration of imper-
fect duties. If discharging the duty required performing several actions, each
individual one might not be demanding, but the series as a whole might be.
So obligation-generation (whether the obligations be coarse-grained or
fine-grained) is a necessary condition. It is clearly not sufficient, however,
as a theory could generate only minimal and occasional demands.
Maximisation
In the previous section, it was established that in order to be too demand-
ing, a theory must make demands. This does seem trivially true. We may
wonder whether it guarantees the availability of a demandingness objection
if these obligations are taken to be maximising.5 McElwee suggests that one
3This is likely to depend on the interpretation of Kant given. Some authors, like
Thomas Hill, suggest that imperfect duties are where we may locate the category of
supererogation in Kantian ethics. Hill claims that duties of beneficence are the duties of
‘widest’ obligation thus allow most latitude (2002, p.204). Other Kantians, such as Marcia
Baron (e.g. 1987; 1995) and Jens Timmermann (e.g. 2005) deny that Kant makes room
for supererogation. As a result, any latitude under their interpretation might not affect
the demandingness of an agent’s obligations.
4I say typically because there may be situations of a tie in terms of expected utility,
and such a tie could be among a large number of options. In those situations, a disjunction
of options equal to the number in the tie would be available.
5The term ‘maximising’ makes more sense when considering utilitarian theories, where
some good (utility) is maximised. I will continue to use this term, but with regards to a
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reason consequentialism is seen as so vulnerable to accusations of overde-
mandingness is that in “its modern versions, consequentialism has generally
included what we might call a presumption of optimality – the idea that
‘only the best is good enough’” (2017, p.86).
For any values a theory may esteem, it might be suggested that an agent
should – and is morally required to – promote those values to the highest
degree she can, or act in accordance with them at all times. It is often
supposed that utilitarianism ordinarily requires that an agent maximises
the amount of happiness, and, as we have seen, this results in an extremely
demanding account of morality. If maximising would have a similar effect for
all plausible conceptions of the good, this would suggest that maximisation
is the problematic feature.
Some types of obligations, however, are not demanding even when an
agent acts in accordance with them as much as possible. An obvious example
of this would be some negative obligations – those following from negative
duties. If we have the (plausible) obligation not to gratuitously torture6
anyone, maximally cohering to this obligation – never gratuitously torturing
anyone – is actually a very easy requirement. If the values of a moral theory
only required actions like this, presumably they could all be compatible with
a very easy lifestyle.
From this we might want to conclude that it is not sufficient for a theory
to be maximising in order for a demandingness objection to be available,
that maximising negative duties need not be that demanding. However,
this would be too quick. Any theory that is to be plausible must place
some value on the wellbeing of others (though perhaps not unconditionally,
e.g. Kant). This should be a value that, in the right contexts, could confer
obligations upon a moral agent. In a case like Singer’s pond example, or to
take an even more extreme case, if one could save a million people simply
by pushing a button, it seems like a theory would be amiss if it did not give
the verdict that the agent was morally obligated to act.
This may have been a little brief, but for reasons like these it does not
seem controversial to claim that a moral theory should (in the right circum-
variety of other theories, an obligation to do the best is more accurate.
6I include the term “gratuitously” to cover cases where torture might be argued to be
important (e.g. with the goal of saving many, many lives), and strange situations wherein
not being able to could be claimed to be demanding. I do not want to take a stance on
that question here, but it seems that gratuitous torture must be easy to avoid.
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stances) entail positive obligations. Any theory that does value the wellbeing
of others and requires maximisation of wellbeing, will be extremely demand-
ing. An alternative option is that a theory may claim that maximising the
good is obligatory, but have the wellbeing of others as only a component in
what ‘the good’ amounts to. On a Kantian picture, for example, as well as
duties to promote the welfare of others (duties of beneficence), an agent has
duties to oneself. Some of the duties to oneself are perfect duties too, like
the duty not to commit suicide, or “deprive oneself of an integral part or
organ” (Doctrine of Virtue, [§6:423]),7 or eating or drinking to the degree
of incapacitation (Doctrine of Virtue, [§6:427]). We might think that these
perfect duties to oneself could limit the amount of beneficent conduct that
could be required of an agent.
Maximally promoting the good (as much as this makes sense) in Kantian
terms, prohibits violation of any perfect duties (as that would make an action
wrong) and might require taking some action to take other imperfect duties
seriously. Some of these imperfect duties are also to oneself, such as the duty
of an agent to “cultivate his capacities” (Doctrine of Virtue, [§6:445]). If we
judge Kant to require that an agent make some time or resources available
for cultivating one’s capacities, even at the expense of potentially life-saving
beneficent acts, we might wonder if this would reduce those commitments
enough to not be susceptible to a challenge of being overly demanding. While
a Singer-esque utilitarian will suggest that one must help others as much
as possible until doing so will involve more sacrifice for oneself than other
agents would benefit, a Kantian might claim that acting like this would force
them to neglect their talents. Pinheiro Walla suggests that one motivation
for Kantians to incorporate imperfect duties is to prevent morality being
“excessively demanding, perhaps even unbearable for human beings” (2015,
p.732). Prima facie, accepting that there are occasions wherein one has a
choice whether or not to perform some beneficent act, and accepting that
one has moral obligations to oneself that compete with obligations to others,
does seem promising for avoiding over-demanding prescriptions.
Because of the apparent promise of manoeuvres like this, we may ask
whether an acceptance of multiple sources of obligations – still accepting
7Kant distinguishes here between integral parts or organs on one hand, and diseased
organs or mere “parts” on the other. Through this distinction he allows that cutting
one’s hair is permissible, but giving away a tooth is maiming oneself, and is regarded as
“partially murdering oneself”.
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that an agent must always do the best – exempts a moral theory from
overdemandingness. My response to this is two-fold.
Firstly, in Kant’s case specifically, it seems like even the perfect duties
to oneself might incur extreme (and implausibly high) demands. Consider
the perfect duty not to deprive “oneself of certain integral, organic parts”
(Doctrine of Virtue: [§6:421]). This could become extremely demanding if
an agent could save the life of a loved one only by donating a kidney or
part of one’s liver. Being forced to watch a loved one die perhaps from a
condition that entails a great deal of suffering – due to obeying this perfect
duty – would be extremely demanding.8 Pinheiro Walla offers several other
cases, where the supposed normative priority of perfect duties over imperfect
ones leads to counterintuitive verdicts, such as the obligation not to violate a
person’s private property (a perfect duty) when doing so would be necessary
to save someone’s life (falling under the duty of beneficence – an imperfect
duty). In addition, she notes that even just complying with perfect duties,
such as the duty to keep promises, can when there are “unfriendly external
circumstances”, be extremely demanding (2015, p.741). Tyrants demanding
that one lies or face threats of severe punishment could be one such example.
Second, we can think of another way a theory may include maximis-
ing and include duties that could compete with the duty to promote wel-
fare. Consider W. D. Ross, for instance, who argues that there are several
sources of duties. As well as duties of beneficence, Ross identifies duties of
fidelity, duties of reparation, duties of gratitude, duties of justice, duties of
self-improvement and duties of non-maleficence (2002, p.21). It would be
possible to have a theoretic weighting to these duties, suggesting that act-
ing upon the ‘heaviest’ duty in a given situation is obligatory. An agent in
this situation is still required to perform the best course of action, but this
will not necessarily result in the greatest happiness or definitively prohibit
actions like promise-breaking.
On a Rossian picture, it is not obvious what maximising might look
like, but it seems plausible that sometimes the ‘best’ thing to do, whatever
that might involve, will be hugely demanding for moral agents.9 In iterative
8As in the case provided by van Ackeren and Sticker, we might think that this case is
another instance where the problem is not that the act is too demanding, but that Kant
arrives at the wrong verdict here.
9This point is also noted by Liam Murphy (2000, p.10). He suggests that Ross –
as well as Samuel Clarke and perhaps William Godwin – advocates a pluralism which
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examples, for instance, it still seems that a great deal will be required (even
if not maximising the amount of lives saved).
However a theory accounts for valuing wellbeing, it seems that max-
imising is at least likely to lead to severe demands. If wellbeing is seen as
the only value, maximising leads to maximising utilitarianism, which is ex-
tremely demanding. If wellbeing is valued among other values, any theory
which maximises all of these will at least have a difficult time explaining
how maximising these values is not extremely (and excessively) demanding.
It clearly seems that obligations do not have to always require doing the
best in order to be overly demanding. To illustrate this, we might consider
a form of satisficing consequentialism. Satisficing consequentialism claims
that agents “may sometimes choose what is good enough, without regard
for whether what they have chosen is the best thing (outcome) available in
the circumstances” (Slote, 1984, p.141). If we consider a ranking of actions
from morally best to morally worst, a satisficing theory claims that of a
certain act, an act at least that good must be done, while an action lower
on the ranking would be impermissible. Higher acts on the ranking may be
supererogatory. If a satisficing account places the bar very high – but still
not maximally high – it might still seem too demanding, and lend itself to
a demandingness objection.
Thus, a (plausible) theory’s being maximising is definitely not necessary
for a demandingness objection to be applicable. Whether, combined with
a plausible account of values, a theory’s requiring maximising is actually
sufficient for the objection, I am not sure, but would tentatively suggest
that there is good reason to think it is.
Having established that obligation-generation is a necessary feature for
a theory to be susceptible to demandingness objections, no other features
could be sufficient, absent obligation-generation. Other features might still
be necessary, or they may be jointly sufficient alongside obligation-generation
(and possibly others). Consequently, for the remainder of features I consider
whether they are necessary or jointly-sufficient with obligation-generation.
involves a maximising (or “optimizing” in Murphy’s terminology) principle of beneficence
(2000, p.137,n.3), and that this is likely to lead to very demanding accounts of morality.
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3.2 Impartiality
One feature of moral theories that we might think is likely to make them
very demanding is moral impartiality. If we accept that everyone is of equal
moral value, then we might be persuaded that the suffering of oneself or
a loved one should have the same ability to generate demands as someone
on the other side of the world. If everyone counts equally, and the lives of
world’s poor are improved much more easily, we might be drawn, prima facie,
to the conclusion that we (the relatively aﬄuent) ought to devote almost
all of our energies to relieving the suffering of the distant poor. It might
seem impartiality is bound to lead to excessive demandingness. Ashford,
for example, suggests that “in the current state of the world it may not be
possible to defend less demanding obligations to those in need within an
impartial framework” (2003, p.274).10
That we might ordinarily think impartiality to be important in generat-
ing the objection is noted by Garrett Cullity, who claims that problems of
demandingness have two conventional theoretical sources noted in the lit-
erature, and that they both have in common the claim of impartiality. He
suggests that once an agent accepts she is no more important, morally speak-
ing, than any other agent “it is easy to see how an extremely demanding
morality might result” (Cullity, 2004, p.92).
One way the problem is ordinarily generated is through impartiality in
relation to what is deemed to be valuable. If the moral evaluation of an
action is determined by the value of an outcome, and the evaluation is
agent-neutral, then a simple method of generating obligations (such as the
maximising criterion of maximising act utilitarianism) will result in very
burdensome demands.
A second way Cullity notes that extreme demands may result from im-
partiality is through responses to reasons (Cullity, 2004, p.92). If an agent
accepts that her suffering (or desires/hopes/dreams) gives her a reason to
act, and that due to impartiality, the force of the reason to act should be
the same regardless of whose suffering grounds it, she is committed to the
demanding claim that she should respond to the needs of others with the
same vigour as she would her own.
Despite this, Cullity rejects that impartiality should be seen as essen-
10A similar point is made in (Ashford and Mulgan, 2012, §8).
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tial to generating the problem. He notes that iterative methods, like those
described in 1.2.1 can generate excessive demands, and relies on neither of
these sources. This can be demonstrated by generating with a very partial
theory. Cullity arrives at extreme demands by considering a low-cost life-
saving scenario and considering multiple iterations of it. Even if the theory
does involve some partiality, if it still requires an agent to sacrifice something
negligible in order to save a life in some case, we can iterate the obligation
until it does become extreme. Problems of demandingness, Cullity argues,
arise even if we were to accept the following, Partial Premise:
“It may be wrong for me to do nothing to help another per-
son, but it is not wrong to be prepared to do significantly less
for him than I would do for myself.”
(2004, p.93)
This premise clearly relies on neither of the traditional sources of exces-
sive demandingness that Cullity mentioned. Cullity uses this to cast doubt
on responses to extreme demandingness which try to justify a claim like the
Partial Premise (like Scheﬄer’s agent-centred prerogatives do), and escape
that way, as this is not enough to actually escape the problem. As the de-
mandingness objection can be generated even if a theory denies impartiality,
it cannot be a necessary condition for a theory to fall prey to the objection.
When we consider impartiality paired with obligation-generation, it is
also not jointly sufficient. That is to say, obligation-generating theories
which are also impartial may not be susceptible to the objection. There
are no obvious examples (to my mind at least) of impartial, obligation-
generating theories which do not fall victim to the objection.11 Even a
theory which makes extremely small demands can result – through several
iterations – in extreme (and implausible) demands, so it is difficult for a
theory to avoid the possibility of extreme demands.
However, we can manufacture theories to meet this condition. Consider
Defenestration-Empathy-Theory (DET). This bizarre moral theory acknowl-
edges that all people are morally equal, but holds that moral requirements
only obtain when someone is thrown out of a window, and they only require
11Miller (2004), Cullity (2004) and Murphy (2000) attempt to provide accounts that
meet this condition in response to concerns of demandingness. Miller’s and Murphy’s
accounts are discussed in chapter 4.
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a display of some empathy with the defenestrated agent. Clearly, this is
not a theory many will rush to endorse, but it is difficult to see how a de-
mandingness objection could apply to such an account. Even if iterated to a
large degree – if you happen to be surrounded by people who are falling out
of windows – displaying some empathy to each of them does not seem like
it could be too demanding. Our actual obligations – ones we are generally
willing to acknowledge – will be heavier than those issued by DET.
We might respond to this finding by suggesting that this is not what
we want impartiality to mean when talking about a moral theory. Bernard
Gert defines impartiality the following way:
“A is impartial in respect R with regard to group G if and
only if A’s actions in respect R are not influenced by which mem-
ber(s) of G benefit or are harmed by these actions.”
(Gert, 2004, p.117)
This might be thought to imply that impartiality required equal treat-
ment. If we consider the generosity, for example, to be impartially generous,
one would need to be generous in ways that are not influenced by who one
is being generous to. Buying a gift for a friend – because they are a friend
– would then seem problematic, as this would clearly be influenced by who
would benefit from the act. We generally do not think that theories claiming
to be impartial make this kind of commitment, so this unrestricted impar-
tiality is not required for a theory to be considered impartial – a theory’s
being impartial does not require that the beneficiary of every action which
harms or benefits to be impartially determined.
There are several candidates that might be intended. Hooker discusses
three things that might be meant by impartiality in “When Is Impartiality
Appropriate?”. These are:
1. Impartial application of good (first-order) moral rules.
2. Impartial benevolence as the direct guide to decisions about what to
do.
3. Impartial assessment of (first-order) moral rules.
(Hooker, 2009b, p.26)
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Requiring impartial application of good moral rules is more subtle than
simply requiring equal treatment of everyone. A good moral rule may (very
plausibly) allow a person to treat certain groups differently. Many rules
– particularly those concerning violations – can often easily be impartially
complied with, and doing so involves no partial behaviour. The requirement
not to kill, for example, must be impartially applied, and this is done by
simply not killing anyone (Gert, 2004, p.118). Some rules however will
mandate partiality. Sidgwick, for example, defends the partial rules that
utilitarianism might result in, as it would “clearly not promote the universal
happiness for each one practically to concern himself with the happiness
of others as much as with his own” (1907, p.431). The rules that result
then may allow, or require, a person to treat themselves or other groups
differently. We might consider the rule:
“The product of a collective enterprise should be divided in
proportion to people’s contributions to the enterprise”
(Hooker, 2009b, p.29)
If this is a good rule (and it looks very plausible), it will often result
in dividing the products of the enterprise unevenly. How to apply a rule
might still be complicated. If a band agrees to implement a rule like this,
for example, they might consider who purchased music software, booked
gigs or provided practice space when applying the rule. It might be that
a fair application of a rule like this would result in one person receiving
considerably more of the product of the enterprise, and this would not be a
problem. When the rule is applied, however, it must be done so impartially.
If Ringo booked the gigs, for example, this should not be seen as a less
valuable investment in the enterprise than if Paul booked them.
A similar example might be the rule that “Employers should pay their
staff what they are entitled to”. We might imagine that most employers do
agree with this rule, yet it still might be applied partially. In workplaces
where women or ethnic minority workers are paid less than their white male
counterparts, for example, it might be suspected that some partial explana-
tions are used in the application.
Hooker correctly claims that impartiality in the application of good
moral rules is “always appropriate” (2009b, p.26). It seems that this should
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be required of any impartial moral theory. However, this understanding of
impartiality does not seem to generate overly demanding moral verdicts un-
less the first-order moral rules themselves are overly demanding.12 A theory
could also be extremely demanding even if its rules are not applied impar-
tially. We might imagine a set of good rules – ones we might be inclined to
agree with – but under a meta-ethical principle that we only apply the rules
partially to members of our own race. Because members of one’s own race
may require large amounts of aid, the racism of this meta-ethical principle
would also not prohibit extreme demands. While we do accept that impar-
tial application of rules is important, this is not typically what we mean
thinking of a requirement for impartiality.
The second impartiality claim Hooker discusses – impartial benevolence
as the direct guide to decisions about what to do – concerns completely
unrestricted impartiality about reasons to act. It suggests that benefits
“to strangers would count in your reasoning no less than the same-sized
benefits to your partner, child or mother” (2009b, p.31). Theories that
standardly require for type of impartiality would certainly be extremely
demanding. Hooker notes that if an agent is able to save three lives by
sacrificing herself and donating her heart and both kidneys, this would be
required (2009b, p.31). Maximising act-utilitarianism may make these sorts
of requirements, but it is not seen as a requirement for a theory’s being
impartial. One type of case where impartial benevolence is required as a
guide is in certain official capacities. People running charities, for example,
who are charged with catering to the welfare of famine-ridden countries are
obliged in their professional capacity to use the resources at their disposal
completely impartially.
If, for a theory to be impartial, it needs to require impartial benevolence
as the guide as to what to do (which I have suggested is not the case), then
this does result in what seem like excessive demands. We know this from
the example of act utilitarianism. This is because as soon as an account of
welfare is plugged in – to say what goods or harms consist in – it would
require an agent to treat the goods or harms of any other persons as just
12A strange feature of this particular analysis is that it allows most theories to be cast
as impartial, so long as the rules are accepted as good rules. Scheﬄer’s agent-centred
prerogatives, for example, could be defended from an impartial position. Even forms of
egoism – perhaps Brink’s rational egoism (1997) – might be regarded as impartial, despite
being, what we understand as paradigmatically partial accounts.
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as obligation-generating as those of herself or loved ones.13 We can also
note that a theory does not need to be impartial in this sense in order to
be overly demanding, as as is demonstrated by several accounts already
discussed which can be overly demanding but are not impartial in this way,
such as Scheﬄer’s agent-centred prerogatives.14
The third of Hooker’s considerations is what I take to be definitive of
what a theory needs in order to be properly considered impartial. It re-
quires that the assessment of which rules that a theory should have must
be impartial. What this requires is not as simple as might be suspected at
first. It seems that an impartial justification must be one that is “defensible
from an agent-neutral point of view” (2009b, p.35). This will then include
assessments which permit no partial evaluations, like the utilitarian assess-
ments of actions, which see benefits or harms as having the same importance
regardless of who experiences them, but also some that do allow partial rule-
formations. Consider rules that might benefit the poorest arrived at through
reasoning from behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance. The rules will be par-
tial, but – if it is accepted that they result from considerations of justice –
impartially justified.
Commitments to impartiality of this sort seem essential for a theory to be
an impartial one. Unfortunately, it is still difficult to see which rules should
be adopted. As Hooker accepts, “no appeal to impartiality by itself can
resolve the question of which agent-neutral considerations and distinctions
do, and which do not, have foundational importance” (2009b, p.39). Because
of this, theories may be justified on impartial grounds and place a heavy
focus on property rights and just transactions, like Nozick in Anarchy, State
and Utopia (1974), or place emphasis on maximising the minimum level
of welfare in a society, like Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1991). Hooker
notes that rules which implausibly benefit those with certain talents, like
song-writing or sporting ability, can be agent-neutrally defended, yet lead
to highly unpalatable elitism (2009b, p.37).
Construed in terms of impartial assessment of first-order moral rules,
impartiality (and obligation-generation) would also not be sufficient to result
13Given an appropriate state of the world, this would then be very demanding. As
mentioned in section 1.1.1 it does not matter whether this state of the world actually or
currently obtains.
14Other examples include Miller’s Sympathy principle, discussed in section 4.1, and
Murphy’s Collective Principle of Beneficence, discussed in section 4.2.
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in extreme demands. We might think the Defenestration Empathy Theory
example could still be an example of this (an impartial theory that is not
too demanding) but this might be rejected as not impartially defensible (as
it simply does not seem like anyone could really endorse such a theory).
A satisficing consequentialism with an extremely low bar for requirement
presumably could be defended impartially however, and the conditions for
satisficing might be stipulated to be so low that it is never too demanding.15
This interpretation of impartiality could also not be necessary, as we saw by
considering the society with horrifically racist rules (or which make specific
reference to individuals) which is also extremely demanding.
When we consider impartiality as a virtue of a moral theory, it involves
a requirement not to be biased in favour of some group or another. We want
our theory to embrace equality in some relevant way. For impartiality to be
plausible as a feature of a moral theory, however, we want it to be compatible
with considerations of justice. For instance, it must be permissible to reward
people who have worked hard, in favour of those who have been idle. This is
agent-neutrally defensible, but will result in partial rules. It also seems that
we must, in the way Sidgwick discusses, be able act partially (to at least
some degree) with respect to our loved ones – even if this behaviour should
be justified agent-neutrally. It therefore seems that, as far as impartiality
is something desirable in a moral theory, it is that its rules must be agent-
neutrally defensible.16
This should demonstrate that a theory’s accepting impartiality is neither
necessary nor sufficient (even alongside obligation-generation) for a demand-
ingness objection to be available. Despite often being picked out as a key
feature in generating overly demanding verdicts, impartiality actually plays
no crucial role in a theory’s being diagnosed as overly demanding.
3.3 Insensitivity to Social Factors
There are many ways in which social factors may affect an agent’s phe-
nomenology of moral obligation. By social factors I mean the values, expec-
tations and practices of an agent’s community. There is an obvious sense
15Jan Narveson seems to want to defend an account of our obligations like this, claiming
that insofar as we can talk about duties to the faraway needy, they are fairly minimal,
and that when people do more than this, it is “nice”, but not obligatory (2003).
16I take it as obvious that these rules should also be impartially applied.
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in which these factors will affect one’s obligations. If, for example, people
around you regularly participate in certain dangerous sports, this may affect
your obligations in that you will more often face situations where you are
able to provide aid. Similarly, if they have certain values, certain behaviours
may offend or upset to them to the point that their welfare will be signifi-
cantly diminished, and we might think that this grounds obligations around
such behaviours. Of course, these sorts of examples do seem relevant, but
they are not what I am concerned with here. What I am concerned with is
ways social factors may affect obligations that are not obviously accounted
for by changes in welfare.
In this section I consider three ways in which social factors may affect
obligations. First, they may make certain acts easier or more difficult to
perform, and could affect obligations that way. Second, other agents not
doing their ‘fair share’, will often make the best action an agent could per-
form considerably more demanding, and if we think morality cannot demand
more than what is fair (in some sense), theories which do not take this into
account will be inadequate. Third, we might think that the social factors
have some role in constituting what our obligations are. I consider these
options in turn.
How can the number of people performing some act make it more dif-
ficult? And how could this affect what one is actually required to do? We
might consider the effect of peer pressure. If many people in a given social
group or community perform a certain charitable act – and the act is such
that knowledge of those performing it is publicly available or readily com-
municated – an agent is more likely to feel compelled that they should also
perform that act. Not only will good behaviour affect the sense of obligation
and willingness to perform such acts, but it also seems like this type of factor
may alter the perception of how difficult it is to perform.
For an example of this sort of behaviour and the perceptions of it by
the agents concerned, we may look at the villagers of Le Chambon during
World War II. Lawrence Blum gives this example when discussing the role
of communities in sustaining virtuous behaviour (1998).17 Le Chambon is a
French village, which during World War II sheltered around 3,000 refugees.
Sheltering refugees was a serious crime at the time, punishable by impris-
17Blum notes that this is an oft-cited example, but himself draws heavily from discus-
sions of the community by Alasdair MacIntyre (1984, p.10).
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onment and potentially death, though none of the villagers of Le Chambon
were executed. Three village leaders were jailed during this time for aiding
refugees.
It may be surprising that so many villagers helped out with assisting
refugees. The effort clearly involved large numbers of the community, as the
village only had a population of about 3,000. What is more pertinent for my
purposes here is how the villagers later described their actions. Blum notes
that though we see the actions of these villagers as extremely admirable,
“The Chambonnais did not see their actions and practises as having been
virtuous in the ‘noteworthy’ sense. When pressed to say why they helped
the refugees, they said, ‘It was simply what one had to do’, ‘She [a refugee]
was standing at my door; how could I fail to help?’ and things of that sort”
(1998, p.242).
Clearly, however, their behaviour was noteworthy. The risks taken by
the inhabitants of this small village for the good of strangers were truly
exceptional. Given that this type of collective action was not replicated in
other similar villages, it seems plausible that the social environment within
the village had a huge impact on what was perceived as required of them.
Being surrounded by people acting virtuously can be seen as promoting
virtuous behaviour in several ways. The presence of exemplars demonstrates
that the virtuous behaviour is possible.18 When a significant proportion of
a community acts in accordance with some virtue, this is bound to be even
more pronounced. On the other hand, if a virtuous person is seen as the
exception, thoughts like “I could never do that” or “That person is just
extremely impressive” might make it more plausible for an agent to believe
they simply are not able to act so virtuously. If surrounded by people similar
in all salient factors to oneself, it seems apparent to a person that they too
can act that way. Others performing a virtuous act makes it seem more like
we could do it too. That the presence of others who act similarly makes it
easier for us is supported by Hallie’s suggestion that we “fail to understand
what happened in Le Chambon in we think that for them their actions were
complex and difficult” (1979, p.284).19
18This thought is noted and substantially developed in exemplarist virtue theory, e.g.
Zagzebski (2017).
19Vanessa Carbonell argues that the presence of moral saints can increase our moral
obligations. Witnessing others perform saintly acts, bearing heavy burdens or making
huge personal sacrifices, provides us with “a special kind of evidence that bears on what
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When we consider acts that are available to us, it seems very plausible
that how difficult it is to commit to an act depends on how difficult one
regards the act. If then, the virtuousness of others in our local environment
alters our perception of how difficult an act (or lifestyle) is, it also alters how
difficult it is for us to actually commit to that act. It is natural to think it
is more demanding to perform hard actions than easier actions. Accepting
this, it seems that the easier a given good action is, the lower the benefit
would have to be to make it morally required. We can imagine reacting
particularly harshly to an agent who chooses not to help someone in dire
need when doing so would be very easy, and doing so because they could so
easily have helped. In this way, being surrounded by a virtuous culture (at
least indirectly) alters what one’s obligations are.
We may also look at how an agent’s obligations might change from a
lack of virtues within a community. While in the case of Le Chambon, the
general community may have found it easier to act virtuously, if an agent
is surrounded by others who seem to do little or nothing to help others,
they may respond to feelings that they should help by comparing to others.
Though recognising that it would be good to act in an other-regarding way,
they may think “No one else is helping” or “I’m doing as least as much as
those guys”. Seeing no exemplars, they may perceive the acts in question
as so exceptional that acting like that is something they just couldn’t do.
Is this type of difficulty accommodated by existing moral theories? It
seems that the only way ordinary (welfarist) consequentialist theories may
count this difficulty as a reason ‘against’ performing an action is if it is
regarded as some cost to wellbeing. However, it is not clear that this can be
done. It seems extremely implausible – or at least I think so – to view the
difficulty of an action one has performed, ceteris paribus, as affecting one’s
current welfare.20
Another way social factors could (conceivably) affect one’s obligations
arises when we consider fairness within a community. Someone may agree
with Singer in thinking that everyone in the western world should donate a
proportion of their disposable income so that collectively we might eliminate
we can reasonably believe about our obligations” (2012, p.228). While Carbonell does
not put her thoughts in terms of difficulty, instead viewing exposure to moral saints as
removing ignorance, much of what she says seems expressible in the terms I have used
here.
20This question is addressed further in chapter 5.
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famine, or deaths from certain diseases. But, they might think, very few
others in the western community donate that amount, which means that to
accomplish the same good, those who are donating would have to give a lot
more. They may wonder “Why should I give away so much of my money,
just because other people aren’t doing their bit?”
The types of thought above suggest that there are some ways that the ex-
pectations or compliance of others might affect one’s obligations. However,
this might strike us as puzzling. Why should other people acting morally or
immorally have an effect on how demanding my obligations are?
Singer discusses this in “Famine, Aﬄuence and Morality”. He compares
his basic pond case with the global poverty case and notes that there is an
asymmetry, because in the pond case there is only one person who can save
the child, whereas there are millions of aﬄuent westerners doing nothing
(or negligible amounts) to aid the global poor. When discussing whether
this asymmetry is morally salient, he discusses an amended pond example,
where there are several onlookers doing nothing. As it seems we would be
under no less of an obligation in that case, Singer concludes that we should
see “the absurdity of the view that numbers lessen the obligation” (1972,
p.233).
However, simply because in this particular situation, the numbers of
potential saviours does not seem to affect what one must do, this does not
mean fairness does not have some role in determining what one ought to
do. Singer’s amended pond case does not obviously lend itself to a sensible
division of labour, whereas in the case of global poverty, we can divide the
costs of saving people between those who are able and arrive at a fair amount
(perhaps a percentage of income, or of disposable income). In the pond case,
it does not make sense to see the saving of the child as a group project. If, as
Murphy (2000, p.96) and Cullity (2004, p.78) suggest, this is an important
distinction, Singer’s ruling out of numbers having a role therefore seems too
quick.
If an obligation-generating theory takes no account of social factors which
affect agents’ perceptions of obligation, they are likely to miscalculate what
obligations agents actually are subject to. Murphy provides a response to
demandingness objections which at least attempts to attempt to account for
some social factors. His particular response will be considered in 4.2.
I have suggested in this section that factors of local expectation and
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compliance can affect an agent’s obligations in a variety of ways. The pres-
ence (or absence) of exemplars may reduce the perceived difficulty of an
action, consequently reducing its actual difficulty, which in turn may affect
its obligation-status. Behaviours being seen as common or expected within
a community may also make those actions comparatively easier because of
threats of social sanctions if one does not ‘toe the line’. That is, not acting
in accordance with some norm carries a risk of drawing criticism, and com-
plying with that norm will not carry that risk.21 It also seems that there
is something unfair about a requirement to ‘pick up the moral slack’ when
other agents fail to do their bit, though it is not obvious if or how a moral
theory should respond to this.
If a moral theory does not factor any of these social features into its
assessment of which acts are obligatory, as I’ve suggested that typical wel-
farist consequentialism will struggle to do, it may be impoverished as a
result. Given the variety of ways considered here that social factors might
affect our obligations, and that these are factors which seem unaccounted
for by standard moral theories, it could be that a failure to appreciate these
factors will, in any otherwise plausible theory, make it overly demanding in
some instances.
It is difficult to evaluate whether this type of inadequate sensitivity to so-
cial factors is necessary to make a theory overly demanding, simply because
it is unclear what a proper appreciation for these factors would entail in a
theory. As with previous considerations, we might be tempted to conclude
that an insensitivity to social factors cannot be necessary for demanding-
ness on the basis of iterative cases. We might think that as long as we
commit to the claim that ‘an agent has an obligation to perform an action
involving negligible cost to relieve significant suffering’ then by the parity
of similar cases, which may be iterated, an extremely demanding conclusion
is inevitable. However, if the way an obligation is generated is sensitive
to issues of fairness or general compliance, the iteration may be halted, by
claiming that an agent has done one’s part or contributed significantly.22
21It is notable that if agents believe practices are more common, they are typically
more likely to believe that these practices are permissible Lindstro¨m et al. (2017).
22This type of thought is considered later, particularly in sections 4.2 and 6.4.
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3.4 Insensitivity to Individual Psychology
As well as social factors that may make a course of action more difficult for
an agent, we might also consider aspects of an individual’s psychology to
have a similar effect. In this category I have in mind particular attachments,
character traits, fears or predilections, which might act as barriers to per-
forming an action one otherwise would seem obligated to perform. It seems
to be a natural thought that these features do affect what we consider to be
required of agents in certain situations.
In this vein, Richard Miller argues that people should be giving more
than they currently do, but that this should not require sacrificing attach-
ments to goals that enrich one’s life (2004, p.361). As long as the projects
are “worthwhile goals”, Miller suggests that a moral theory should not de-
mand their sacrifice (2004, p.362). Because of this, people psychologically
constituted in such a way that their lives would be made significantly worse
very easily – perhaps their worthwhile goals require practically all of their
available resources – would (according to Miller) have lesser obligations than
other people.
While this is controversial, there is a plausibility to the notion that
having a certain attachment to a goal or activity might count against actions
that would be incompatible with their enjoyment. To take a more modest
example, consider Daphne, an agent who is usually quite sensitive to the
plight of the world’s poor. Daphne gives a large portion of her income
to charity, but has one family heirloom which she would not sell, despite
knowing that it would raise enough money to do a great deal of good. She
would find it hard to part with the item because of its sentimental value
to her. We probably would not begrudge her this one luxury that has
strong personal value, despite her knowing she could save several lives if she
did part with it. If we find examples like this convincing, it suggests that
psychological attachments can grant ‘special permissions’ to not perform
some act that would otherwise be obligatory.
Similarly, it seems plausible that people who are generally of a friendly
disposition but find certain beneficent acts – like helping with the elderly,
perhaps – particularly difficult might have less of an obligation to perform
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those actions.23
Another type of example we might consider could involve confronting
phobias. Imagine Aga, who is mildly agoraphobic. She is uncomfortable
in open spaces, though the anxiety subsides very quickly once the situation
is over. One day, spending her time in her house conducting her standard
daily routine (all indoors), she notices through the window that a baby is in
the middle of the road. No one else seems to be around, so she knows that
to secure the baby’s safety she would have to go outside for a brief time.
The very thought of doing so makes her panic, but she knows she could do
it.
Though we might well think Aga is still required to rush out to save the
baby, her condition definitely seems to complicate matters. If she did not
go outside, maybe we would blame her, but not to the same degree as a
neighbour across the road without such a condition who watched idly.
An alternative way of accounting for this phenomena is to treat these
types of psychological features as excuse conditions.24 The ‘right’ actions in
each case were still obligatory, but the agent is excused (or their culpability
is mitigated) by the extenuating psychological circumstances. A potential
failing of analysing these situations as only excuse conditions is that we
might be tempted to see the agents as no more praiseworthy (than a person
without the specified psychological feature) if they do act in the right way
– they have still merely done what is obligatory.
3.5 The Diagnosis
The availability of a demandingness objection to a moral theory depends
on that theory making demands of agents. This much is clear, and it does
not seem to matter what kind of obligations these are; they may be coarse-
grained or fine-grained. A plausible theory that also maximises — that
requires maximal promotion of whatever goods it espouses — seems at least
likely to be overly demanding.
While embracing impartiality is often heralded as leading to demanding
obligations, there are several ways in which a theory may be rightly labelled
‘impartial’ that do not have this result. The only notion of impartiality
23Whether difficulty has an effect on moral obligations is discussed extensively in chap-
ter 5.
24This is the solution I favour, and argue for in section 5.2.2.
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which would guarantee that a theory is demanding — impartial benevolence
as the direct guide to action — is not a feature possessed by many theories,
so is clearly not crucial in propagating extreme demands.
I have suggested that factors involving one’s moral community, such
as local compliance and expectation, can (at least indirectly) change how
demanding a situation is. If theories do not accommodate this (and many
do not) the verdicts of how much is demanded in those situations is likely
to be mistaken.
It is also apparent that our judgments about moral agents do vary in
accordance with various features of individual psychology. However, I tenta-
tively suggested that these considerations may be best understood as play-
ing a role in granting excuse-conditions. It certainly is not the case that
unusual features of individual psychology explain most cases of overly de-
manding verdicts, though, as psychologically ‘normal’ agents would (and
do) find many of these verdicts implausibly demanding.
In terms of isolating a cause for demanding verdicts, the most promising
type feature from this analysis seems to be an insensitivity to certain features
of agent’s moral community.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter I have attempted to find which features make a theory vul-
nerable to this objection. The most obvious feature is a generation of moral
requirements. These requirements might be disjunctive (obligations to do φ
or ψ or ξ). Though impartiality is often cited as being important, I have
argued that a theory need not be impartial in order to fall prey to demand-
ingness, nor will every impartial theory be susceptible.
Instead, a failure to account for several broad factors – social features
which might affect obligation and certain aspects of individual psychology –
were noted as promising avenues. If what I have suggested is correct, then
issues of compliance and expectation within a moral community, and an
agent’s perception of these features have a much greater role in determining
what an agent’s moral obligations actually are than is usually accepted.
Psychological differences among individuals were also discussed, though no
verdict was concluded about whether an ignorance of those issues can result
in overly demanding accounts. In the following chapters, I consider moral
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theories offered in response to overdemandingness which can be seen as
taking these features into account.
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4Potential Solutions and
Failings
“Everybody Else is Doing it, so Why Can’t we?”
– The Cranberries, album title
“A problem left to itself dries up or goes rotten. But fertilize a
problem with a solution – you’ll hatch out dozens.”
– N. F. Simpson, A Resounding Tinkle
In this section I discuss two recent attempts, by Miller and Murphy
respectively, to provide responses that adequately address the demanding-
ness objection by making changes in accordance with some of the features
mentioned above. Richard Miller attempts to soften moral obligations by
examining underlying dispositions rather than individual actions. This move
is able to cater for differences in individual psychology leading to different
moral obligations. Liam Murphy limits demands in relation to social fac-
tors, particularly focussing on how demands change in nonideal theory, i.e.
in situations where there is not full compliance with the moral rules.
I will suggest that each of these attempts ultimately fail, and attempt
to illustrate why this is the case, before considering what lessons might be
learned from these accounts.
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4.1 Miller’s Underlying Dispositions
Richard Miller sees his project as a direct reaction to Peter Singer’s extrem-
ism. He concedes that while Singer’s principle looks extremely plausible,
upon reflection, its demandingness “misconstrues ordinary morality” (2004,
p.358).
In opposition to Singer, Miller proposes a more moderate account of our
duties of beneficence, based on the ‘Principle of Sympathy’,1 that:
“One’s underlying disposition to respond to neediness as such
ought to be sufficiently demanding that giving which would ex-
press greater underlying concern would impose a significant risk
of worsening one’s life, if one fulfilled all further responsibilities;
and it need not be any more demanding than this.”
(Miller, 2004, p.359) 2
Rather than focussing on individual acts, Miller’s principle examines
the appropriate attitude of concern an agent should have. This concern
is an “underlying disposition”, which should be demanding enough that
expressing more concern would risk making one’s life worse.3 Miller is clear
that the suggestion that minor reductions in the quality of goods in some
instances or other trivial events do not count as worsening one’s life. Against
the possible counter-claim that such trivialities do worsen one’s life, but
only by an insignificant amount, he doesn’t offer a rebuttal, but instead
suggests that such opponents recalibrate the view to treat “significant risk
of worsening one’s life” as short for “significant risk of significantly worsening
one’s life” (2004, p.359).
Miller makes a distinction between underlying dispositions, which ex-
press basic concerns in a coarse-grained way, from personal policies, which
1Henceforth Sympathy
2Miller also defends this principle in the first chapter of Globalizing Justice: The Ethics
of Poverty and Power (2010).
3This may seem reminiscent of Kant’s imperfect duty to beneficence. Kant holds
that “beneficence is the maxim of making others’ happiness one’s end, and the duty to it
consists in the subject’s being constrained by his reason to adopt this maxim as universal
law” (The Doctrine of Virtue, in The Metaphysics of Morals: §9). Imperfect duties, such
as this, involve latitude, so may be discharged in various ways. Though there is some
disagreement among Kantians (see Timmermann 2005), several argue that for Kant, one
is not morally required to help in every situation (e.g. Baron 1987, Hill 2002).
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are “specific standing commitments” (2004, p.360). Underlying dispositions
are the subject of Sympathy. A similar disposition may, in different people
provoke a different response, based on one’s inclinations, means and skill
set. We may consider the disposition to help those in need in a situation
where a bystander has a medical emergency. The underlying disposition
will prompt one to help. If the would-be helper has medical training, this
help will probably be manifested by immediate medical help, whereas if not,
calling for help might be the more appropriate personal policy.
The more moderate demands entailed by the Sympathy depend on what
counts as significantly worsening one’s life. Miller wants Sympathy to be
more compatible with everyday moral commitments, thus allow agents to
act in accordance with various worthwhile goals the agent identifies with,
“with which he could not readily detach” (2004, p.360). For Miller, aban-
doning a worthwhile goal, such as developing a sophisticated appreciation of
music or expanding one’s culinary horizons, does significantly worsen one’s
life. Clearly, Sacrifice would not allow agents such indulgences, but Miller’s
Sympathy does encourage people to pursue “worthwhile goals”. These goals
are seen as basic interests; those that give “point and value to specific choices
and plans” (2004, p.361). Miller’s “basic interests” must not be confused
with the interests an agent needs to merely survive, but are those interests
that a person may see as essential to who they are.
Miller even defends some extravagant interests, even when their pursuit
comes at the cost of donating more to the needy. Though it would allow
us to relieve suffering further if we had more modest interests, once one has
certain interests and one’s life would be worsened if they cannot be pursued,
one should not be obligated to damage one’s life by abandoning them. This
allows Sympathy to be compatible with the occasional (and depending on
the nature of the interest, even the not-so-occasional) purchase of luxury
goods.
Despite this relaxing of obligations, Miller is adamant that Sympathy
would require significant spending from most of the world’s non-poor, though
he does acknowledge that some people with expensive tastes (e.g. if one has
an “exorbitantly expensive goal that most of us lack or could readily do
without”) will need to “retain much more than he otherwise would to avoid
worsening” their lives (2004, p.363).
Miller is even able to defend why this particular principle is appropriate.
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He sees equal respect as the foundation for judgements of moral wrongness:
“a choice is morally wrong if and only if it could not be made under the
circumstances by someone displaying equal respect for all persons” (2004,
p.366). If equal respect for all is a good foundation from which moral claims
can be deduced, and Sympathy is consistent with equal respect for all – that
is, it does not provide contradictory verdicts – then Sympathy must be a
good moral principle (at least with regards to what is morally wrong).
One might wonder how it is possible to respect everyone equally, yet
allow some in the third world to starve, and privilege others, like oneself or
one’s family. To alleviate this concern, Miller notes the distinction between
equal respect and equal concern. Equal concern would require that one be
equally distraught by a stranger contracting a deadly illness as her child
catching the same illness (which strikes most of us as undesirable). Though
we may respect everyone equally, the interests of those closest to us will
bring us to act more readily and more acutely than those of a stranger.
Similarly, we will (generally) be more readily moved by our own needs than
by those of others: Respect for others need not require us to “be prepared to
do violence to who one is” (2004, p.362). As we identify with our worthwhile
goals – we see our goals as part of who we are – and we should also respect
ourselves, we cannot be required to abandon these worthwhile goals. So,
Miller is able to argue, equal respect for all is consistent with Sympathy.
Miller is adamant that equal respect is universally acknowledged as good,
and explains that it does not entail equal concern or equal treatment, but it
isnt exactly clear what this lofty notion – ‘equal respect’ – actually means.
It seems that Miller sees this as suggesting to us all a particular way of
thinking about agents and requiring a degree of consideration. The term
itself, “equal respect”, appears compatible with not respecting anyone at
all, as long as everyone is not respected equally.
It might be that equal respect is a confused notion, but I will suppose it
must involve certain features. Primarily, it must involve some appreciation
that there is no objective reason to favour the interests of one person over
another. It would be inconsistent with equal respect to promote govern-
ment policies belying a valuing of a certain culture, person or group as more
valuable than another. When one manifests unequal concern, this must be
because of some special relationship, and not because of a supposed differ-
ence in intrinsic value. Equal respect must also entail an acknowledgement
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that all moral agents have interests of their own, and a recognition that
their goals have value for them in the same way our goals have value to us.
I will assume for the remainder of this paper that “equal respect” is able
to perform the justificatory function he supposes, though I do acknowledge
that further probing could be undertaken in this avenue. Equal respect for
all, we may suggest, is a common-sense moral principle that we all do and
should support.
It is perhaps of interest to note that Sympathy does not generate any of
the counterintuitive judgements to several of the counterexamples posited
against Sacrifice discussed in 2.2.1. One such type of example involves
iterative demands. If one can save a child from drowning at negligible cost,
it seems obvious that one should do it. However, even when the stakes are
this high, if there is an endless amount of children dying, we might think that
after a certain point, it is permissible to not save one. This point has recently
been argued by Travis Timmerman (2015). According to Miller’s account,
what would be morally required would be having an appropriate level of
underlying concern. This would require a serious and genuine concern, but
would allow one to give up at some point, acknowledging that manifesting
a degree of concern more than this would significantly worsen one’s life.
4.1.1 Problems of Miller’s Account
There are several problems with Sympathy, some perhaps providing only
minor difficulties that could be reconciled. I argue here that some of these
problems require us to deny Sympathy. Though Sympathy is supposed to
provide us with a good moral principle to live by, it seems too generous
to some (and possibly not to people we deem morally good), too harsh on
others and, after some considerations, unclear.
Sympathy seems too weak
Because of Miller’s stance on “basic interests”, Sympathy may make very
minimal (or no) demands of certain agents. A basic interest gives “point
and value to specific choices and plans” and there is no restriction on how
costly or affordable these may be (2004, p.361). The basic interests, and the
goals an individual has as a result, could be quite ostentatious. If one of my
goals involves expensive travel, my life will be made worse by my inability to
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do so, so I could choose to opt to engage in very expensive trips around the
world, rather than giving to the poor. We might imagine that this expensive
travel is of such a high level that no disposable income remains.
It might be suggested that this example is uncharitable. Maybe this
sort of ostentatious travel or other extremely expensive activities should be
excluded as possibilities for worthwhile goals that contribute to one’s ba-
sic interests. Miller clearly envisages Sympathy as usually justifying only
“occasionally purchasing. . . luxuries and frills” (2004, p.361), so it might be
supposed that some limitation on what could suffice would be beneficial.
For several people with such hobbies, Miller would claim that while such
activities are enjoyed, their loss would not constitute an actual worsening of
one’s life. It is important not to overrate “what merely frustrates, blowing
it up into something that worsens one’s life” (2004, p.362). Several people
may profess that because of their deep love of extravagant travel, its sac-
rifice would harm their lives substantially, but in doing so may merely be
overstating or overestimating its importance to them.
Though some people, after reflection, may concede that they had over-
rated the value of ostentatious goods to their lives, it seems that some cer-
tainly would not. Some people really will identify with exorbitant habits,
and see their lives as thwarted if they needed to abandon them. We might
imagine someone who has the goal of visiting every capital city in the world,
and exploring there, as a means to enrich herself. If she was to contemplate
missing out on her extended expensive trip around South East Asia, she
might feel a great sense of loss. So, rather than donating tens of thousands
of dollars to an effective charity and potentially treating over 5,000 people
for neglected tropical illnesses for a year,4 Sympathy seems to allow her to
indulge in her expensive trip.
There seems a difficulty here, as those who have had the means to develop
extremely expensive habits throughout their lives must be those who have
had the greatest means available. Due to their wealth, these are the types of
people who we really want to give most to the world’s needy. However, these
are also the people who will be allowed to spend the most on ostentatious
goods under Sympathy, as understood thus far. It seems like Sympathy
could be supplemented by additional premises governing which goals are
4Based on a donation of $10,000 to the Schistosomiasis Control Initiative (figures from
www.givingwhatwecan.org in July 2017).
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worthwhile, on the basis of just how costly they are. Surely, those who spend
millions on expensive art collections – when there are vast communities
suffering acutely who could be relieved of their suffering with that money
– are acting in an unjustifiable way? Even if we acknowledge that their
donating would risk making their life worse, given the importance of what
is at stake, they ought to do that.
However, Miller does argue quite explicitly against this when considering
characters like Richard Dworkin’s ‘Louis’. What Louis cares about is domi-
nated by “an extremely expensive, worthwhile goal of ultra-refined savoring
of food and drink meriting such sensory discrimination” (2004, p.363). As
his goal is worthwhile, the demands of Sympathy will be minimal, or none.
Despite many of his neighbours living moderately austerely, Louis can revel
in his expensive tastes. Nobody is required to aid Louis in his pursuit of
these goals,5 as that certainly would not be required by our responsiveness
to the neediness of others, but he must be allowed to use all the resources
at his disposal to fulfil his goals.
Perhaps, though we may judge this as unfair, Miller would simply con-
cede that such people would not be obligated to give as most people are.
Sacrificing these particular life goals could be seen as doing damage to who
Louis is as a person, and if he was to give to the needy it would be at the
cost of his own identity.
This type of response, however, does seem untenable. We may imagine
our other Louis-type character, who has the worthwhile goal of travelling
the world. She does so in such a way that commits her to giving less to
the poor than someone raised in less wealthy conditions (and who, as a
consequence, has less extravagant goals). We can, by stipulation, increase
the wealth of the agent and the costs required by her project, such that she
is spending millions, in which case it definitely seems like she is worthy of
criticism/scrutiny. In these cases, the principle seems too weak. As Eliza-
beth Pybus notes, “selfishness doesn’t relieve us of the moral requirement to
be willing to do things for other people” (1982). Engaging in ostentatious
5Miller stipulates that nobody has this obligation because the “neediness” involved in
Sympathy is seen as on a par with “the sort of deprivation that Singer labels “very bad””,
i.e. those needing relief from starvation or disease (2004, p.359). Louis clearly does not fit
into this category. Exactly why it is only the Singer variety of neediness that Sympathy
should apply to is unstated, and perhaps warrants its own discussion, but that may prove
tangential to current purposes.
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projects, even ones that are “worthwhile”, does seem selfish and unable to
justify failing to ever act beneficently. This at least seems problematic for
Miller’s account, if not a knock-down objection.
Sympathy is not a clear principle
Though Miller may simply bite the bullet in the types of cases described
above, the following problem demands a response. Sympathy holds that
our underlying dispositions to respond to neediness should not be more
demanding than would “impose a significant risk of worsening one’s life”.
Miller does not elaborate what he considers a significant “worsening” of
one’s life to be.
For a “worsening” to occur, there must be a relation between two situa-
tions, one judged as better and the other worse. To undergo a “worsening”
because of a certain choice, the agent must then be seen as selecting the
worse of two options. I propose three interpretations for how this may be
understood:
a a worsening of one’s foreseen expected future,
b a worsening in comparison to everyone else, and
c a worsening compared to one’s situation before one gives.
(a) Worsening of a foreseen future
This interpretation relies on some notion of an “expected life” which an
agent’s life could be better/worse than. This particular version seems to
have most support from Miller’s comments: When introducing the princi-
ple, Miller claims that the significant risk of worsening one’s life means a
“nontrivial chance that one’s life as a whole will be worse than it would oth-
erwise be” (2004, p.359). Even this option seems slightly ambiguous. If we
suppose we are considering donating a certain amount of money to charity,
is the quality of our life under this level of giving supposed to be compared
to giving nothing, or to our current level of giving (supposing that we are
already donating some amount)?
The first of these options seems likely to be problematic when evaluated
by people on middle-incomes who give a small to moderate amount already.
Consider Noah, who earns a modest income – enough to survive, put some
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money away for a rainy day and have a little disposable income to spend
on the occasional luxury – and through his life has been moved by many
of the disaster appeals or OXFAM adverts and gives 10% of his income.
He also has a passion for nice whisky. Upon thinking about Sympathy, he
concludes (rightly) that his enjoyment of whisky is a worthwhile goal. He
also calculates that if he ceased to give at his current level, he would be able
to buy an additional nice bottle of whisky every month, with the hope of
expanding his pallet.
Most people will seem to have an interest or passion similar to Noah’s,
one that they will identify with and that will enrich their lives if properly
pursued. It might also be the case (and I suspect it is)6 that the vast majority
of these could pursue such goals much more successfully (to the extent that
lacking this would make them substantially worse off). If correct, this would
lead not, as Miller claims, to people giving much more of their incomes to
the needy, but potentially much less.
The second suggestion for this interpretation might result in situations
more similar to those Miller envisages. Noah, and the vast middle-classes,
would judge whether giving an additional amount to their current donations
would lead to the pursuit of their goals being substantially less successful
and consequently worsen their lives. However, basing what should be given
merely on one’s current giving practices seems somewhat arbitrary, and
Miller claims that this is something he aims to avoid (2004, p.370). This
also might seem to unfairly disadvantage those who are currently donating
a non-negligible amount of their income, as they would not be comparing to
an egoistically ideal possible future.
(b) Worsening of a future in comparison to others
One possible interpretation that might be taken could set the ordinary, sta-
tus quo of giving as the grounds for comparison. This interpretation seems
the least plausible, but still worthy of mention. It might be thought that
everyone in the west should be donating, but everyone in a similar position
should be donating a similar amount. If a small amount of people donate
substantial amounts of their earnings, while others earning similar amounts
in their community give little or nothing, those who do donate may find
6This is an empirical matter, and also subject to rationalising, which may add diffi-
culties to the application of Sympathy.
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themselves in relative poverty. We might see that as objectionable, so con-
clude that one’s donations shouldn’t leave them worse off within their own
local society.
This interpretation seems to allow for a “collusion” of not giving, so that
no one worsens their lives compared to everyone else in their position. As
Miller’s principle is also couched very cautiously – even risking worsening
one’s life is motivation enough to warrant not giving additional money – it
might even lead to people reducing their donations, because otherwise they
may risk worsening their position in society.
(c) Worsening in comparison to pre-giving state
One natural interpretation of the “worsening” Miller refers to is in com-
parison to one’s state before they make their donation. As I have already
mentioned, Miller does suggest that the comparison should be against what
an agent’s situation would be otherwise, not before. However, this interpre-
tation should be mentioned, as it would be an alternative if it did not pose
significant issues of its own (though I will suggest that it does).
Independently of any donations to charities, people will experience in-
creases or decreases in their standards of well-being. Whether due to changes
in income, the cost of living or any number of non-financial factors, an
agent’s well-being is unlikely to be constant. People in relative poverty may
become quite aﬄuent, and vice versa. On one extreme, we may imagine a
young socialite from a very wealthy family, but who earns nothing. Despite
inheriting several houses, her life is very likely to be substantially worsened
if she gives money to charities, simply because her quality of life is likely to
worsen anyway, certainly over a long period of time. Perhaps several of the
family homes will have to be sold to pay for a very expensive lifestyle (full
of worthwhile goals, we may assume for the sake of this argument) and this
is certain to impact her quality of life.
This interpretation may then lead to the unsatisfactory conclusion of
some of the wealthy elite having no duties of beneficence. The example
could also be ran the other way. A moral agent trying to improve her
station in life would be obligated to give at a level such that it wouldn’t risk
worsening her life from that starting position. If an agent’s life is unlikely to
be worsened – because of a poor starting position – no matter how hard she
works, this interpretation would require her to remain in a similar position.
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As well as obviously being contrary to Miller’s purpose, a principle like this
would impede social mobility to a grotesque degree.
Sympathy seems too demanding
Given that the first objection I raised to Sympathy was that it was too weak,
it might seem peculiar to claim that it is also too demanding. However, just
as the principle seemed to weak with regards to a certain group of society
(namely, rich people with ostentatious hobbies), it is (at least sometimes)
too harsh on less wealthy people.
As mentioned previously, it seems clear that Miller did intend Sympathy
to require agents to compare how their life would be if they donated extra
to a possible future that could be expected if they did not. This might also
be the most plausible interpretation of the principle. However, despite the
earlier objection that Sympathy might be too weak, this interpretation can
actually be very demanding for certain moral agents.
I suggest this because of how we are likely to envisage expected possible
futures. Consider Sally, a child from a western family who grows up in
relative poverty. Sally’s family is heavily reliant on benefits throughout
her youth and as a result she is well-fed and educated, but not aﬄuent.
She works very hard and is rewarded by occasional promotions. Sally is
humble, however, and whenever greeted by a promotion is surprised, and
does not expect to receive another. She does not expect to ever earn enough
to satisfactorily pursue her worthwhile goals. Because Sally does not think
she can pursue these goals to a degree that would further enrich her life,
she regards Sympathy as commanding that she adopt a very high level of
underlying concern, as she does not believe doing so is likely to worsen her
life by hindering these goals.
As Sally’s tale is intended to illustrate, this interpretation of Sympathy
can also result in a hindering of social mobility. We might suppose that
if Sally had an accurate idea of how her circumstances would change, she
would have realised that she would comfortably have been able pursue her
goals. Miller could respond to this criticism by claiming that rather than
what an agent actually expects, the principle concerns rational expectation,
or what one should reasonably expect. This could mitigate problems caused
by Sally systematically underestimating the prosperity in her future. How-
ever, to bring out the problem, we need not make use of a case with an
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agent who underestimates their potential to fulfil their goals as much as
Sally does. If an agent becomes accustomed to a more austere lifestyle,
they are unlikely to identify with more glamorous goals, even if they may
be attainable.7 Childhood dreams of pursuing an exciting career are likely
to be left unfulfilled by most. An alternative take one could take on Sym-
pathy might suggest that even childhood dreams or fantasies do count as
worthwhile goals one identifies with, but this interpretation would minimise
to the point of negligibility any duties of beneficence in such cases.
4.1.2 Rejecting Miller’s view
Though Sympathy is able to respond to several of the problems levied against
Sacrifice, it carries a lot of baggage of its own. Even when the principle is
properly specified, the obligations it generates seem extremely unjust. It
strikes many as obvious that the bulk of our obligations to the poor should
fall at the hands of the rich, as they are the most able to do something
about it. Sympathy, however, seems to many of the rich ‘off the hook’, while
having the unintended consequence of restricting the spending of the poor
to the minimal luxuries they may have become accustomed to.
The switch from Singer’s principle, focussing on individual actions, to a
principle which concerns underlying dispositions, appeared to be promising.
Because of this, it is able to satisfactorily avoid several of the problems
Sacrifice faces and give appropriate responses to various problem cases.
One of the purported successes of this type of account is that it can give
different verdicts of what an agent’s obligations are due to individual psy-
chological differences. In section 3.4, whether factors like this – including
things like phobias and special attachments – could make an difference to
one’s obligations. However, given some of the examples which appear prob-
lematic for Miller, it does not look like this is promising – at least in the
way that Miller attempts to account for the obligations.
7We might consider Isaiah Berlin’s example of an agent who has adapted their pref-
erences to be so minimal that their desires are all satisfied even under a tyrant (Berlin,
2002, p.182).
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4.2 Murphy’s Collective Beneficence
Liam Murphy offers an account of our moral demands that takes into ac-
count some of the factors I termed “social factors” in the previous chapter.
He observes that the obligations prescribed by many demanding moral the-
ories are, in many situations, extremely demanding because agents cannot
expect others to comply with the theories. Because of this, agents who
do attempt to comply with the theories are subject to unfair demands. In
this section, I describe how Murphy arrives at his proposed principle, which
he cautiously offers as “more plausible than the principles” he is aware of
(2000, p.5), before discussing some undesirable implications of the account
and consequently rejecting it.
In Murphy’s discussion, he focuses on issues pertaining to beneficence.
It should be noted that duties of beneficence are not the only way extreme
demands are generated by moral theories, so his response might not be
available for all potentially problematic cases. He illustrates the problem
by considering an obvious candidate for a principle governing our duties of
beneficence, which he swiftly rejects. The ‘Optimising Principle of Benefi-
cence’. . .
“. . . requires agents to do the best they can for others. It
requires us to keep benefiting others until the point where fur-
ther efforts would burden us as much as they would help the
others.”89
(2000, p.6)
This would clearly be, given the current state of the world, an extremely
demanding principle. In fact, it looks like it would be even more demanding
than Singer’s Sacrifice Principle, because one would be under an obligation
to aid until the burden imposed is as much as others would be helped,
whereas Singer only requires that the additional sacrifice be “comparable”.
8This principle is characteristic not only of utilitarianism. Murphy notes that it is also
included in the pluralisms of W. D. Ross’s, Samuel Clarke and William Godwin (2000,
p.10,n.4).
9Elsewhere, Murphy offers (and rejects for the same reasons) a similar principle, which
he terms the ‘Simple Principle of Beneficence’. This states that every agent is required
“to perform the action, of those available to her, that will make the outcome best” (1993,
p.268). This is susceptible to all the problems of the optimising principle, but is committed
to a consequentialist account of goodness.
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Intuitively, Murphy notes, people think this ‘just couldn’t be right’, that
the obligations imposed by it are far too excessive (2000, p.6). However,
if everyone or nearly everyone did comply with the Optimising Principle
(a situation he calls ‘optimal full compliance’) the demands on each of us
would typically be fairly minimal. The reason that the Optimising Principle
of beneficence is so demanding is that others are doing much less than they
would be required even under full compliance (2000, p.13).
Accepting that the Optimising Principle demands too much of agents
(in these cases of partial compliance) is Murphy’s starting point. This gives
us reason to reject that principle and seek a new way of understanding
morality’s demands. One way that the extreme demands entailed by the
Optimising Principle could be curtailed is by placing a limit on what might
be demanded.10 Murphy discusses a class of principles – “limited principles
of beneficence” – which do just that.
The simplest way a limited principle might function would be to set some
limit to demands, such that no situation could ever require more of an agent
than this limit. If this was the only limiting factor, however, it would be
inadequate for our purposes. To see this, we can consider instances where it
seems that morality really is extremely demanding, like Ashford’s machete
case – where “ the only way of stopping billions of people suffering an ag-
onizing death was by hacking off your left leg with a fairly blunt machete”
(Ashford, 2003, p.274). If we accept that this demand is legitimate,11 then
the limit could not be lower than that amount. But then this limit seems
of no help, because even the Optimising Principle usually demands nothing
like this much of us.
Murphy considers a more complicated type of limiting principle via
Scheﬄer’s agent centered prerogatives. These (by themselves) are not lim-
iting principles because they only provide a multiplying factor by which
10How this could be measured is a difficult question, and one Murphy spends a signif-
icant portion of Moral Demands in Nonideal Theory considering. His answer relies upon
comparing how one’s life would go under full compliance with some principle from now
on, with how it would go if one lived perfectly prudentially in the actual world. The
demand of the principle is taken to be how much better off one would be in the prudential
situation than in the case of full optimal compliance (2000, p.42). It should be noted
that this way of viewing demands might have some very peculiar consequences – possibly
suggesting that even the Optimising Principle makes no demands of us – as pointed out
by Tim Mulgan (2003, p.115). I will not engage with this difficulty here.
11If we do not share that intuition, we could give another situation where an enormous
amount is at stake where some incredible sacrifice really is demanded of an agent.
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one can weight one’s own interests when determining what is permissible.
However, Murphy suggests that we might amend this view into a limited
principle. To do this, the multiplying factor an agent is able to apply to
one’s own interests could be indexed according to how much good there is
to be done. To clarify, in some situations where significantly more good
could be done – after an environmental disaster, for instance – the extent
one is permitted to prioritise one’s own interests would go up, in order to
keep the demand below a certain limit (2000, p.65). Even if this were done,
however, Murphy suggests that an additional indexing would be required to
compensate for the amount of non-complying agents. This double-indexing
would not only be a strange manoeuvre, but it would also result in the ac-
count failing to capture one of the intuitive benefits of Scheﬄer’s account –
that the amount that might be required of an agent increases depending on
how much good one can do.
These two approaches – setting an absolute limit and the more complex
index-based approach – illustrate a tension that limited principles face. We
both want to recognise that is is possible to ask too much, yet we also think
that our obligations are sensitive to the amount of good that can be done.
In Muprhy’s view, it is not actually the extreme demands that are the
problem with the Optimising Principle, at least not directly. One motivation
we might have for thinking this is right is the multitude of legitimate ways
we can be subject to extreme demands. For example, we probably think you
can legitimately take on huge moral burdens not related to beneficence (e.g.
debts, reparations, obligations from promises, parenthood). For reasons like
this, Murphy rejects the notion that there is a fixed limit to moral demands
(2000, p.15). Rather, he thinks the problem is that an ideal theory will
involve an “unfair imposition of responsibility” (2000, p.99).12
Murphy suggests that duties of beneficence are best regarded — and
naturally regarded — as group obligations. He notes that agent-neutral
12Michael Ridge, drawing upon Murphy’s arguments, also suggests that it is unfair-
ness that is the problem really identified in moral theories perceived as overly demanding.
He rejects Murphy’s solution (2009, p.196) and develops his own alternative, which in-
tends to distribute burdens under partial compliance fairly, in what constitutes a “kind
of compromise between unconstrained beneficence (Singer and Unger) on the one hand,
and beneficence as strictly constrained in conditions of partial compliance (Murphy) on
the other” (2009, p.198). I do not discuss this here, but I deem it susceptible to several
of the criticisms I make in the section that follows, most obviously (though not only) to
instances of overdemanding verdicts upon single agents.
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principles can be seen to apply to people as individuals or as a group (2000,
p.96). Agent-neutral principles are those with aims that can be specified
without referring to the agent. These are contrasted with agent-relative prin-
ciples, which must apply to individuals, such as those commanding promise-
keeping. An agent who accepts that promise-keeping is important has the
goal of not breaking their promises, not merely minimising the amount of
promises that are broken.13
If duties of beneficence are seen as an individual aim, Murphy suggests,
the compliance of others can be seen as affecting one’s obligations the same
way as natural phenomena might. With non-group aims, we respond to
what others are doing, but it has no special moral relevance. Just as a
promise I make (an individual aim) to make an appointment may become
more burdensome if the weather gets considerably worse, if I hold the aim
of poverty relief as an individual aim, it is irrelevant whether others are
complying or non-complying – what matters is how much I can do. Viewed
this way, an increase of the number people suffering from an illness would
increase my burden the same way a reduction in compliance would.
If however, we conceive of the aim as a group aim, it makes sense to divide
the burden among ourselves. When we view principles of beneficence in this
way, it makes sense for us to care about how we divide the moral labour.
This means that, unlike with individual ventures, it makes sense to ask what
we ought to do in cases of partial compliance. When we consider group aims,
our “concern that the compliance effects of pursuing the principle be fairly
distributed is parasitic on that prior moral aim” (2000, p.106).
Murphy thinks this is how we should view our duties of beneficence. One
reason that seems to count in favour of this way of viewing beneficence is
the agent-neutral character of the obligations. If we really have the aim of
eliminating starvation, we do not care who feeds the starving. It should not
matter to an agent “if the benefits flow more through the agency of others
than her own agency” (2000, p.75). We could find a related motivation in
the way certain members of the public think that duties of aid are ‘for the
government’, suggesting that we do view it in terms of a collective responsi-
bility (2000, p.4). While people may express this type of thought about aid,
this makes an obvious contrast with, say the obligation not to kill, where no
one would make such a claim.
13Murphy notes that this example is borrowed from Nagel (1986, p.177).
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Another motivation for viewing duties of beneficence this way is that he
thinks it is the key to dissolving demandingness objections. I will return to
this point shortly.
Because he sees something special about cooperative aims – such as the
shared cooperative aim of beneficence – which affect how much is demanded
of people under partial compliance, Murphy determines that we require a
‘nonideal theory’. A nonideal theory is one that accounts for situations
wherein agents either cannot or will not comply with ideal principles.14.
To provide this nonideal element, Murphy suggests that where cooperative
aims are concerned, a compliance condition is needed in order to mitigate
for unfair distribution of demands.
The Compliance Condition An agent-neutral moral principle should not
increase its demands on agents as expected compliance with the prin-
ciple by other agents decreases. Demands on an agent under partial
compliance should not exceed what they would be (all other aspects
of her situation remaining the same) under full compliance from now
on.
(2000, p.77)15
The general thought behind the condition is that other people not ‘doing
their bit’ should not mean that you have to do more. It has some intuitive
pull. Murphy considers an agent who asks: “Why should I do more just
because others do less? Surely I should only have to do my fair share”
(1993, pp.277-278). Kwame Anthony Appiah makes a similar point, claiming
that. . .
“. . . if so many many people in the world are not doing their
share – and they clearly are not – it seems to me I cannot be
required to derail my life to take up the slack.”
(2007, p.165)
Garrett Cullity describes views which embrace this thought ‘Fair Share
views’. These divide the burden of some collective project fairly among those
it falls upon and use this to fix a limit of what is required (2004, p.74).
14It is this insistence on accounting for factors of expectation and compliance which
means Murphy’s account incorporates some of the factors discussed in section 3.3
15Also formulated in very similar terms in “The Demands of Beneficence” (1993, p.278).
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Any number of moral principles could be devised that would meet the
Compliance Condition. For instance, we could propose an extremely mini-
mal conception of morality’s demands, which claimed that in full compliance
very little (or nothing) is required, and this does not change in partial com-
pliance. Alternatively, and possibly more plausibly, we might suggest a prin-
ciple which set moderate demands in typical situations of full compliance,
but included some limit to the stringency of morality’s demands. So long
as the principle did not require more of an individual in partial compliance
than it would in full compliance, it would meet Muprhy’s condition.
In accordance with this, he proposes the Collective Principle of Benefi-
cence.
Collective Principle of Beneficence (simple formulation)16: A person
need never sacrifice so much that he would end up less well-off than
he would be under full compliance from now on, but within that con-
straint he must do as much good as possible.
(2000, p.117)17
The Collective Principle of Beneficence (CPB) would provide the intu-
itive verdict that our obligations to the global poor in the current state of
the world are considerably more moderate than the extremists suggest. It
also has the virtue that if some catastrophe (like a natural disaster) were to
ensue plummeting additional millions of people into absolute poverty, con-
siderably more would be required of us. This seems in keeping with what
we typically think (as is demonstrated by the surges in charitable donations
in the wake of major earthquakes or similar disasters).
16The full formulation, which Murphy admits is ‘terribly complex’ is as follows:
“Everyone is required to perform one of the actions that, of those available to her, is
optimal in respect of expected aggregate weighted wellbeing, except in situations of partial
compliance with this principle. In situations of partial compliance, a person’s maximum
level of required sacrifice is that which will reduce her level of expected well-being to the
level it would be, all other aspects of her situation remaining the same, if there were to
be full compliance from that point on. Under partial compliance a person is required to
perform either an action, of those requiring no more than the maximum level of required
sacrifice, that is optimal in respect of expected weighted aggregate well-being, or any other
action which is at least as good in respect of expected weighted aggregate well-being.
However, no one is required to act in a way that imposes a loss on some other person
unless that other person’s level of expected well-being after the loss would be at least
as high as it would be, all other aspects of the situation remaining the same, under full
compliance from that point on” (2000, pp.117-118).
17Elsewhere this is called the “Co-operative Principle” (1993, p.280).
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4.2.1 Problems with Murphy’s View
Partial Compliance and Small Marginal Sacrifices
The CPB holds that our individual duties of beneficence are derived from
group obligations — with the particular requirement upon each individual
calculated some fair way — and each agent is never obligated to do more
than that.18 In the case of world poverty, this leads to a verdict which might
strike us as plausible.
However, the account does not always provide such intuitive verdicts. In
any instance of a group obligation, if everyone in the group complies with
a principle, then everyone pays their fair share, and the group solves the
problem. If there is only partial compliance — if some do not contribute
their fair share, or perhaps contribute at all — the agent is still only required
to pay a maximum of that amount.
According to the CPB, the group among whom the collective requirement
applies is determined by those who should share the aim. If someone shirks
their responsibilities, the obligation is not re-evaluated with regards to the
smaller group.19 Noting this, in his criticism of Murphy’s position, Cullity
provides an example which he sees as problematic.
“There are three people drowning, and three bystanders, in-
cluding me. We can rescue them, but only by using a winch
mechanism that can be operated by a minimum of two people
or, more easily, by three.”
(Cullity, 2004, p.76)20
18It is of course open for debate how a “fair share” could be calculated. Do those who
are more able to contribute have to pay more – and how much more? Singer discusses a
variety of suggestions for how this burden could be shouldered in The Life You Can Save
(2010, pp.160-169).
19If it was, without restriction, the collective principle would seemingly escalate into
the optimizing principle for the complying agents.
20Recently, Singer and de Lazari-Rabek provide a similar example, where instead of
three bystanders and three drowning people, there are ten bystanders and ten drowning
children. In their version, you are the only one who jumps in to save a child (2014, p.329).
It seems absurd to say that if you save just one and leave the other nine to drown you
have satisfied your obligations. This version may be more compelling, but the mechanism
leading to the issue – which results in the wildly implausible conclusion – is the same.
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In this situation, it looks like there is a collective requirement to save
the three people. Among the three bystanders, the fair share required is
derived. It seems clear that a everyone here should save one person. This is
best done by each co-operating to operate the winch. The CPB holds that
none of the agents is required to sacrifice more than they would if everyone
cooperated in that way.
However, Cullity then supposes that one of the bystanders shirks this
responsibility. As the CPB holds that no one is required to sacrifice more
than they would under full compliance (but they must do as much good as
possible with that sacrifice), we might imagine that this amount of sacrifice
could only save two of the three people. As Cullity notes, this does not seem
right.
“This does not mean that the two of us who are left have done
enough if we winch out only two people. Each of us should be
prepared to save all three, given that the effort involved is small.
And if we can only do so by cooperating, we should cooperate.
The two of us now constitute a new group upon which a collective
requirement falls – to help the people who still need it – and I
should fully contribute to fulfilling this further requirement.”
(2004, p.77)
This looks even more problematic if we have introduce a case with elastic
thresholds – where small additions can result in considerably more good.
Many of the most pressing cases do not seem to be of this sort,21 but we
can easily imagine such cases.
Consider the following case:22 A powerful and evil (but remarkably trust-
worthy) wizard arrives in a village, Agencia (a principality with a population
of one hundred), claiming he will kill everyone in the neighbouring large city,
21In the case of world poverty it does seem to be the case that (within certain limits)
the more money is given, the more lives can be saved, and that the amount of lives saved
by one donation would be similar to the amount saved by an additional donation. There
will be various thresholds, however, the passing of which will determine whether certain
initiatives can take place.
22This is an elaborate fantasy case to emphasise the point. None are likely to be nearly
as extreme in the actual world, but as discussed in section 1.1.1, we typically think moral
theories should be universal, in that they should be able to give appropriate verdicts in
all possible cases. Granted, wizards might not be possible, but this can be replaced with
a powerful scientist if too objectionable!
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Patiencia (population fifty thousand), unless he receives one thousand gold
coins. The wizard tells them he will summon the one hundred villagers in
alphabetical order into his tent to give him the gold, and if he does not
have enough gold after the last person has left, he casts his evil spell. The
villagers are all equally wealthy and can all afford to pay their fair share —
ten gold coins — so at an impromptu village meeting decide to do so. Ada
goes first, then the next, and so on. When the final villager, Zorgon, arrives
in the tent, he pulls out his coin sack ready to hand over ten coins, when
the wizard announces that he has only received 989 coins so far. Perhaps
someone in Agencia has deliberately flouted the agreement, or maybe they
have miscounted.
According to the CPB, Zorgon is not required to sacrifice any more
than the ten coins. However, considering what is at stake, and the minimal
additional cost, it would seem absurd to claim that Zorgon is not under an
obligation to contribute eleven coins. Zorgon’s doing the most good with up
to ten coins might involve not giving the wizard any, but instead opting to
buy a friend who is feeling a bit sad an ice cream later. The CPB might thus
conclude that Zorgon must either buy a friend an ice cream or go “above
and beyond” his duty and give the wizard eleven coins. The suggestion
that buying the friend an ice cream would be permissible in this case seems
ludicrous.
Though Murphy’s view does take into account compliance, surely some
other factors must be in play in determining our obligations. Though it
isn’t fair that some people might have to pick up the moral slack, this
might still, in cases where the benefit of additional negligible sacrifice is
enormous, be required of them. This would be evidenced by the blame
felt (and appropriately felt) by the rest of the village towards Zorgon if he
refused to pay the eleven coins to prevent the catastrophe.
Murphy acknowledges and accepts this conclusion (1993, p.290, n.43).
Though it seems implausible, he notes that it looks like any principle except
the Optimising Principle will be subject to structurally similar problems.
At any limit, if it turns out that minimal additional sacrifice would result in
some huge benefit, it will seem bizarre to claim that the additional sacrifice is
not required. Murphy’s response in the face of this problem is to admit that
the CPB seems problematic, but suggest that it is still the best candidate
we have.
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Extreme Demands in Full Compliance
Leaving aside the unusual verdicts that the CPB leads to in cases of partial
compliance, we might object that it fails as a response to demandingness
objections because not all instances of excessive demands seem to be caused
by partial compliance. Murphy rejects this, and in doing so considers some
extreme demands caused in other ways. One instance is cases of heroic self-
sacrifice like the soldier who jumps on a grenade to save his comrades, and
Captain Oates, the member of Scott’s Antarctic expedition who left the tent
to certain death when he realised his ill-health was jeopardising the chances
that the others would survive (2000, p.99). Murphy notes that these acts,
while requiring incredible bravery, do not actually entail sacrifice on his view,
as in both cases the agent would have died anyway. Full compliance does
require that they act in this way, but Murphy does not see this as a problem.
We regard these acts as heroic because performing them is “motivationally
very hard”, but Murphy thinks the CPB is correct; that these agents are
required to act as they do (2000, p.100).
As those cases do not involve what the CPB can regard as a sacrifice
(because the agents have the same well-being whether the comply or not),
they do not provide the best challenge. Murphy also discusses cases where
one’s well-being is affected:
“[S]uppose you are the only person in a position to prevent
a nuclear accident that would kill many thousands of people.
If you do what is needed, however, you will receive a painless
but eventually fatal dose of radiation. Do you escape in the
helicopter, leaving many thousands to die. or do you, in effect,
sacrifice your life?”
(2000, p.99)
The CPB clearly requires the sacrifice here, and again Murphy accepts
this verdict. This does seem very plausible, but by setting up the case in
this way, with the benefit of complying so enormous, Murphy seems to have
given an easy test. On any plausible weighting, Scheﬄer’s agent centered
prerogatives or Miller’s Sympathy principle would also arrive at this verdict.
In fact, any (even remotely plausible) account which accepts that there are
duties of beneficence and that they can sometimes require one to sacrifice
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one’s life will come to this verdict. More tricky, would be if the preventing
the incident would only save two people, or perhaps one person and a dog.23
The CPB seems to still require the sacrifice, but this is far less intuitively
obvious.
There also seem to be very different types of cases that can lead to ex-
cessive demands, even when compliance is full. Instances where the burden
falls only on one agent provide the easiest cases, as full compliance is guar-
anteed simply by the individual complying. Consider, for example, Judith
Jarvis Thomson’s violinist example (1971, p.49). If, like Thomson, we think
it would ask too much of an agent to require them to be bed-ridden for nine
months even if this is the only way to preserve the life of a famous violinist,
the CPB provides no way of responding to this.24 Optimal behaviour would
clearly involve making the sacrifice, and as the victim’s compliance would
ensure full compliance, the CPB would require that sacrifice.
For a more commonplace example, we might consider Fiona Woollard’s
demandingness objections to extremely burdensome prescriptions for preg-
nant women and new mothers (2016b). If we think the advice – and pur-
ported duties – for women to avoid not only foods like “unpasteurised cheese,
raw eggs, paˆte´, raw meat, liver, etc. ” but also “new cars, new furniture, air
fresheners, deodorant, sunscreen, non-stick frying pans, and food in plastic
containers” is too demanding, we cannot explain this away by considering
rates of compliance.
The overly demanding prescriptions in these instances is high even under
full compliance – because the compliance (or non-compliance) of others does
not create additional ‘moral slack’ to be picked up – so any appeal to the
Compliance Condition is of no help.
Murphy acknowledges that it would be a theoretical benefit to the Com-
pliance Condition if adopting it dissolved demandingness objections and sees
23Metz provides cases structurally similar to this and makes a very similar objection,
though his objection is clouded by his assumption that Murphy’s argument is reliant
upon utilitarian elements (2001, p.616). These problems are more serious than this, as
they persist even if – as is the case in “The Demands of Beneficence” (2000, p.280)– the
CPB is given in an axiologically neutral way.
24This case might look slightly different because the purported requirements violate
some right to bodily autonomy, and we could suppose that this has a special status that
provides an important moral distinction. If, however, the length of time in the violinist
case was, say, a mere ten minutes, it seems obvious that one would be required to make
that sacrifice. So, it seems that it is the amount demanded that makes the requirement
intolerable, rather than the type of burden.
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this as one reason to endorse it. He does, however, recognise that it might
not be able to do this on its own. With that thought in mind, he suggests
that it could be supplemented with a limiting principle making a Limited
Collective Principle of Beneficence (1993, p.289). This would provide a con-
straint upon demands that meant that they could never be more burdensome
than some extreme level. However, we can create cases like those provided
above – where a principle makes a demand of only one agent – where the
principle seems to demand too much, even though it demands an amount
that could be required in certain cases. For example, consider Thomson’s
violinist case once again. Even if we accept that in that case it would be
good to volunteer but not morally required, our verdict is likely to change
if the amount of people that could be saved was significantly higher. Being
hooked up to a thousand people might seem implausible, but we could alter
the example so it only(!) requires that one undergo extensive medical tests
that restrict one’s movement to the same degree so that some rare antibod-
ies could be collected from one’s blood. Presumably, in that instance, we
would judge that the sacrifice is required, so a Limited Collective Principle
would also fail.
Of course, it would be possible for Murphy to reply that even if his
account fails to resolve overdemandingness in certain non-group cases, it
might still succeed with the types of collective project he discusses.25 But
as overdemandingness was the starting position for Murphy’s discussion,
and as Murphy saw the prospect of dissolving demandingness objections as
a big motivation for suggesting the Compliance Condition, this would be a
big weakness.
We might also think it desirable (if possible) to give a uniform expla-
nation for why principles are overly demanding. Perhaps this could even
extend to other normative domains, which share certain structural features,
like rationality (e.g. Hedberg 2014) or etiquette (e.g. McElwee 2016a).26
Given the non-group cases where demandingness seems to be a problem, it
does not look like the CPB is able to give a uniform explanation even in the
moral domain, and because of the agent-relative normative requirements in
play, has no promise of responding in the other domains.
25Given the objection from small marginal sacrifices already discussed, I would be
suspicious even of that claim.
26The notion of supererogation across normative domains is discussed further in section
5.2.4.
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4.3 Explaining the failures
It seems that the recent attempts to respond to overdemandingness have
serious flaws.27 Not only do they give extremely counterintuitive verdicts in
certain situations, but each has reasons why it seems unable to adequately
respond to the demandingness itself. Miller’s attempt fails in this because
it ties demands to how well an agent’s life is going (or going to go), not
taking into account that demands might be too extensive, while keeping
consumption of luxury goods the same. Murphy’s principle fails to account
for demandingness specifically because it sees the problem of moral demand-
ingness as a symptom of a failing to distribute demands when groups only
partially comply. Although the paradigmatic cases – being required under
a Singer-esque view of morality to donate practically all of one’s income to
effective charities – are overly demanding because of partial compliance, this
is not always a factor in generating the problem.
To better address the problem, I next suggest thinking about what is
so bad about theories that make extremely burdensome prescriptions, par-
ticularly focussing on the unfair attributions of blameworthiness made by
such theories. Thinking about when blame is and is not appropriate, and
the relationship between blameworthiness and moral wrongness, may shine
some light on what conditions must obtain for an agent to be subject to
moral obligations.
27One notable recent attempt I have not discussed is Garrett Cullity’s. His solution in
The Moral Demands of Aﬄuence 2004) involves examining the presuppositions of benef-
icence. These presuppositions – facts that must be the case in order for the motivation
to hold – provide limitations on beneficence. Particularly with regards to beneficence,
Cullity claims it is a presupposition that an “interest in having or doing something can
only ground a moral requirement. . . as long as it is not morally wrong for you to have or
do that thing” (2009, pp.23-24). He then suggests that if it is permissible for us to help
others pursue certain life goods, it must also be permissible for us to pursue them our-
selves. While I do not have the space to fully discuss this here, I think Cullity’s account
fails because it overgeneralises, in part because it does not adequately distinguish between
needs and goals. Regrettably, I do not have space to discuss Cullity’s account adequately
in this thesis.
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5Blameworthiness, Difficulty
and Obligation
“Only in our virtues are we original, because virtue is difficult.”
– Iris Murdoch, Nuns and Soldiers
“ ‘What ho!’ I said. ‘What ho!’ said Motty. ‘What ho! What
ho!’ “What ho! What ho! What ho!’ After that it seemed rather
difficult to go on with the conversation.”
– P.G. Wodehouse, My Man Jeeves
In chapter 4, I argued that there are serious problems of the weakened
theory offered by Miller. Miller attempted, through his principle, to give
verdicts of weaker obligations, or to permit sub-optimal actions in favour of
one’s own interests. While he recognises that there is something problematic
about extremely burdensome theories, he fails to say exactly what is the
problem. Of course, as we discovered in chapter 3, this is no easy task. None
of the obvious candidates (e.g. impartiality, maximisation) lend themselves
as culprits for making a theory overly demanding.
Similarly, recent attempts that do make an effort to locate plausible
problems of a theory that make them overly demanding, like Murphy’s,1 also
fail. Murphy (like Kwame Anthony Appiah ) thinks the problem consists
in compliance (or lack thereof). As was suggested in the third chapter,
1I also regard Scheﬄer (1982) and Cullity’s (2004) comprehensive attempts in this
regard.
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compliance does seem to be a relevant feature, but Murphy’s particular
account seems problematic for the reasons given by Cullity.
In this chapter, we take a step back and consider obligation more ab-
stractly. We begin by thinking about the notion of moral obligation and the
closely related notion of blameworthiness. After this, I offer a solution to
the demandingness objection based on recent work by Brian McElwee, con-
sidering the possibility that understanding obligations in terms of difficulty
might be a way to more successfully account for the extent of the demands of
morality. I reject this, but in doing so suggest that there may be a problem
in the dialectic, which contains a presumption of doing the best. This leads
us to problems when we consider theories susceptible to demandingness ob-
jections, because our everyday moral verdicts and practices contain no such
presumption. I suggest that removing this shift and instead taking seriously
considerations of how obligations are generated, many of our problems will
be alleviated. If this dialectic shift is taken seriously and we consider deontic
and axiological matters independently, I claim that we are unlikely to accept
a theory which is overly demanding (if we do, the problem will be because
of our considerations of deontic matters).
Of course, simply suggesting that we should address our deontic concerns
somewhat differently is easy. The difficulty really arises in contemplating
how we should think about our obligations if they are not – as some suppose
– tightly linked to considerations of value. I examine intuitions in cases like
Le Chambon, where we can see that obligations appear to be very context
sensitive. I then discuss our moral phenomenology when we judge that we
are under an obligation, and when we flout such an obligation.
Following this, I discuss what sort of success criteria are needed for a
satisfactory theory of moral obligation (and what relation will be possible
between obligation and value). These are proposed criteria by which we can
judge whether a theory is successful. It should, for example, preserve our
ability to (and make sense of our practices of) to partake in moral discourse.
Ideally, we will also preserve notions of moral progress (e.g. that things are
better now, without rampant slavery, than they were when the slave trade
was in full flow). We presumably will also want to preserve the ‘moderate’
position that we do have moral obligations, and perhaps more substantial
ones than many people regularly meet, but these are not as excessive as is
claimed by the extremists.
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5.1 Blameworthiness and Moral Wrongness
Clearly, demandingness objections concern moral obligation. They make the
claim, of a certain moral theory, that its obligations are more burdensome
than they should be. Definitionally, an agent who fails to meet an obligation
(or commits an action that they were obligated not to commit) has done
something morally wrong.
Some have claimed that moral wrongness is an elusive or intractable
notion and might be better understood via some other concept.2 We might
think an easier concept to discuss is blameworthiness, and think that because
of the close relationship between moral wrongness and blameworthiness, this
can then help us in making some claims about obligation.
5.1.1 Some Thoughts About Blame
Before discussing blameworthiness more seriously, let us forestall one poten-
tial confusion. We should of course note that an action’s being blameworthy
(or an agent’s being blameworthy for performing a certain action) does not
mean that the expression of blaming is appropriate (or even possible) in the
case.3 Perhaps we can consider a case where a group is being driven to a
destination. The driver claims that they have knowledge that one route is
best, against the advice of several of the passengers. Because of his failure
to take good advice, we would normally accept that the driver is blamewor-
thy for the group’s being late. This might appropriately be borne out in
an expression of blame in some way. A passenger might rightly say “It’s
your fault we’re so late” or “You should listen to us next time”, or impose
some other social censuring. However, perhaps the passengers know that the
driver has recently had some sort of serious life problem, is currently finding
it very difficult to deal with negative responses or is prone to extreme over-
reactions that make him unable to perform simple tasks. In this instance,
it might be inappropriate for them to blame him – that is, to express the
blame sentiment. Obviously, in the latter case, it certainly would not be
2Derek Parfit, for example, suggests that something like this might be successful (2011,
p.165). Richard Yetter Chappell agrees with this diagnosis and justifies his project in a
similar way (2017).
Mulgan actually suggests the contrary claim — that our strongest relate to “the right-
ness and wrongness of actions” (2006, p.3).
3Skorupski takes pains to clarify this distinction in The Domain of Reasons, and
suggests that this is an area Mill was insufficiently clear on (2011, p.292).
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appropriate to blame him while he driving. This distinction – between the
blame sentiment and the act of expressing blame – is important to keep in
mind. When someone is blameworthy this can be understood as their being
blame-feeling-worthy (Skorupski, 2011, p.292).
So, what is it to blame someone? While we may say in ordinary language
that something, even inanimate objects, are ‘to blame’ for some state of
affairs – like “the faulty brakes were to blame for the crash” or “I blame the
bad weather!” – our talk of moral blame is more than simply establishing a
causal role. It is also clear that blame can be rightly felt (or appropriate)
and yet not expressed. This much is generally agreed upon, but the exact
nature of the role of blame in our moral lives is not.
One feature of blame is that an instance of blame makes a claim of
a moral failing. For it to be appropriate to feel blame towards someone
for being late, doing so must involve a negative evaluation of her conduct.
However, Smart correctly noted that our notion of blame is more than that
of moral grading (1961, p.303). While there is a way of thinking about praise
as simple evaluation, the purpose of which is communicative — to indicate
that someone possesses a skill or has performed in such a way — blame
doesn’t work this way. Saying that someone is a very good singer is an act
of praising, while saying that they are not good at singing is (generally) not
one of blaming.
It is a contested issue what the proper function of blame is. Macalester
Bell identifies fives distinct aims of blame, each of which are valuable in a
certain way.
1. Blame marks the damage done to our relationships.
2. Blame informs wrongdoers of their wrongdoing.
3. Blame motivates its target.
4. Blame educates and motivates the moral community.
5. Blame expresses condemnation / avoids moral condonation.
(2013, pp.267-268)
These are all plausible effects that acts of blaming might have. Clearly
not all expressions of blame will involve all of these features, or even have
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all these features as possible outcomes. It may not be possible to damage a
relationship that is non-existent or already toxic.4 We need not accept that
these effects must all (or even mostly) are present for an expression to count
as blaming, but these are often consequences of acts of blame.
Scanlon sees the first these as the most important. His account of blame
focusses on how one’s relationship with the target of the blame is altered.
He claims that “to blame a person is to judge him or her to be blameworthy
and to take your relationship with him or her to be modified in a way
that this judgment of impaired relations holds to be appropriate” (2008,
pp.128-129). It also requires that the target is a moral agent, the type
of relationship one must be engaged in for blame to be appropriate is a
“moral relationship that we stand in to all rational creatures” (2013, p.87).
Sher, providing a different type of account, sees blaming as including “a set
of affective and behavioral dispositions, each of which can be traced to a
single desire that the person had not performed his past act or not have
his current bad character” (2006, p.112). Strawson famously regards blame
as an expression of a reactive attitude. This expression (if successful) will
typically have some of the effects Bell describes. He also notes that blaming
requires treating a person as a moral agent. Strawson expresses this thought
when he contrasts the attitude involved in a human relationship with “the
objective attitude”, in which someone is regarded as merely “an object of
social policy”, something “to be managed or handled or cured or trained”
(2008, p.9).
While Strawson, Scanlon and Sher offer very different accounts of what
it is to blame, they share certain features. Expressing blame is only appro-
priate in the context of moral agents. When blame is applied, it implies
that the target has exhibited some moral failing. Because of its social roles,
blame seems to be a concept extremely important to our navigating the
moral world and our living with others generally.
Due to of the variety of negative consequences of being blamed for an
individual, we do not want to be the appropriate targets of blame, i.e. we
do not want to be blameworthy.
4Because Scanlon sees blame as involving modification of relationships, this type of
case offers a prominent problem for his account of blame – the ‘stranger problem’ (e.g.
2013).
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5.1.2 The Relationship Between Blameworthiness and Wrong-
ness
So far in this chapter, I have mentioned the close connection between blame-
worthiness and moral wrongness, but given no suggestions as to the nature
of this relationship. One natural thought that we might have is that the
blame sentiment is only appropriate when a morally wrong action has been
committed, or more formally:
If φ-ing is blameworthy, then φ-ing is morally wrong.
This seems to be very plausible.5 With that in mind, should we ac-
cept that every blameworthy act is morally wrong? There are two types
of responses that suggest not. The first involves what Julia Driver calls
suberogation.
Suberogation
Driver introduced this term to describe a category of acts purported to
be blameworthy but not wrong, or bad to do but not forbidden (1992).
Driver provided three types of examples she supposed could fit in this cate-
gory: ‘morally charged’ situations, the case of multiple abortions, and owing
favours.
Morally charged situations are ones in which it is permissible to do two
options, but one is good, while the other is bad. Driver gives examples of
a man refusing to swap seats to accommodate an elderly couple on a train,
and a man who can donate a kidney to save his brother (1992, pp.286-7).
In each case, Driver suggests that while it would be praiseworthy to act
well, failing to do so is blameworthy but not wrong. She suggests that as
the agents are within their rights not to do the good action, it cannot be
obligatory, so failing to do so cannot be wrong.
I suggest that Driver is mistaken about the correct verdicts in these cases.
In some instances, she seems to be assuming that just because someone acts
‘within his rights’ that he does not act wrongly in doing so. In The Merchant
of Venice, Shylock gains a legal right to a pound of Antonio’s flesh, but it
would still be wrong to him to invoke that right. In the seating instance, it
5This also seems to be the standard position, e.g. Gibbard (1990, p.42), Skorupski
(2011), McElwee (2016b, p.21), (Bell 2013, p.265), McGeer (2013, p.162).
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seems plausible that it is just wrong to not move. In the kidney case, Driver’s
judgment that the refusal to donate is blameworthy also seems suspect. She
suggests that “failing to act on an ideal does seem blameworthy” (1992,
p.288), but this simply seems mistaken. If this was the standard below
which we deemed people blameworthy, everyone would (almost constantly)
fall into this category. The notion that everyone – including people who
spend impressive amounts of time and money trying to make the world a
better place – merits blame is precisely the type of thought which makes
extremely demanding theories seem so implausible.
The case of multiple abortions is a peculiar one. Driver insists that the
abortions must be ‘frivolous’ in order to be suberogatory (1992, p.293). It
is unclear exactly what the frivolity is thought to indicate here. If they are
truly accepted as frivolous (and there is any value associated with the life of
the foetus), even one seems blameworthy, and suited to a similar diagnosis as
the morally charged cases. Previously, however, she presented the problem
as one with a different structure:
“If abortion is permissible, then multiple abortions are per-
missible. But a woman who has nine abortions has done some-
thing morally questionable. . . if every single abortion is unre-
servedly permissible, why this feeling that there’s something
wrong with the eighth, the ninth or tenth (per agent)?”
(1992, pp.288-289)
This problem seems to call to attention problematic character traits,
but with many parallel cases. We might imagine the decision to give (or not
give) money to charity. If an aﬄuent and informed agent goes one month
without donating any money towards relieving some of the vast suffering in
the world, this might be permissible, but if they never donate any money,
they are likely to be judged as having morally failed. Structurally similar
examples might be extremely mundane. If you lived with several other
people, and there was a chore that needed performing each week, not doing
it on any individual week is permissible, but deliberately shirking regularly
would not be.
The question of how many of this type of action makes an agent blame-
worthy is a coarse-grained question, but once the notion that one cannot
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commit wrongs by acting within one’s rights is dispensed of, this type of
example offers no particular problems of its own. We can simply say that
agents do act wrongly when they act in this way – even if we judge that we
must allow them to do so.
The final example Driver makes use of involves favours. If one agent has
helped another you on many occasions in the past, ordinary moral thinking
would suggest that you ‘owed them one’. Driver again seems convinced that
this could not be obligatory – she says the agent failing to deliver on a favour
owed “is not doing anything wrong” (1992, p.289). It is unclear why she
thinks this. It might again be that no agent has a right to having favours
returned, but just as it would be wrong to let a child drown in Peter Singer’s
pond, regardless of whether we think there is a right to be saved from ponds,
one can act wrongly in this sort of case, even if there is no right to favours.
For the reasons provided above, I see no reason to accept Driver’s claims
that suberogatory acts do exist. I would posit instead, that the acts in
question either need to be understood as wrong when taken as a whole (like
not doing one’s part to keep your residence clean) or, as perhaps wrong in
each individual case. Even if each individual “frivolous abortion” or “not
cleaning of the kitchen” is wrong, we might judge that they are the types of
cases where it is not appropriate to express blame – even though they are
blameworthy.
An Epistemic Dimension of Blame?
A second way we might think that an act might be blameworthy but not
morally wrong is if we accept that blameworthiness depends on the epis-
temic position of the agent, but that moral wrongness depends on effects
or facts. We could then give a paradigmatic case of wrongdoing wherein
an agent is also blameworthy, but then tweak the example such that either
the agent’s epistemic position is such that they could not be aware that any
negative effects would occur, or so that no negative effects actually obtain.
This position (and this method of elucidation), is advocated by Ishtiyaque
Haji. He considers cases involving two doctors to elucidate his position. In
these cases he attempts to give cases of blameless wrongdoing and blame-
worthiness without wrongness.
The first case – Howser’s Hell – Doctor Howser, does everything she
can to save her patient, and from the diagnosis she had come to (with good
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reason) gives her patient medicine A. Unfortunately, the diagnosis, through
no fault of Doctor Howser, was incorrect (1997, p.528). Haji suggests that
this is a case of blameless wrongdoing .
The second case (Deadly’s Defeat) involves Doctor Deadly, who (unsur-
prisingly) tries to kill her patient with some medicine that will accomplish
that according to the diagnosis, but is foiled by bad luck. It just so happens
that due to some rare and unnoticed fact about the patient’s condition, this
medicine is just what was needed, and the patient makes a full recovery.
Haji suggests that although injecting the patient with the medicine here
was the right thing to do, Deadly is to blameworthy for her conduct. Dr
Deadly is clearly the problematic case for the above claim, as this purports
to provide a case wherein an action is blameworthy but not wrong.
While I accept Haji’s claim that Deadly’s Defeat gives us a case where
the agent is blameworthy, it is still not clear that it provides a cases without
wrongdoing.6 In the remainder of this section, I will sketch out some points
in favour of rejecting that cases of blameworthiness without moral wrongness
are possible.7
There are two types of manoeuvres one might use to defend the above
conditional against cases like this. Firstly, one might hold that actions
can only be morally evaluated under certain descriptions. If, for instance,
only actions under descriptions that could be salient to agents at the time
of performance were morally evaluable, we could say that Doctor Deadly
acted rightly in trying to kill the patient, but that saving the patient was
not something she could be morally evaluated for. What the agent really
did, in this sense, is what Austin would refer to as what the agent baldly
did. We may. . .
“argue that is it is not quite fair or correct to say baldly ‘X
did A’. We might say it isn’t fair just to say X did it; perhaps he
was under somebody’s influence, or was nudged. Or, it isn’t fair
to say baldly he did A; it may have been partly accidental, or an
intentional slip. Or it isn’t fair to say he did simply A — he was
6Parfit discusses cases like this, but distinguishes between what is “objectively right”
and “subjectively right”, the latter of which depends on one’s epistemic position (1984,
p.24).
7It might be noted that the evaluation of rightness/wrongness in play here is a very
consequentialist one; what has the best consequences is regarded as the right action. While
it could be argued that this is a mistake, I will not press that claim here.
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really doing something quite different and A was only incidental,
or he was looking at the whole thing quite differently.”
(1961, p.124)
Perhaps we would be tempted to impute moral responsibility only for
actions it might be properly said that an agent ‘baldly’ did. This type of
manoeuvre would require major development and revision, and while I think
it may offer promising results, defending such a radical manoeuvre is not
required here.
A second approach is motivated by the thought that Haji’s proposal
struggles to make sense of claims that it is wrong to attempt to perform
wrongs. When Doctor Deadly tries to kill her patient, Haji claims she is
only blameworthy. But what is she blameworthy for?
It would serve purposes of discussion here to discuss why Haji thinks that
blame should be so divorced from wrongness. Haji motivates his position via
bringing out a tension that arises between two commonly-held principles:
Objective Wrongness S has a moral obligation to perform [not to per-
form] A if and only if it is morally wrong for S not to perform [to
perform] A;
and
Ought Implies Can S has a moral obligation to perform [not to perform]
A only if it is within S’s power to perform [not to perform] A.
(Haji, 1997, p.526)
If we accept these principles, Haji claims, we are committed to the claim
that it “is morally wrong for S to perform [not to perform] A only if it is
within S’s power not to perform [to perform] A”, the claim that wrongness
depends on alternative possibilities, which Haji labels (WAP) (1997, p.527).
Haji sees this as plausible, but as forcing us to deny that blameworthiness
depends on wrongness, because of verdicts it provides in Frankfurt-style
examples.
In a typical Frankfurt-style case, an agent harbours an intention to com-
mit some wrong, φ at time t. Unbeknownst to them, if they display any
indication of not φ-ing at t, a counterfactual intervener (often a wizard, or
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ingenious neuroscientist) will make it the case that the agent does actually
φ (1998a).
Because of the Frankfurt-style cases, while we might accept that wrong-
ness depends on alternative possibilities, we certainly do not want to accept
that blameworthiness does. If we did accept that, then the agent who does
freely choose to assassinate someone, with the counterfactual intervener lurk-
ing in the background, would be blameless. Frankfurt’s cases aim to preserve
moral responsibility in these cases.
Haji claims that in these cases, the agent does nothing wrong, but they
still do something blameworthy. But what is it that these agents do that is
blameworthy? In his analysis, Haji claims that when Doctor Deadly injects
the patient with the cure, she is blameworthy for injecting the patient — it
is the physical behaviour for which the agent is blameworthy.
This leads to some strange results. On Haji’s account, Doctor Deadly
is blameworthy for injecting the patient (even though it saved her), while
Doctor Howser is praiseworthy for injecting the patient (even though it killed
her).
A much more natural way to present the blame here would be that
Doctor Deadly was blameworthy for attempting to kill the patient. Similarly,
Doctor Howser is praiseworthy for intending to save the patient.
Once we have reached this evaluation, however, we can ask whether
what those agents were blameworthy for was also morally wrong. Either,
one could suggest that these are mental actions, and thereby preserve the
notion that the concepts of wrongness and blameworthiness both predicate
over actions. Alternatively, one could make the case that something like
intentions might not count as full-blown actions, but might still be the type
of things that can be wrong/blameworthy.
Either of these manoeuvres has some plausibility. While Frankfurt sug-
gests that actions require a purposive guided movement (1998b), others
consider mental actions to be an obvious and ordinary type of action. Mele,
for example holds that deciding to act — what he calls practical deciding
(distinguished from cognitive deciding, which is simply deciding that some-
thing is the case) — is a type of action (2003, p.198).
If, on the other hand, we decide that intentions or decisions are not
actions, this is still not a death-knell for the view that something (whatever
the relevant category is) must be morally wrong in order to be blameworthy.
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Lifting the requirement that wrongness must be a property attributed only
to the domain of actions might actually make some cases easier to explain. If
we consider cases of culpable ignorance, for example, it can be very difficult
to locate a specific action that was at fault. Forgetting may be another such
example.
I do not take a stance on which of these routes is likely to be best here,
though as in 1.1.3, I will continue to refer to decisions, tryings, volitions and
the like as actions. This is intended only as a loose way of talking, rather
than a serious commitment to the existence of mental actions. What I take
to be important here is that it can be wrong (as well as blameworthy) of an
agent to make a certain decision (regardless of its action-status).
While I have only briefly sketched some of these arguments, there are
several ways one can defend against Haji’s claim, and these give results more
in keeping with our intuitions about what people are blameworthy for. More
can certainly be said on these matters, but more substantial discussion is not
required here. For our purposes here, I will simply accept the conditional “If
agent A is blameworthy for φ-ing, then it must be true that it was morally
wrong of A to φ”.
5.1.3 Blame and Demandingness
If what has been argued for above holds, this makes the set of blameworthy
acts a subset of the set of morally wrong acts. It should be noted that the
set of blameworthy acts is also a proper subset of the set of morally wrong
acts, as there are wrong acts which do not seem to be blameworthy. Haji’s
Howser’s Hell case purports to give one such example, where the doctor gives
her patient what she takes to be drug that will cure, but, unbeknownst to
her and through no fault of her own, the drug actually kills the patient.8
As well as cases where the agent’s epistemic situation seems to alleviate
blame, there are also cases where agents are not judged as blameworthy
even when they do know all the details of a situation. Let us consider a
man who has told his wife that he will cook dinner that evening. This is
8If one of the above strategies is taken, this actually will not provide an adequate ex-
ample. If one holds that only descriptions which could be salient to the agent as something
she does at the time of the behaviour can be regarded as actions, and that only actions
can be judged as wrong, Howser’s Hell will not provide such a case. We might see this as
in keeping with Austin’s analysis of what an agent ’baldly’ does. However, the following
examples do not share that feature, so I need not dwell on this point.
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a fairly obvious case where this speech act confers upon him an obligation
to perform an act – namely cook dinner that evening. We might imagine
situations obtaining however that make the day much more stressful and
exhausting for the man than he could have anticipated. Perhaps his mother
calls with a host of problems, the dog gets ill and needs to be taken to the
vet. We might think that the obligation is defeated if the events are too
exhausting (I’m staying neutral on this), or if they take up enough time to
make it impossible to also make dinner, but it looks like there is an amount
of stress/exhaustion that would make it the case that he ought to make
dinner, but that – given the events – it would be excusable not to do so. If,
when his wife arrives home, he tells her of the stressful day (and apologises
for not cooking), it would be inappropriate for her to blame him (or even
feel blame towards him) for not making dinner.
This discussion of blameworthiness was motivated by the thought that
blame is a more tractable notion than moral wrongness. It seems clear that
we want our moral theory to forbid actions that are blameworthy. We should
also be aware that blame is a primary motivation for raising demandingness
objections. We find it extremely inappropriate to say of some agents that
their conduct is morally wrong. Consider McElwee’s example of John, a
typical first-world, reasonably well-paid agent, who, after being struck by
the extent of suffering in the world. . .
“. . . resolves to donate 30% of his income to Charity X. He
also spends two nights a week raising money for Charity X, writ-
ing letters to newspapers and politicians campaigning for greater
justice in international trade, and organising campaigns to raise
awareness of unfair and harmful trade conditions. But John does
less than the most he can to produce the best available conse-
quences. He could be giving up, say, 75% of his income, and six
nights a week to good causes (while still retaining his psycholog-
ical health and the ability to carry on this way of life over a long
period of time).”
(2010, p.395)
If we accept an extremely demanding moral theory – one which claims he
morally ought to be giving 75% and donating six nights a week – this gives
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the verdict that John’s conduct was wrong. One of the reasons this sounds so
implausible is that there is an implication of condemnation, and further, an
implication of blame that we find troubling here. Now, we might suggest, as
many maximising consequentialists would be likely to, that though he does
act wrongly, he is not blameworthy because in this sort of case he has an
excuse.
Worth serious consideration are the cases where we do not deem blame
appropriate, and whether in those sorts of cases it is a matter of excuses
that make this the case, or rather whether something about the situation
determines that the action actually isn’t wrong. Those making demand-
ingness objections seemingly have to accept the latter claim. One response
that has been raised recently is that the difficulty of an action seems able to
alleviate the blameworthiness of an agent who fails to perform it, and that
because of this we should consider whether the difficulty of an action can
make it non-obligatory. This discussion will be the focus of the following
section.
5.2 Difficulty
Until recently, difficulty has been largely neglected as a potential explanation
for a moral theory’s overdemandingness. This might strike us as surprising,
considering how definitions of ‘difficult’ are very similar to definitions of
‘demanding’.9 Recently, a few authors have discussed whether or how the
difficulty of an action may affect its moral status.10 Just how difficulty re-
lates to moral obligation is not at all obvious. Amongst the few philosophers
discussing the subject there is already significant disagreement. One natural
thought we may have, which was mooted towards the end of the previous
section, is that if an action is particularly difficult for an agent, it is less
likely to be morally obligatory. Even more boldly, we might suppose that
demandingness objections to moral theories really point to the difficulty of
the actions they prescribe as problematic.
One motivation for viewing difficulty as having this role is that it could
explain why certain factors are of normative importance. For instance, when
making his case for the moral equivalence of watching a child drown and
9This point has been noted by McElwee (2017, p.23).
10See McElwee (2016b), Gustafsson (2016), Cohen (2000a) and Chappell (2017).
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failing to donate some amount that would save a child to a charity, Singer
claims that both the number of people not acting and the proximity to the
child are morally irrelevant (1972, p.232, 233). If an action’s obligatoriness
is accounted for, even in part, by difficulty, we can see why these factors
can be relevant. If no one else acts when confronted by a tragedy, it makes
it easier to not act yourself. Contrarily, if everyone else is acting (jumping
in to save children or donating), it might be more psychologically difficult
to omit to act. Proximity, similarly, can make it more difficult to ignore
someone’s suffering. We could thereby explain the moral relevance of social
or psychological factors.
This explanation would also allow us to make a concession to Singer.
We could admit that proximity to the victims or numbers of onlookers are
not directly morally relevant. This captures something important of our
intuitions, as these factors do not seem to matter. Why should it matter
how close someone is if you can help them just as easily? A difficulty-
based account of demandingness could say that Singer is right that these
features do not matter directly, or in themselves. Rather, these factors are
one way for an action to be more difficult, and it is quite plausible (for
independent reasons) that the difficulty of an action can affect whether or
not it is obligatory.
In chapter 1 (and again when discussing Scheﬄer and Miller in chapter
4), we discussed the problems with seeing a theory as too demanding be-
cause it imposes too many costs. Some act’s being more difficult, however,
does not require that it entails any additional costs. McElwee suggests that
it is problematic to conflate difficulty and costliness (and notes that it is
often assumed that demandingness concerns only the latter (2016b)). The
problems of this conflation are made salient when we consider what distin-
guishes the concepts. G. A. Cohen tries to elucidate the distinction between
cost and difficulty through an example of a person who needs to help his
friend get to airport:
“A friend desperately needs to get to the airport, and I can
secure his presence thereon time either by giving him ten pounds
for a taxi fare, or by driving him there on my bicycle, with him
sitting on the bar. I am poor, but I have ten pounds in my
pocket at my fingertips, so it is not difficult but it is costly for
me to give him the money for the taxi fare. It is costly because
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giving ten pounds involves a large sacrifice for me, but it is not
difficult for me to supply him with it, as it would be if I had to
go to a bank the other side of London to get the money.”
(2000b, pp.238-239)
While Cohen clearly picks out something important with this distinction,
difficulty is also going to be a factor in the case of giving the money. We can
easily imagine someone, after realising that giving £10 is the only way to
help their friend, really struggling to give them the money. This of course
isn’t a physical difficulty — putting your hand in your pocket to reach for a
£10 note is, for most of us, a relatively simple matter — but it is a difficulty
nonetheless. We might see it as a motivational difficulty.11
Elsewhere, Cohen even begrudgingly acknowledges this type of difficulty
(2000a, p.24), but claims that this sort of difficulty cannot serve to stop
something being morally required. He claims that though it is “unreasonable
to ask someone to do something impossible. . . it’s not unreasonable to ask
them to do something very difficult”.
Cohen does little to justify this claim. He discusses the distinction in
relation to the difference between voluntarily donating some money to the
world’s poor, and having that same money taken by a government and
directed for the same purpose. When thinking about writing the cheque,
Cohen suggests that the difficulty in “contemplating the consequent cost can
generate a cost not in the throes of the decision itself”, but doesn’t see this
as significant, and even then sees the difficulty as only contributing insofar
as it can increase the costs (2000a, p.25).
One issue arises in the variety of ways we can understand the notion of
‘difficulty’, or the different ways something might be ‘difficult’. Consider,
for example, hitting a bullseye on a dartboard. It seems natural to say that
this would be (for most of us) difficult. ‘Difficult’ here seems to relate to
the likelihood of success. However, it does not seem to mean only likelihood
of success. It would be infelicitous to say of some statistically improbable
events that they would be difficult. For example, winning the lottery is
extremely unlikely. Similarly, the chance for any individual agent, that the
sperm cell would win out and successfully fertilise the egg to make an embryo
11McElwee uses this term (2016b, p.25). Chappell, in referring to a similar phenomenon
uses the terms mental effort or exertion of willpower (2017).
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that became them, is extremely slim. However, despite the low probabilities
of an agent succeeding in these tasks, it would not seem appropriate to
call them difficult. What seems relevant in the distinction here is that
deliberately hitting a bullseye requires that the agent orients themselves
towards that goal, whereas winning the lottery (in an important sense) or
being born are not things one can try to do.
In other situations the effort required (and duration) is what makes some-
thing difficult. Being a parent is difficult, for example. Here it clearly isn’t
about the probability of success — most people in the history of the world
have done this (and not simply in the sense of successfully reproducing) —
but the long-term commitment that is required.
Motivational difficulty can relate to both of these. If you are unlikely
to succeed in an activity, it can be very difficult to motivate yourself to
continue. Applying for jobs in a horrific job market, for example, might
make an agent wonder, “What’s the point?” and make the process difficult.
It also seems like it can be difficult to get oneself to commit to something
which you could guarantee success in, like a long-term project or an increased
monthly donation. This is the difficulty in getting oneself to act, which is
importantly separate from the costs themselves.
It is often (if not always) impossible to completely separate costs from
difficulty. This is because the things that can make something difficult –
spending effort, time, money – also impose a cost. McElwee notes that we
can consider cases wherein the best thing to do for the agent comes from
a particular difficult action, in order to attempt to pull apart difficulty and
costs (2016b, p.26). For example, we might consider an agent thinking about
undertaking a strict exercise regime. The agent might realise that doing so
would be the best thing they could do — it might make them healthier,
more attractive and generally happier — so despite additional difficulty,
would result in a huge welfare gain. These cases could be useful because, in
a sense, there are no costs for the agent – they would actually benefit from
the action. In this type of case, however, we can see that there are welfare
costs, even if they would not be ‘net costs’. For example, we might consider
the burdens as costs to a person at a certain time slice.
Because difficulty is usually (if not always) inextricable from some cost,
it makes analysing its moral relevance problematic, especially if we want to
contrast its moral relevance with that of costs.
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One type of example that we might consider is of an agent suffering from
acute depression.12 Some days, he finds mundane activities extremely easy.
On other days, summoning the effort to even get out of bed seems impossible,
and he often fails because of this. While in his bed, we may imagine, that
the agent realises the costs/benefits accurately both on the good day and
the bad one – they seem to be the same. (This might be dubious, as being
depressed is likely to deplete the enjoyment of ordinary tasks, but it seems
like we can imagine an agent surmising that the costs/benefits are the same
on these days.) The agent might acknowledge, in this situation, that the
costs of remaining in bed are the same on each day, but on a bad day rousing
the effort is just more difficult.
We can try also to highlight motivational difficulty in a case like Cohen’s
donation example. To focus on it, we can contrast with a case the same in
all relevant respects. Consider Bill and Bob. Bill is filling out his tax return
as he usually does, and discovers on the new form that his government has
introduced a temporary additional tax to relieve some emergency, and is
required to tick a box to illustrate his understanding of the situation. Bob
is in the same situation, however his country’s government has decided to
present their citizens with the option of paying this money as a donation,
and to choose to do so, citizens must simply tick the box.
Bill reads the description, sighs, and ticks the box. The cost has simply
been exacted from him. Bob, however, reads the option, pauses, and perhaps
considers the small kitchen renovation he will have to put off, or luxury good
he will not be able to afford any time soon, if he does tick the box. The
internal strife that takes place – or may take place if Bill genuinely thinks
that the donation would do more good to others than if he kept the money
for himself – is the motivational difficulty. Of course, going through this
process may be stressful or unpleasant, so may also impose some costs to
his wellbeing. When considering whether a potential action’s high difficulty
may in itself make it permissible to omit, those costs (the ones to the agent’s
welfare) must be ignored.
Could the sheer difficulty that an agent would undergo if they performed
the action considered make it okay for them not to do it? Cohen rejects
12Chappell gives a structurally similar example of a lazy agent, who knows “full well
that they will feel better - even in the moment - if they do it” and accepts that the “only
‘unpleasantness’ here is in the prospect of bringing themselves to actually do it” (2017,
p.8).
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this, claiming that an action’s difficulty “is no reason for not performing
an action that (although difficult) is possible” (2000a, p.24). He deems
difficulty as irrelevant to moral obligation, but there are good reasons to
think it is important. In the next section, I will provide an argument for
giving difficulty a larger role.
We might consider two claims, a strong thesis and a weak thesis:
Strong Difficulty Thesis The demandingness of a moral theory is fully
accounted for by the difficulty of its prescriptions; if a theory is ob-
jectionably demanding, this is explained by its prescriptions being too
difficult.
Weak Difficulty Thesis Demandingness is partly accounted for in terms
of the difficulty of the prescriptions; if a theory is objectionably de-
manding, this may be due to the prescriptions being too difficult.
It should also be clarified that both these theses concern difficulty di-
rectly. If an agent is strongly considering two alternatives, one of which
benefits them, but the other of which there is more moral reason to do,
the associated difficulty may result in some mental anguish, which could be
understood as a cost to the agent’s welfare. Any modification of what is
obligatory – if this is deemed relevant at all – from this anguish can be seen
as an indirect result of the difficulty. To elucidate, consider hedonic utili-
tarianism, suggesting that all that matters is pleasure. While the difficulty
may reduce the agent’s pleasure here, and plausibly result in changes in the
hedonic calculus, it only matters derivatively.
The argument presented 5.2.1 aims to establish the weak thesis, though
with a little supplementary argument could be used to endorse the strong
thesis.
5.2.1 An Argument from Blame
This subsection employs the notion of blameworthiness to form an argument
for the Weak Difficulty Thesis. One motivation for proceeding in this way
is the thought mentioned earlier that moral wrongness is an elusive or in-
tractable notion, so it may be better understood via some other concept. I
will present two generally accepted claims, and put forward the case that
the best explanation for these is the Weak Difficulty Thesis.
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Consider two phenomena we may consider worthy of explanation:
1. We suppose that being too demanding is a reason to reject a moral
theory.
That this claim is true is evident by the mass of literature regarding the
demandingness of morality. That we are correct to suppose this is essentially
what I argue for in chapter 2, in rejecting the extremist positions that dismiss
the objection. If we think that some moral theories should be rejected simply
because of how demanding they are — or because they could ask too much13
— of some moral agents, we accept this claim. I shall take this as given.
For the reasons discussed in 2.1, appealing simply to costs imposed can-
not explain a theory’s being too demanding. Now consider the second claim:
2. Our blaming (and praising) practices do, and appropriately, make al-
lowances for difficulty.
I take at very least the descriptive component of this claim to be fairly
uncontroversial. To be clear, I intend this claim to include shifts in blam-
ing/praising in both directions, i.e. making an otherwise praiseworthy act
less or non-praiseworthy (e.g. if it is extremely easy in a particular circum-
stance) or making an otherwise blameworthy act less or non-blameworthy
(e.g. if it would be extremely difficult to refrain from doing it in this partic-
ular circumstance).
In practice, if an agent fails to perform a desirable action in a certain
situation, but further contextual features come to light which make it clear
that performing that action would have been particularly difficult for that
agent, we are likely to find them less (or not at all) blameworthy.
Consider, for example, the agent suffering from depression mentioned
earlier, and a colleague casting verdicts about them. Though the colleague
might originally deem him blameworthy for, say, missing an unimportant
meeting, the discovery that his depression made it extremely difficult for
him to motivate himself to perform even ordinary tasks, might cause them
13I add this caveat because we may imagine a moral theory which we deem appropri-
ately demanding given the current state of affairs, but which may seem too demanding
if, for example, much/all of the easily relievable suffering has been eliminated. Ashford
makes the observation that Scanlon-style contractualism is extremely demanding in any
practically realisable state of the world (2003). This may still serve as cause to reject a
given theory.
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to rescind that judgment, or at least make them judge the conduct less
blameworthy.
More controversial is the question of whether it is appropriate that our
verdicts of blameworthiness (and praiseworthiness) vary in this way. In
considering this, it is useful to think back to what we have said (in 5.1) about
the role or function of blame. One feature of blame is that the blaming agent
will be disposed to modify her evaluation of the blamed person’s character.
Would we accept that we should differently modify (or not at all modify)
our evaluation of a person for not φ-ing, if we discover that, φ-ing, for her,
would have been extremely difficult?
It seems at least plausible that the difficulty experienced by the agent
is relevant here. It makes sense that our praising and blaming practices,
having a significant role in our actual social interactions, would be catered to
account for human failings or weaknesses. Perhaps some accounts of blame
and blameworthiness could make defending this claim more troublesome,
but I regard this as fairly uncontentious.
Accepting these two claims as true, we might hypothesise that the best
explanation for both these claims is that the permissibility (or impermis-
sibility) of an action can depend (at least in part) upon its difficulty (i.e.
that the Weak Difficulty Thesis is true). If then, we accept the truth of
these claims, and that the best explanation for them is the Weak Difficulty
Thesis, we should also accept this thesis.
The conclusion to this argument aims at the Weak Difficulty Thesis. This
is tentatively defended by McElwee, though he rejects the Strong Difficulty
Thesis. After arguing that “considerations of difficulty appear independently
relevant in determining the extent of appropriate moral demands” (2016b,
p.31), he argues that costs to the agent are also important, even without
reference to difficulty. In attempting to support this position, he makes the
following claim:
It seems plausible to say that the simple fact that performing
some act, A1, will lead to a cost to me, while some alternative
act, A2, will lead to a larger cost falling instead upon someone
else, can be sufficient to ground a moral permission to perform
A2 instead of A1, even if somehow performing A1 is as easy as
performing A2.
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(2016b, p.31)
A few thoughts about this type of example should be mentioned. McEl-
wee notes that it is “difficult to have firm intuitions” about it because “given
the motivational structures humans almost universally have, imposing a cost
upon oneself is almost invariably more difficult that imposing a cost on a
stranger” (2016b, p.31). This is certainly a difficulty we might have here.
Another consideration that we should note is that even if McElwee is cor-
rect for some assignment of costs in A1 and A2 (which again is hard to say
because of the nature of the case), it definitely isn’t the case for all costs
meeting these descriptions. If you could accept a very small cost on yourself
in A1 or impose a terrible one on someone else in A2, this definitely does
not seem to ground any permission to perform A2.
Contra McElwee (and Cohen), we might also speculate that costs can be
disregarded entirely. Against the inclusion of costs in demandingness at all,
I would offer several points. Firstly, it looks like costs will be accounted for
any plausible moral theory. Understanding the costs of an action as Cohen
does, as “what I would lose (but would have preferred to keep) as the result
of performing it” (2000a, p.23), these include losses of possessions, abilities,
health, time, opportunities and all manner of uncontroversially good things.
They are losses to interests, and any theory which cannot account for their
goodness (or that they provide a pro tanto reason in favour of some course
of action), and factor these into certain moral decisions, is a theory that
has failed independently of its understanding of demandingness. If we are
already involving difficulty in our understanding of demandingness, then
this includes the difficulty of imposing costs on oneself, so we might wonder
what work costs are doing.
That this is the case does nothing to undermine McElwee’s case above,
as it stipulates that there is no difference in difficulty between the cases, but
it is important to keep in mind that costs are being counted somehow, as
costs to an agent (just like costs to a moral patient) do enter one’s moral
evaluations. Why then, should we expect costs to feature as an aspect of
demandingness at all?
To spell this out further, here is the claim: high costs to an agent cannot
make an action too demanding, unless these costs outweigh the costs to
others,14 in which case the action will not be morally required anyway.
14This ‘outweighing’ may be understood in various ways. We might think that the
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I have little more to say here, but it might be suggested – if we accept that
costs are ruled out, and no other factors seem able to contribute to shifting
obligations – that McElwee should be committed to the Strong Difficulty
Thesis. On the other hand, there may be independent reasons for thinking
that costs to an agent matter, or additional considerations of import.
Regardless, for the reasons given in the following subsection, I will ulti-
mately reject both these positions.
5.2.2 Difficulty as Merely an Excuse Condition
It is generally accepted, as discussed earlier, that a morally wrong action
is blameworthy except when an extenuating circumstance applies.15 Exten-
uating circumstances include justifications and excuses.16 To say that an
action is justified “is to say (insofar as we focus on the action, rather than
the agent) that though the action is of a type that is usually wrong, in these
circumstances it was not wrong” (Baron, 2005, p.389). The proponent of
either the Weak or Strong Difficulty Thesis claims that difficulty can be a
justification condition. I, however, will argue that difficulty is of the type of
extenuating circumstance that makes an action which is morally wrong not
blameworthy: excuses.
We can make one argument for the consideration of difficulty as an excuse
condition by making use of discussion from literature. First, it might be
useful to think a little about the nature of excuses. Often, in everyday moral
discourse, a mistaken belief can provide an excuse. Imagine the case in which
an agent deliberately smashes the window on the front of someone’s house
with a rock. Ordinarily we would acknowledge this behaviour as wrong, as
it is wrong to damage the property of others without permission. If there
is no more to the story – if this was sheer and gratuitous destruction – the
distribution of costs matters here. For example, we might not think that an aggregation
of interpersonal costs can outweigh the cost to one individual, e.g. (Scanlon, 1998, chapter
5). Whether or how this is the case is not a matter for discussion here.
15For example, Smith (1983), Kelly (2013), Baron (2005, 2007).
16In criminal law, we can categorise these as defences. These acknowledge that a law
was broken, but point to circumstances which make it the case that punishment is not
appropriate, and (where successful) result in acquittal (Dressler, 1995, §16.01). In legal
philosophy there are also two other types of defenses. These are “specialised defenses”,
which are specific defenses acknowledged in the law for particular crimes, and “extrinsic
defenses”, which acknowledge the culpability of the agent but offer reasons why prosecution
is not appropriate (Dressler, 1995, §16.03,[D],[E]). These less obviously have parallels in
the moral case.
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agent is blameworthy for this conduct.
If however, the agent broke the window to gain access to the building
after judging that a resident needed urgent medical attention the verdict is
likely to be different. This will often provide at least an excuse for doing
this, even if the agent was mistaken. Perhaps they leapt to the verdict that
the resident was ill, when they were simply lying in the middle of the floor
relaxing, and the agent should have knocked on the window first or done
more to ascertain the particulars before responding in that manner. (If they
were correct, or perhaps warranted in their judgment that help was needed,
then the verdict is likely to be that the act was not even wrong, as this
would justify the breaking of the window.)
So mistaken beliefs or ignorance of certain facts can absolve an agent
of blameworthiness.17 These types of scenarios do not usually provide an
excuse in legal philosophy, as a certain mens rea – state of mind – is, for
most crimes, a required element.18 There is a structural similarity even
between these cases and the moral cases however, as it is still accepted that
the actus reus – the criminalised action – has been committed, but that the
agent is not culpable.
What else can count as an excuse? There is considerable discussion of
excuses in legal literature. While there are differences in what amount to
excuses in legal and moral discourse, the sorts of explanation that can serve
as excuses are similar. Of course, excuses that exculpate in law may not leave
one without blame morally, because there is a great deal of behaviour which,
though we may condemn, we do not deem suitable for criminal punishment.
Marcia Baron categorises excuses as falling into two types:
a. those (insanity being the paradigmatic instance) that come into play
because of some feature of the actor that differentiates him from most
adults and makes it very difficult for him to act as the law requires.
b. those (such as duress) that come into play because the situation was
17This is not always the case, as there are cases of culpable ignorance, discussed notably
by Holly Smith (1983).
18There are cases where mistakes of facts (or even mistakes of law, which usually
cannot provide legal excuses) are able to excuse, and arguments that further mistakes
should excuse as discussed in Garvey’s “When Should a Mistake of Fact Excuse?” (2009).
Normally, however, defenses based on mistakes of fact will constitute “failure of proof”
defences.
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such that it was extremely difficult for that actor and would be ex-
tremely difficult for most actors to avoid acting wrongly or unlawfully.
(2007, p.2319)
It is notable that both categories reference difficulty. However, the de-
scriptions here seem to relate more obviously to other sorts of difficulty.
Motivational difficulty, it seems, has to be perceived, whereas some of the
difficulty discussed here clearly does not. Its being difficult (either generally,
or for a particular agent) to discern whether someone needs urgent medical
attention or whether they are simply relaxing in a situation is not something
the agent will notice. These are instances more like the difficulty involved
hitting a bullseye, in that they are difficult because of the unlikelihood of
success despite intentions oriented appropriately, rather than Cohen’s case
of cycling with someone on the handlebars, or the motivational difficulty
previously mentioned, where the difficulty is phenomenologically salient to
the agent.
Cases of excuse because of duress are helpful cases. They give an instance
of non-blameworthy agents, where it seems like they are not blameworthy
because of difficulty, but the obligation remains unchanged. This is evident
because we still deem the agent succumbs to duress as having done some-
thing wrong (even if they are not blameworthy because of it). Duress is
(usually20) accepted as a legal defense if the following holds:
1. another person threatened to kill or grievously injure the actor or
a third party, particularly a near relative, unless she committed the
offense;
2. the actor reasonably believed that the threat was genuine;
3. the threat was “present, imminent, and impending” at the time of the
criminal act;
4. there was no reasonable escape from the threat except through com-
pliance with the demands of the coercer; and
5. the actor was not at fault in exposing herself to the threat
19While Baron intends her discussion to bear fruit in legal discussions of excuses, she
expects her discussion of excuses to apply to morality more generally (2005, p.39).
20Dressler notes that murder is a general exception to this (1995, §23.01[B]).
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(Dressler, 1995, §23.01[B])
It seems clear that duress of this sort may excuse an agent, not only
legally, but also morally. In many cases, it might look like the agent is not
only excused, but also morally justified, in complying under duress. We
could imagine, for instance, a legitimate threat against one’s life unless one
stole a snack from a convenience store. This type of behaviour, at least
for consequentialists, will be entirely justifiable. When the action required
under compliance is considerably worse (but still excusable), however, we
may judge that the agent isn’t blameworthy, but be unwilling to accept that
the action was not wrong. By excusing the agent in this case, we say “Yes,
you did something wrong, but considering the circumstances, we can’t blame
you”.
It also seems like identifying difficulty as the cause for this excuse is the
correct diagnosis. We can imagine an agent going through a horrible internal
struggle before co-operating with a terrorist’s demands and finding resisting
– believing that this would result in their death – to be too difficult (maybe
impossible, but for simplicity, let us not assume that at this juncture). If
another agent of very cool temperament, simply evaluated the situation and
decided that they would rather live succumbed to the same demands – with
no sign of difficulty or internal struggle – we may judge them considerably
more harshly.
In some relevant ways, the duress cases seem structurally similar to the
cases involving motivational difficulty discussed earlier. The agent may re-
alise what they should do, and this may involve minimal physical exertion,
but psychologically it can still be extremely difficult. If we accept the sym-
metry in this regard, and accept (as I have suggested we should) that diffi-
culty acts as an excuse condition in duress cases — and that the difficulty
cannot, in those cases change the obligation-status of actions — we may
expect a parallel verdict in other motivational difficulty cases.
Unless some relevant disanalogy can be noted, or alternative arguments
provided, I suggest that this treatment is appropriate in all cases where
difficulty can alleviate blameworthiness. If this is correct, then though dif-
ficulty can alleviate blameworthiness, it does not prevent difficult actions
from being obligatory.
A supplementary argument for this conclusion may be made based on
the phenomenology of blameworthiness for the blameworthy agent, and fe-
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licitous responses for an excused agent. Consider an agent who has an
obligation to φ, but something transpires that makes φ-ing significantly
more difficult. Perhaps she had agreed to meet a friend, but her method of
transport broke down and the additional difficulty this entails makes it not
blameworthy to fail to φ.21 Now, we may imagine that the agent realises
this about her situation — she knows that she would not be blameworthy if
she does not φ. For an agent in this situation, it would be strange to count
the fact that she would be ‘off the hook’ as an allowance to not φ. In order
for the agent to not be blameworthy, it should be the difficulty that explains
the not φ-ing.
It would be infelicitous for the agent to count the reason that she could
be excused as somehow in favour of not performing the required act. We
might imagine an agent who has promised to meet a friend, but knows that
if the weather is horrible enough, this would make motivating her action
difficult enough that she would not be blameworthy for failing to do so.
She stares out of the window while getting ready to leave, and when the
rain picks up sufficiently says to herself with a smile “Oh good, the weather
is horrible enough now, so I’m off the hook — I don’t have to go.” This
somehow seems inappropriate. It would be much more appropriate for her
to anxiously struggle over the decision, still perhaps feeling that she should
go, but not being able to bring herself to do it.
An agent with appropriate sentiments will also feel differently in the
aftermath both of these cases. If, as Ross discusses, an agent who deems
themselves justified in breaking a promise, while realising that the prima
facie reason to keep the promise remains, may feel a compunction to make
amends (2002, p.28). They will not however (or, it would not be appropriate
to) feel the “shame or repentance” which accompanies a wrongdoing (even
when not blameworthy).
If the arguments presented in this section are successful, we should reject
the claim that the difficulty of an action that otherwise would be obligatory
can render it non-obligatory, i.e. we should reject the Weak Difficulty Thesis.
21Keeping costs fixed in this type of case will be difficult. Usually this sort of case will
result in additional time, physical effort or money being expended. For the sake of the
example, let us assume that costs are somehow fixed between the cases.
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5.2.3 Resistance to Understanding Difficulty as Merely an
Excuse Condition
This is however, just one type of case. We could accept that the actions of
someone committing a serious crime (even under duress) will be evaluated
as morally wrong regardless of the difficulty, yet say for other actions, or
failures to act, the wrongness may be contingent on difficulty. That is,
we may maintain that though difficulty sometimes only acts as an excuse-
condition, there are instances where it can justify an action, that is, make
an otherwise morally wrong action permissible.
Consider the following situation:22 April is a nurse who works in a chil-
drens wing of a hospital. April is well qualified for this job, and though it
is emotionally draining, she finds it very rewarding. After an increase in
crack cocaine in the area, the amount of children coming into care increases
dramatically, making a tough job even harder. April realises that though
she already has a job where she can help provide care for the children, if she
was to decide to become a foster carer, she could take one of the children
who was healthy enough to leave the hospital into her home and do even
more good. She knows that while she is doing a great deal to help, she could
do even better.
Generally, in this sort of situation, we would not say that the April has
an obligation to help. It might be a really good thing to do, and extremely
noble, but not obligatory. The real April actually did become a foster carer
in order to take in babies and provide extra care, but it would be bizarre, if
she had not volunteered to foster the children, to ask why she didn’t. There
are uses of the word ‘ought’ under which we might say that she ought act
in this way, but this is not the ‘ought’ of moral obligation, but rather an
‘optimific’ ought, an ought of most moral reason – the type of ought that
can consistently be used in phrases like “You ought to φ but you don’t have
to”. It is what Fishkin refers to as a “weak ought” (1982, p.12).
Because, in this sort of situation, we would not think there is an obli-
gation, and an obvious reason why this is the case, presumably, is just how
difficult it would be for her. The apparent difficulty seems to make the be-
haviour optional, rather than something that she ought to do, but would be
22This example is modified from a similar case, based on a true story detailed in an
article on the 10th of March, 2013 in the Cincinatti Enquirer, and also discussed by
Vanessa Carbonell (2016, p.39)
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excused for not doing.23
If the difficulty of an action in this sort of case is the only reason we
can posit for the action’s not being obligatory, and we hold firm to the
intuition that this sort of action is not required, the orthodox understanding
of demandingness must be reconsidered: difficulty must be attributed an
integral function in our conceptions of when a theory is too demanding.
This type of argument offers a convincing role for difficulty in our moral
framework.
In the following section, I will attempt to demonstrate why I think this
argument fails.
5.2.4 Rejecting Difficulty and Reconceptualising the Prob-
lem
If we formalise this argument, I think we can discover where it fails, and
from this pinpoint why examples of the type given above do not establish
even the weak thesis.
1: There are cases where the morally best action is not obligatory.
2: This requires explanation – something must make it the case that the
best action is only optional.
2a: The cost of actions in these cases cannot explain their optionality.
3: Only the difficulty of these actions can explain 1.
4: If (1), (2) and (3), then the difficulty of an action can (in some cases)
make it non-obligatory.
Conclusion: The difficulty of an action can (in some cases) make it non-obligatory.
The first premise in this argument claims simply that morality does
not require maximising. While there are ‘extremists’ who deny this claim
23The orthodox reason that might be offered for the optionality here would be the
increased costs for the agent, which have obviously not been controlled for here. They
might, for example, consider something like Scheﬄer’s agent-centered prerogatives (Schef-
fler (1982)), but we have already noted the problems with that type of account in 4.
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and minimalists (who claim that morality makes either no or negligible de-
mands),24 it is a fairly standard position. If a demandingness objection is
ever appropriate, this premise must be true.
The second premise – which was previously only implicit – is where I
will claim the serpents have already entered the garden (we’ll come to this
later). The side premise [2a] perhaps does not need to be made explicit
here, but I have included it as it is the denial of the orthodox position. The
third premise is supported by the intuitions in the April case in the previous
section. In cases like that, the difficulty seems to make it permissible not to
perform the goodly act, and no other salient feature seems able to fill the
explanatory role. The fourth premise seems obviously true, and, with the
conjunction of the first three premises entails the conclusion.
The second premise claims that [1] requires some explanation, implying
that the default requirement is that one must perform the morally best ac-
tion. This is extremely dubious. There are many theoretical accounts which
do not dictate that an agent is obligated to do the best. Any account which
allows for the existence of supererogation – going above and beyond what is
required – is committed to it not being the case that one is always required
to do the best action possible. Supererogation is compatible with [2], but
each case where supererogation is possible would have to be one where a
special consideration applies; one that makes the best action optional. To
take a mundane example, there are social niceties — offering someone a
cup of tea, perhaps — which do seem good, but completely optional. A
compulsively courteous host may view this as a requirement, but that will
definitely not be the norm. Adopting [2] would mean that we would require
a special explanation why (assuming the tea-making is the morally best be-
haviour) it is not a requirement. Simple mundane cases like this suggest
that the presumption of a default obligation to maximise the good seems
problematic.
I claim that most people who are responding to demandingness objec-
tions (other than the extremists, who simply claim that they are bad objec-
tions) embrace an argument with premises 1 and 2. This explains Scheﬄer’s
move in adopting agent-centered prerogatives: he thinks these prerogatives
explain premise 1, seemingly accepting a default position that we ought to
24This is again making use of Kagan’s terminology from The Limits of Morality (1989,
p.5).
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perform the morally best option. Murphy similarly endorses his collective
principle of beneficence to limit our moral obligations. That he needed to
do this, I claim, indicates that he assumes that moral obligations needed to
be limited, that otherwise they would naturally be unlimited, and that we
would be obligated to perform the best action.
So, let’s think about why this presumption might hold. Why might
we think that one is always morally obligated to perform the morally best
action? Obviously, that best action does have the most (morally) to say in
favour of it. One question we might ask is whether there is a parallel across
other domains. Is there, for instance, a prudential obligation to act in the
most prudential way?
Trevor Hedberg claims that there does exist a concept of epistemic su-
pererogation (2014). Similarly, McElwee argues that it does make sense to
talk about supererogation across a variety of normative domains, including
prudence and etiquette (2016a). The rationale for this claim is the struc-
tural similarities in how we treat/discuss these domains. For example, there
are general norms which apply to etiquette: it is expected that people wear
relatively clean clothes, that they use a knife and fork in the ‘proper’ manner
or that they begin letters by appropriately addressing the addressee. If an
agent is found flouting these norms this may result in some form of social
censure – they may be talked about behind their back, mocked personally
or excluded from further similar social gatherings. This is the analogue of
blame in the moral case. Similarly, many of these norms may be adhered
to in varying degrees. The obligation of etiquette to dress appropriately for
a nice dinner might be conformed to by wearing a shirt and jacket, but it
might be even better to wear a suit or a tuxedo. Perhaps the person re-
ally ‘making an effort’ would be praised for doing so, whereas those only
just adhering to the norms would receive no positive or negative attention.
We might suggest that there being a requirement and the ability to do bet-
ter across other domains indicates that we should think something similar
occurs in the moral case.
That there are claims of supererogation in other domains, however, may
not convince any advocates of [2]. They may claim that the default obli-
gation is to do the best in all of these domains, and that some extenuating
circumstances must apply in each case in order to make it permissible (in
that domain) to act sub-optimally. Alternatively, they might simply claim
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that morality is special. Discussions regarding the overridingness of morality
might lend credence to this, and considering the arguments I have already
offered (e.g. in 2.4.2, when discussing Dorsey’s position), this might seem
like a plausible position.
Another way we might suggest that the thinking behind premise [2]
is mistaken is again by simply considering our ordinary moral practices.
Premise [2] would have us accept that moral failing – exhibiting some moral
failure – normally (absent extenuating circumstances) means simply acting
non-perfectly. Considering that it nobody does act perfectly, we must either
accept that extenuating circumstances are ubiquitous or that everyone is
acting wrongly practically all the time. The former of these options is clearly
absurd, pathologizing the normal. The latter, however, also sounds pretty
ludicrous.
What do we think our moral concepts are doing? Rather than assuming
that the best is what is required, might we not suppose that obligations
are grounded in other ways? Other moral asymmetries might be relevant
here. We tend to consider not offering help to someone in dire straits in
one’s immediate proximity to be abhorrent behaviour. However, simply not
doing good things for people who are not in pain is generally considered to
be morally neutral. Does this not tell us something about our concepts of
moral obligation?
We might suggest that the second premise could be read so that it is only
in high stakes cases – where one’s action could do a great deal of good, or
prevent a great deal of bad, perhaps – where there is an expected (default)
requirement to do the best. However, these are exactly the types of cases
where we celebrate supererogation. We adulate those who run into burning
buildings risking their lives to save others – this is definitely not ordinarily
required.25 We do not really care much about supererogation in a trivial
case, like doing slightly more than one’s fair share of the household chores.
One way we can show that premise [2] is at least not obviously true is by
considering positions which might be taken to deny it. While utilitarians are
often seen as accepting something like this, Mill definitely did not,26 it is not
25Obviously firefighters and some others will have special obligations in such cases.
26This is apparent from chapter five of Utilitarianism, as well as in “Auguste Comte and
Positivism” (1865, p.143), where Mill explicitly endorses supererogation. See Jacobsen’s
“Utilitarianism without Consequentialism” (2008) for extended exegesis on this point.
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required by variants like satisficing utilitarianism,27. Rule consequentialists
will also typically reject this.28 From a Kantian perspective, we might em-
brace a position like Thomas Hill’s, according to which it is permissible to
discharge imperfect duties to varying extents, such that the best act might
not be required and may instead be supererogatory (2002). We could also
look towards more radical accounts, such as the type of moral bargaining en-
dorsed by Gilbert Harman (1975; 1996). According to this view, our moral
obligations depend on our agreements, so unless our agreements made it the
case that the default moral obligation were maximal, it would not be, so
premise [2] would be rejected.
In rejecting premise [2] for the above argument about difficulty, I need
not engage with the third premise. It is strange to ask, I have argued, why
we are not obligated to do the best in some situations, just as it would be
strange to ask “Why are you not travelling to Madrid today?” Without some
background assumptions which suggest that we have reason to expect you to
be acting in this way, the question is very bizarre. I have also suggested that
one reason it doesn’t strike us as weird in the moral case is optimific and
deontic readings of ‘should’ and ‘ought’. This is why it seems peculiar in the
case of April in the previous section to describe her as excused if she chooses
not to foster the children (in addition to all the good work she is already
doing). A reason why she might not perform the act is the difficulty, but
she simply is not under an obligation to foster one of the children anyway,
so it isn’t an excuse.
If premise [2] is false, this gives us an easy response to the April case.
Rather than asking, “Why isn’t this required?” we ask “Well, why would it
be?”. The question of what is required will require a story about when and
how obligations are generated, but so long as this does not generate what we
think of as excessive requirements, it can forestall the problematic dialectic
move.
In the following section, I will explore the potential of accepting some-
thing like this shift in the dialectic, and the suggestion that we instead should
focus on developing an account of moral obligation that is less parasitic upon
whatever theory of value we take.
27Slote talks about satisficing consequentialism more generally but notes that his dis-
cussion also applies to utilitarianism specifically (1984).
28We may consider Hooker’s account from Ideal Code, Real World (2000) or Mulgan’s
from The Demands of Consequentialism (2001) as examples.
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5.3 Foundations of Moral Obligation: Success Cri-
teria for a Moral Theory
In the previous section, I suggested that a good moral theory should have
a theory of obligation separate from its axiology: simply finding what acts
have the most moral value does not answer all the questions about one’s
moral obligations. In chapters 3 and 4, I suggested that certain social factors
appear to play an important role in what we take our moral obligations to
be. Compliance in particular was discussed, and with it Murphy’s collective
principle of beneficence in chapter 4, but this was ultimately rejected in part
because of its counter-intuitive implications.
Despite rejecting the account of beneficence based on deriving individual
obligations from the obligations of a group, cases like Le Chambonnais or
other instances where something like ratcheting-up (e.g. Carbonell, 2012)
seems to occur, indicate that standards can be raised when communities
accept more burdensome obligations.
Before putting forward a positive proposal, let us consider some criteria
by which we may evaluate how successful a theory of moral obligation is.
I tentatively suggest the following checklist of conditions a theory ought to
satisfy. It should:
1. conform to most/all strong intuitions
a) provide ‘moderate’ verdicts.
b) support intuitions about moral progress.
c) must be able to satisfactorily respond to Cullity’s iterative de-
mands problem.
2. allow for moral discourse.
3. allow for the possibility of moral mistakes.
There are clearly other criteria by which one could evaluate an account
of obligation, but this tentative list incorporates some of the problems that
have been identified in the previous chapters. Let us consider the list briefly
before considering whether it is plausible that a theory could satisfy these
criteria .
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Conforming to Strong Intuitions
As, when responding to demandingness objections, we are relying upon in-
tuitions, any resulting account had better fare well on this front.
Recently, and particularly in the last decade, a great deal of suspicion
has been cast over the use of intuitions in philosophy. Some of this has
followed interesting results developed through the experimental philosophy
movement. As discussed in 2.3.1, Unger discussed some of the issues facing
our various types of intuitions (1996), particularly raising difficulties with
order effects and other biases which affect our judgments. Kagan similarly
raised issues with intuitions, focusing in problems with intuitions about cases
and arguing that it is likely that some form of error theory will be required
(2001, p.59).
Of course, up until this point, I have been making use of intuitions. I
will not offer a substantive defence of this practice here,29 but will suggest
that we should focus on certain strong intuitions and seek a theory that
is consistent with those. Mulgan makes a distinction between decisive and
distinguishing intuitions, where the former are judgments a theory must
accommodate, and the latter are treated as secondary (2006, pp.2-3).
In chapter 2, I argued that we should adopt the moderate position,
that is, that theories should make non-negligible moral demands, but not
(typically) make demands as extensive as those prescribed by maximising
act consequentialism. As this is entailed by the position that underpinned
the demandingness objection, it will be of no surprise I regard this as a
decisive intuition.
A second general intuition which would be desirable for a theory to be
consistent with involves the notion of moral progress. We know that the
extent of practices like slavery were far more commonplace at various times
in the past, and we want to be able to say that removing these is progress in
some way. It would be a strange and alarming result if our theory could not
evaluate a situation as better today because of those sorts of developments.
A third feature of preserving certain strong intuitions will be the ability
to resist extreme demands that result from Cullity’s problem of iterative
29There are several ways one may defend the use of intuitions. Kagan discusses several
options with these, but judges more work on the topic to be required. Perhaps the
most radical treatment of the issue is Herman Cappelen’s Philosophy Without Intuitions
(2012), wherein Cappelen claims that philosophers do not actually use intuitions, but
rather considered judgments with arguments.
155
demands. As I suggested that some accounts (like Scheﬄer’s agent-centred
prerogatives) should be rejected because of an inability to respond ade-
quately to these cases, a theory that is able to give moderate intuitions in
these cases is required.
Moral Discourse and Moral Mistakes
Conforming to intuitions about how demanding morality is seems to be the
most obviously relevant criterion of evaluation, when a previous theory has
been rejected for being too demanding. In addition to this, I have suggested
that a good moral theory should permit moral discourse and should be com-
patible with the notion of moral mistakes. A major motivation for this will
become apparent in the next chapter, as these are often seen as providing
problems for the type of account I defend. With that in mind, I will say
little further on this now, but take it for granted that it is clear that these
are desirable features of a moral theory.
In this chapter, I have analysed the notion of blame and suggested that
the implication of blame is a major motivation in making demandingness
objections persuasive. Through rejecting McElwee’s position on difficulty,
and considering when excuses are appropriate, I suggested that some of the
discussions in this area seem predicated upon an assumption that one has
an obligation to do perform the best action. I have also suggested that con-
sidering how obligations are formed, and being sensitive to ways this may
incorporate social factors, may help us respond to overdemandingness. In
the final chapter, I offer a schematic for how this could be done.
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6Positive Proposal:
Reasonableness in Obligation
“Kimmy, we have a wonderful thing here in New York called ‘moral
relativism’.”
– Lillian Kaushtupper, The Unbreakable Kimmy Schmidt1
In this chapter, I offer a tentative proposal of a theory of moral obligation
which can provide a response to the demandingness objection, and satisfy
the success-conditions laid out at the end of the previous chapter.
In chapter 3, we noted that several traditional explanations for what
makes a theory overly demanding seem to fail. It was also suggested that
some features – like whether others are in a similar position to act – which
are often taken not to be morally relevant do seem to make a difference
to our intuitions about what obligations are appropriate. Singer raises this
explicitly in “Famine, Aﬄuence and Morality”, claiming that both in the
case of the drowning child and the Bengali refugees, whether there are others
in the same position “can make no real difference to our moral obligations”
(1972, p.233).
It is puzzling, given Singer’s claims, that our moral intuitions about what
is obligatory do seem to be affected by what others expect and what others
like us are doing. In the preceding chapter I explored whether the notion of
difficulty might offer a successful explanation for this. The difficulty of an
action appeared to be a promising candidate because it could depend in part
1Season 2, episode 1: “Kimmy Goes Roller Skating”. Written by Tina Fey.
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on social factors, and perhaps in turn this could limit our obligations. In 3.3,
we noted that ‘social difficulty’ could explain some of the phenomenology.
Seeing many others act in a certain way may make it appear easier, which
could remove actual psychological barriers. If, on the other hand, no one
else is acting in some self-sacrificial way, or if no one expects people to act in
that way, it can make it difficult for an agent to act in that way. Similarly,
if an agent is expected to act a certain way, social pressures to act in that
way could make it more difficult to not act that way. Given this, it seemed
plausible that as theories typically do not account for difficulty, this could
provide an explanation for why so many seem to demand so much in certain
situations.
The particular reason difficulty did not provide a suitable explanation
for overdemandingness was that difficulty is an excuse, not a justification.
This is important because when excuses are applicable the conduct was still
morally wrong – i.e. the agent was still under an obligation not to act as they
have (not φ-ing was still demanded of them). In order for not accounting
for difficulty to explain why a theory is overly demanding, an act’s difficulty
would have to be a justification for not doing it, i.e. it would have to make
not performing that act permissible.
The more general diagnosis that emerged is that it is a mistake to try to
explain why obligations could vary with these social factors (and relatedly
overdemandingness intuitions) by looking at how our obligations might be
limited. I proposed that instead, it might be more promising to look at how
the obligations are generated. This way of thinking does not suggest that,
as a default, optimal acts are obligatory.
The problem then arises again of how we might explain how obligations
can vary with social factors, if not because of difficulty.
Let us consider situations where intuitions about our obligations seem
to vary in accordance with one’s moral community. For example, it seems
clear that in a community where the vast majority of people recycle their
plastics and expect compliance with this practice, people within that com-
munity are more likely to judge that behaviour to be obligatory compared
to a community where compliance with and expectation of this practice is
negligible.2 Why might the members of this moral community judge that
2This example is structurally the same as the Chambonnais case, discussed in section
3.3, but is perhaps a more commonplace type of case.
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they were not under an obligation to recycle here? In such cases, it might
even be acknowledged that one rule – like recycling one’s plastics – would
be ideal, but agents do not consider it obligatory to act optimally. This
case seems parallel to the situation of many of us with regards to the global
poor. Many people will acknowledge that the state of affairs would be vastly
improved if we all donated in line with a fairly burdensome rule, but not
deem it obligatory. Cases like these may prove elucidating, as the intuitions
involved in them form the bedrock for making a demandingness objection.
If we judge that these intuitions are veridical – which it seems we must if
we accept (as I have suggested that we should) that the demandingness ob-
jection offers a genuine challenge – we require a moral theory that can allow
for obligation-verdicts to differ because of these factors.
This chapter provides a proposal of how demands might be generated in
those situations. I attempt to suggest that by making use of reasonableness –
a concept which already features heavily in moral theory – we could explain
why social factors play a part in generating obligations.
We can see that reasonableness appears important from looking at some
descriptions of the problem of overdemandingness. Consider, for example,
Tim Mulgan’s description of The Demandingness Objection:
“This leads to the common objection that Consequentialism
is unreasonably demanding, as it leaves the agent too little room
(time, resources, energy) for her own projects or interests. I shall
call this the Demandingness Objection.
(2001, p.4)
And another description of the objection by Hooker:
“The objection levelled at act-utilitarianism is that act-utilitarianism
demands more sacrifice than it is reasonable to demand”
(2009a, p.151)
A third example comes in Liam Murphy’s discussions, where he claims
that when. . .
“. . . we ask what an acceptable level of demands would be,
all we can say is that the demands made by the morality we are
committed to are reasonable.”
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(2000, p.68)
And here is a fourth from Fiona Woollard:
“The Demandingness Objection is the objection that a moral
theory or principle is unacceptable because it is too demanding:
it asks more of an agent than we can reasonably expect.”
(2016a, p.89)
A common feature in these descriptions is an allusion to what is reason-
able.3
We might note ambiguity present in each of these quotes. It is not clear
from these descriptions whether reasonableness is a constraint or limitation
on demands, or constitutive somehow of what they could be. If anything, a
more natural reading would suggest that reasonableness is only a limitation
on moral demands. An alternative way that we might view reasonableness is
as actually having a role in generating obligations or demands, rather than
merely limiting them so that they are more modest than the requirement
to act optimally. Later in this chapter an account of this sort, provided by
T. M. Scanlon is discussed. His account sees what is reasonable as having a
role in determining what the demands are.
It is claimed that moral demands must be reasonable. Why might this be
the case, and what is the content of this requirement? We can also note that
several accounts already give reasonableness a central role, thus we might
speculate that we could provide an adequate account of moral demands such
that it had at its heart a concept of reasonableness.
A major issue for some theories seems to be that our moral intuitions
are affected by social factors (expectation and compliance). Why might
an account which appropriately regards reasonableness be any more able
3This type of description of the problem - alluding to the failure of a theory to make
reasonable demands, or being unreasonable in its prescriptions - is adopted by several
others too, including Ashford (2003, p.273), Cullity (e.g. 2004, p.101), Chappell (2007),
Yetter Chappell (2017).
McElwee talks of the objection in terms of what it would be reasonable to blame people
for, claiming an overly demanding theory makes prescriptions that it would be inappropri-
ate to blame people for feeling to meet (2016b, p.19), and elsewhere of theories providing
“verdicts that are unreasonably demanding” (2017, p.84). Woollard gives a similar de-
scription in “Dimensions of Demandingness”, noting that “some theories or principles ask
so much of the agent that they mean it is not reasonable to expect an agent to choose to
conform to the moral principle” (2016a).
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to respond to this problem? This shall be developed further later,4 but to
provide a brief response, we can see reasonableness as being sensitive to
these issues. If it is expected of everyone in a community that they will
recycle their plastics, not doing so is unreasonable. What and how much it
is reasonable to do in a given community will vary with what people actually
do. In this way reasonableness may have a constitutive role in determining
the obligations an agent has, and – or so I will suggest later – may evade
difficulties posed by the some of the intuitions other moral theories (like
maximising utilitarianism) struggle with.
Before seriously analysing the notion of reasonableness, a brief clarifi-
catory note should be made regarding the meaning of the term throughout
history. At least at some points in the past “reasonable” simply seemed to
mean rational or in accordance with reason, whereas “unreasonable” meant
contrary to reason. We can see this usage in Hume’s Treatise on Human
Nature:
“It is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the
whole world to the scratching of my finger. . . . In short, a passion
must be accompanied with some false judgment, in order to its
being unreasonable; and even then it is not the passion, properly
speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judgment.”
(Hume, 1969, II.3.3)
Hume simply equates the unreasonable with that which is contrary to
reason. The meaning of “reasonable” has clearly changed since Hume’s
time. In today’s parlance it definitely would seem unreasonable to prefer the
destruction of the world to a negligible harm, though perhaps not irrational
if the agent had very strange goals or desires. This distinction between
reasonableness and rationality is the focus of some discussion, notably by
Scanlon.5 What the current meaning of the term is – and the concept that
I suggest is useful in successfully accounting for our moral demands – will
be discussed in the following sections.
Putting reasonableness at the centre of moral theory is not a new idea.
In What We Owe To Each Other, Scanlon writes that he takes the notion
4See section 6.1.5
5This is discussed further in section 6.1.3.
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of “reasonable” to be “basic to moral thinking” (1998, p.192), and it plays
a significant role in his contractualism via reasonable rejection. Margaret
Moore notes that as well as Scanlon, Brian Barry (1989) and John Rawls’s
(1991; 1993) accounts also put reasonableness at the forefront of moral the-
ory (1996, p.168).
In the following section, I examine several discussions of reasonableness
in the last century, highlighting the key features identified. In section 6.3, I
discuss Scanlon’s account, as an example of an extant theory which heavily
relies upon reasonableness, before suggesting reasons why it might be overly
demanding, offering a challenge broadly related to Margaret Moore’s criti-
cisms. I then tentatively offer an alternative account of what reasonableness
entails, and drawing upon Gilbert Harman’s moral relativism, suggest that
such an account could prove successful in responding to many of the prob-
lems raised in previous chapters. Finally, I evaluate how successful a theory
of this sort might be in view of the issues raised for other accounts in chap-
ter 2, the success criteria discussed in section 5.3 and objections unique to
a relativistic accounts of obligation.
6.1 Views of Reasonableness
6.1.1 Sibley and Rescher
Serious discussion of reasonableness occurs in two articles from the 1950s.
Both focus on distinguishing rationality from reasonableness. We can see
that this is an important distinction to make if we consider the variety
of theories that make use of one or other of these as central concepts. As
Scanlon notes (1998, p.190), each of Gauthier, Hare, Kant, Habermas discuss
rules (or principles) that everyone would (or should) rationally agree to.6
Sibley complains that many writers “assume that these terms [‘rea-
sonable’ and ’rational’] (and their antonyms) are completely synonymous”
(1953, p.554). Sibley argues that this is not the case. In doing so, he sug-
gests that rationality is an “intellectual virtue” and that reasonableness is
instead a “moral virtue” (1953, pp.556-557). More specifically, he claims
that reasonableness requires “a positive sympathetic disposition towards
6Scanlon then attempts to demonstrate that reasonableness is a better candidate for
a source of normativity. This is discussed in the next subsection, and more extensively in
6.3.
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others” (1953, p.557).
Rescher largely agrees with Sibley, adding that the distinction is between
“reason and judgment, rationality and reasonableness, shrewdness and wis-
dom” (1954, p.61). Acting reasonably, however, seems for both Rescher and
Sibley to require rationality. Rescher states that “whereas any discussion
presupposed the rationality of the interlocutors, we must add in discussing
ethics the tacit premise that they are reasonable” (1954, p.61).
The general picture that both endorse seems to be that rationality re-
quires an ability to reason adequately, but does not require that an agent
possess any specific values. Returning to the Hume quotation from earlier,
we would not claim that there is anything irrational about preferring the
destruction of the world to a scratch on one’s finger,7 but it would not be
reasonable. Being reasonable requires accepting certain things as valuable.
Sibley describes this by saying:
“If I seek, for example, to justify my action by pointing to
some good it achieves for me, I must be prepared to allow, as
at least a prima-facie objection to it, that it results in what
another deems harm to himself. Reasonableness thus requires
impartiality, “objectivity”; it expresses itself in the notion of
equity.”
(Sibley, 1953, p.557)
Sibley claims that in order for an agent to be reasonable, they must be
able to justify their behaviour by use of reasons they would accept from
others. The onus on impartiality in reasonableness is discussed in more
depth later.
6.1.2 Rawls
Sibley and Rescher clearly saw reasonableness as an important moral no-
tion. Sibley went as far as stating of someone who is merely rational (not
reasonable) that “we do not know what ends he will aim at in his conduct;
we know only that, whatever they are, he will use intelligence in pursuing
7Of course, if one does hold some values that are better promoted better by the latter
than the former – as even the most thorough-going egoist usually would – it would be
irrational too. The claim here is simply that there is nothing necessarily irrational about
having that preference.
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them”, whereas of a reasonable person we may “infer that he is willing to
govern his conduct by a principle of equity, from which he and they can
reason in common” (1953, p.560). But while they valued its importance,
contract theorists like Rawls and Scanlon made further use of the notion,
placing it at the forefront of their moral thought.
In Theory of Justice, rationality receives more of the focus than reason-
ableness. It is ‘mutually disinterested rationality’ that agents should possess
in the original position (1991, p.13, et passim). He later conceded, however,
that there is a pluralism of “incompatible but reasonable comprehensive doc-
trines” (1993, p.xviii). As agents holding these incompatible doctrines will
have conflicting views, it is a challenge for political liberalism to demon-
strate how people with these incompatible views might coexist and what
must happen in cases of conflicts. A further issue, and at issue here, is how
one determines which of these comprehensive doctrines are reasonable.
Like Sibley and Rescher, Rawls distinguishes the reasonable from the
rational.8 Rawls claims that reasonable people. . .
“. . . are not moved by the general good as such but desire for
its own sake a social world in which they, as free and equal, can
cooperate with others on terms all can accept. They insist that
reciprocity should hold within that world so that each benefits
along with others.”
(1993, p.50)
Once again, an emphasis on reciprocity can be noted. As a hallmark of
reasonableness, reasons that are deemed as appropriate for one person must
also be taken as appropriate for others.
For Rawls, justice as fairness requires that an agent must be both rational
and reasonable. He does seem to accept that agents can actually be (at least
in theory) merely reasonable, as well as merely rational. Merely reasonable
agents “would have no ends of their own they wanted to advance by fair
cooperation”, whereas merely rational ones would “lack a sense of justice
and fail to recognize the independent validity of the claims of others” (1993,
8Rawls actually traces this distinction back to Kant, claiming that the ratio-
nal/reasonable distinction is analogous to hypothetical/Categorial imperatives (1993, p.48,
n.1). As will be seen later in this chapter, I do not think the distinction maps quite so
neatly.
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p.52). From this it seems we can pinpoint what reasonableness entails for
Rawls: a sense of justice and the ability to recognise the independent validity
of claims of others.
He later elaborates that the reasonable is “not the altruistic” (1993,
p.54); it simply requires reciprocal acceptance of reasons. The reasonable
agent will treat a reason as just as morally relevant whether it is their reason
or someone else’s. The account detailed in Political Liberalism then requires
that the principles, in order to be acceptable in a well-ordered society, must
be acceptable by agents who are reasonable and rational. He summarises
what the reasonable entails by discussing what a reasonable society looks
like:
“In a reasonable society, most simply illustrated in a society
of equals in basic matters, all have their own rational ends they
hope to advance, and all stand ready to propose fair terms that
others may reasonably be expected to accept, so that all may
benefit and improve on what every one can do on their own.
This reasonable society is neither a society of saints nor a soci-
ety of the self-centered. It is very much a part of our ordinary
human world, not a world we think of much virtue, until we find
ourselves without it. Yet the moral power that underlies the ca-
pacity to propose, or to endorse, and then to be moved to act
from fair terms of cooperation for their own sake is an essential
social virtue all the same.”
(Rawls, 1993, p.54)
This captures several important features of reasonableness. It does not
require perfect behaviour. It requires acceptance that others have rational
ends that they want to pursue, and that these count equally when we propose
or endorse moral rules. Rawls regards the willingness to propose and endorse
terms of cooperation as the basic aspects of the reasonable.
6.1.3 Scanlon
Scanlon’s contractualism is the leading moral theory which regards reason-
ableness as having a crucial role in determining which acts are wrong, via
his notion of “reasonable rejection”. Unlike Rawls, who permits principles
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that only rational and reasonable people would accept, Scanlon claims that
“an act is wrong if it would be disallowed by any principle that no one could
reasonably reject” (1998, p.197). This is a further elaboration of Scanlon’s
position that justification – which requires reasonableness – provides “both
the normative basis of morality of the right and wrong and the most general
characterization of its content” (1998, p.189).
Like Sibley and Rawls, Scanlon distinguishes the rational from the rea-
sonable. He provides an example wherein parties are negotiating for water
rights, but one landowner has control over the vast majority of the water
already. In this instance, Scanlon suggests it would be reasonable for him
to make an agreement whereby everyone got at very least some minimal
amount of water. Not to do so would be unreasonable, however, it might
not be irrational. What would be rational for him would “depend what his
aims are” so presumably concerns some sort of means-ends reasoning (1998,
p.193).
Like Rawls, Scanlon takes reasonableness to include some sort of recogni-
tion of the reasons/needs of others. He suggests that a reasonable judgment
is “not a judgment about what would be most likely to advance their inter-
ests or to produce agreement in their actual circumstances or in any more
idealized situation, but rather a judgment about the suitability of certain
principles to serve as the basis of mutual recognition and accommodation”
(1998, p.194).
Both Scanlon and Rawls hold that reasonableness commits an agent to
some sort of values. The reasonable agent must recognise some goods valued
by others and acknowledge their pursuit of those goods. This acknowledge-
ment, if reasonable, must not discriminate based on who possesses the rea-
son; a reason ‘counts’ the same whether it is held by them, one of their loved
ones or neighbours, or a stranger. In this sense, their view of reasonableness
requires impartiality.9
9It is notable that though this is a requirement for impartiality, what this requires
is not something that obviously leads to extreme demands. In terms of the notions of
impartiality Hooker speaks of (discussed in 3.2) this may require impartial application of
moral rules and (perhaps) impartial assessment of first-order moral rules, but it certainly
does not require impartial benevolence. Recognising that people have reasons that ‘count’
the same as one’s own does not entail that any of those reasons ground obligations.
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6.1.4 Marcia Baron on Reasonableness
Marcia Baron has recently written about the notion of the reasonable in
both ordinary and legal contexts (2011; 2017). Baron expresses concern
about conflations of the term in the legal setting. Rather than confusing
reasonableness with rationality, as was Sibley’s worry, in law it is “often
treated as synonymous with. . . ‘average’, ‘ordinary’, ‘law-abiding’, and ‘pru-
dent’” (2017). There are many dangers, as well as clear conceptual faults
of identifying “reasonable” as “ordinary”. Holding those of low intelligence
or children to “ordinary” standards of what they should be aware of would
be a clear conceptual mistake.10 In our everyday notion of reasonableness,
however, we can see that a person of low intelligence might act reasonably
(or at very least, not unreasonably), but still not be aware of factors that
would be salient to others. An appropriate understanding of reasonableness
must be able to account for this.
Baron’s analysis of the concept is somewhat broader than that of Rawls
and Scanlon. The concept contains some notion of what is appropriate. Let
us consider the following remark on the concept:
“Reasonableness is primarily about how one reacts to others
and, more broadly, how one views others. It calls for fairness,
and for awareness of others as people like you with aims, inter-
ests, needs, the right to make claims on others, and bad days. It
calls for tolerance and some modicum of cooperation and reci-
procity. It does not call for moderation in general, but does call
for moderation insofar as the moderation is in order for getting
along with others.”
(Baron, 2017, pp.24-25)
She notes that what is relevant for establishing an agent’s reasonableness
is their reactive attitude to some situation (2017). A reasonable person is not
furious over minor inconveniences, does not become profoundly aggrieved by
a perceived minor slight and does not blame those who do not deserve it.
10This type of mistake in using the reasonable person standard was a problematic
mainstay in English law, as demonstrated in several high-profile cases, notably Elliott v
C ([1983] 1, W.L.R. 939) and R v G ([2003] UKHL 50), where children were originally
found guilty of arson because they were not as aware as we would expect from adults of
damage that would result from their behaviour.
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Importantly, a reasonable person would not act upon such reactive attitudes.
This stage in between reaction and action gives an agent the opportunity to
act reasonably. The person could then be described as unreasonably angry,
but may still act reasonably. A hot-tempered person, with the knowledge
that he is often disproportionately angered by small matters may decide to
take a deep breath and calm himself. Alternatively, he may fuel his anger
and cause himself to lash out. When there is no good reason to do so,
“stoking one’s anger” seems unreasonable (2017, p.11).
Here we can see that an agent’s being reasonable will have an internal
element. An agent who deliberately allows herself, or even revels in feelings
of anger or cruelty may be being unreasonable.
In the requirement here of viewing others appropriately, we may be re-
minded of the human perspective (contrasted with the objective attitude)
discussed by Strawson (2008, p.9). We may also note that perfect moder-
ation is not required, but the amount needed for getting along with others
is.
Baron notes that though the concepts are different, what conduct is
considered “ordinary” or “customary” can inform what it is reasonable to
expect of an agent. She considers a surgeon charged with negligent homicide
(2011, p.28). In a legal case, when discerning whether or not a defendant
was negligent, it might be useful to know what procedures are customary, or
expected in that situation. Knowledge of the accepted practice can inform
what sort of behaviour deviates from this, and whether a surgeon might
reasonably have made the mistakes the defendant has.
As well as comparing reasonableness to standards like “averageness” or
“law-abidingness”, in attempting to discover what type of property reason-
ableness is, Baron compares it to various virtues. In some respects, rea-
sonableness shares a lot with typical virtues. With practice a person can
become more reasonable, just as one can work on becoming more generous
or more brave. Being reasonable is also a valuable character trait. However,
reasonableness “is not exactly an excellence; it is more a threshold notion.
That said, one can excel at being reasonable.”
To illustrate what reasonableness does not entail, Baron compares it
with phronesis, the virtue of practical wisdom. While phronesis is a genuine
excellence, reasonableness is not; it is a threshold skill – and one with “not
a very lofty” threshold at that (2017, p.8). In addition:
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“Phronesis involves getting it right. Reasonableness, even
supreme reasonableness, does not. The phronimos cannot be
a bungler (though it is consistent with being a phronimos that
one occasionally gets it wrong); but a reasonable person, even
a supremely reasonable person, can, and in more than one way.
Even a supremely reasonable person might have a tendency to
be forgetful, or to send e-mails with egregious typos, or to hit
‘reply to all’ when this was not what she intended and is a very
unfortunate mistake.”
(Baron, 2017, p.8)
This is important to note. Reasonableness does not require never making
mistakes. This ties partly in with the distinction between reasonableness
and rationality discussed by Sibley, Scanlon and others, as being reasonable
(even supremely so) does not require flawless rationality. Also, not being an
excellence, but a threshold notion, it does not require optimal performance
on every occasion. A reasonable action might be ‘good enough’ without
being the best action available.
Several of the features of reasonableness Baron picks out are not dis-
cussed at all by Sibley, Rawls or Scanlon. We can make use of some of this
evaluation in considering a more thorough interpretation of reasonableness.
Of particular note for the tentative account I offer is the suggestion that
what is reasonable is informed by the community one is in – the “ordinary”
or “customary”. If we accept that these matters of convention – these con-
tingent features of one’s environment – play a role in determining what is
reasonable, and suggest that reasonableness is a constitutive factor in obli-
gation generation, this might be used to explain how social factors can affect
what morality demands. This point might be accepted even if the degree to
which customs “inform” what it is reasonable to expect is fairly minimal, as
Baron seems to hold. We might (as I will suggest later) postulate that these
effects are actually very significant indeed, and thus have a considerable
impact on our obligations.
6.1.5 General features of reasonableness
Here we are interested in reasonableness as it pertains to the moral domain.
However, more generally the concept can be applied to all sorts of things. An
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explanation may be reasonable. A theory could be reasonable. A computer’s
processing speed might be reasonably quick or slow. The price of a pint of
cider may be reasonable. When we take these descriptions to be appropriate,
we signal that whatever described is somehow acceptable (or unacceptable)
– we think it conforms (or fails to conform) to the norms of the domain of
discourse.
More specifically, even moral reasonableness seems to be a broader notion
than some authors have indicated. As well as individual acts, a person who
regularly acts reasonably is a reasonable person. It is evident that it is
used in very different ways in the discussion of how ethicists have used
it: reasonable actions, how reasonable people act, reasonable rejection of
principles, reasonable reactions to the actions of others. Any of these could
conceivably play a role in a theory of moral obligation.
As noted in the case of feeling angry unreasonably, the concept can
apply to actions or internal mental processes. Reasonableness also seems
to concern how one judges others. It would be unreasonable to be overly
harsh in one’s evaluations of others, or expect too much of them. Evaluating
actions (or internal mental processes) is what we are concerned with when
making moral judgments.11
In accepting that intra-mental processes relate to reasonableness, in a
reasonableness-based theory of obligation we can find support for many of
our common practices. If an agent has the ability to rein in their emotions,
but chooses not to, we deem them responsible for any subsequent actions,
even if later, overcome by emotions, they lose control. Accepting that the
nature of specific internal processes of this nature may confer reasonableness
upon an action, this might lend itself to a theory of action that concerns
attempts. In relation the discussion in section 5.2.2 of agents who attempt
some wrongdoing, but fail due to unexpected circumstances, understand-
ing wrongdoing in terms of reasonableness would allow us to maintain that
the agent still does something wrong. This would allow us to preserve the
common-sense claim that people are only blameworthy if they do something
wrong, which is difficult to to maintain on some accounts (e.g. those which
require some negative consequence to identify an instance of wrongdoing).
11This seems to be the case even when the moral judgments are, on the face of it, of
moral principles. When we evaluate the principle “gratuitous torture is morally wrong”,
for instance, we are concerned with actions of gratuitous torture.
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Reasonableness requires that when moral agents are engaged with, they
are regarded qua agents, and not simply as things. This is the case insofar as
the types of things that an agent recognises as being valuable for them must
also be recognised as important to others. Reasonableness thus requires the
type of weak impartiality discussed by Scanlon and Rawls – that what an
agent regards as ‘counting’ morally must be regarded as counting for every-
one. This does not require (at least without other factors being involved)
that any of these values ground obligation upon other moral agents, but if
they do (and if they do in virtue of being objects of desire), then they should
ground obligations agent-neutrally.
It also seems correct that what actions count as reasonable – and what
morality requires of agents – will depend in part on what is customary or
ordinary. To give an everyday example of this, a colleague recently posted
on social media asking advice, about renting practices in Edinburgh. She
asked whether it was reasonable to be asked to pay six months deposit before
moving in (the responses, resoundingly, said it was not). The question was
clearly intended to ascertain whether this practice was typical – whether
this was customary.
Because what customs are in place or what is considered ordinary is a
contingent matter – the customs in place could have been different – this
introduces an element of context sensitivity to the notion. This feature will
become important when providing the blueprints of a reasonableness-based
theory of obligation, as it can grant an escape from overly demanding moral
obligations in some circumstances. Such an account thus is able to evade
demandingness objections, or so I will suggest in section 6.4.
6.2 Reasonableness in Theory: A Very Brief Sketch
Before going any further, we can consider what might be learned up to this
point. If my hypothesis is correct, the notion of reasonableness is partly
constitutive of what can be morally required. Rather than viewing rea-
sonableness as merely limiting the obligations of agents, it plays an earlier
conceptual role: we do not examine what (absent some sort of defeaters)
ought to be done and then ask whether this is reasonable (perhaps reducing
the burdens accordingly). Instead, we ask what it would be reasonable to
expect of an agent as a theoretically prior question.
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As previously mentioned, I do not want to commit myself to a particular
axiology here. Insofar as this is possible, the following should remain neutral
regarding questions of the nature of value. What is desired is that the
resultant theory is able to provide consistent (non-contradictory) judgments
about which actions (or perhaps behaviours or dispositions) are permissible
or impermissible. We also want the theory’s verdicts on these matters to
bear some similarity to those we ordinarily make. Perhaps this need not
require perfect matching with an individual’s intuitions,12 but if an aim of
this move is to avoid counterintuitively demanding verdicts, the theory must
at least be able to typically avoid what are seen as clearly overly demanding
requirements.
What is desired is, simply put, something to complete the sentence:
1. φ-ing is impermissible if and only if. . .
where φ-ing is an object of moral judgments.
And do so in such a way that largely conforms to our demandingness
intuitions.13
By making use of the deontic relations, completing those conditions can
give us all the traditional normative categories – permissibility, impermissi-
bility, obligatoriness, optionality and omissibility.14
Even given everything said so far, there are many ways one might try to
complete the impermissibility condition. Consider:
φ-ing is impermissible if and only if
1. it is reasonable to require an agent not to φ
2. a reasonable principle forbids φ-ing.
3. a reasonable person would not φ.
12That might not be possible without resorting to a crude form of intuitionism, whereby
what is permissible is relative to different individuals at different times and is simply
identical with what they view as impermissible. Peter Unger’s demonstration of the
susceptibility of our intuitions to order effects and various other biases (discussed in section
2.3.1) suggests that the intuitions regarding a given case is taken to be good evidence (by
most of us) that this faculty is at least not infallible.
13Phrasing the requirements this way does not seem to load the question unnecessarily,
as any of the main rivals of varying types of moral theory can provide the conditions
where some φ is permissible/impermissible, with the exception of those which do not
involve obligations (but we excluded those from this general discussion in section 3.1.
14The relations are described formally in (McNamara 2014).
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4. any principles which no one could reasonably reject forbid φ-ing.
5. no principles which no one could reasonably reject permit φ-ing.
6. all reasonable principles forbid φ-ing.
7. a reasonable judge would condemn φ-ing.
8. φ-ing is unreasonable.
Some of these candidates might be plausible. Some may be equivalent (at
least under some interpretations). There are certainly other ways one might
compete the condition making use of reasonableness. I will not attempt to
rule out all of these (or the multitude of other) potential cases. However,
I will attempt to avoid the question of whether the condition focusses on
principles/dispositions or individual acts – whether the φ should refer to
a principle or an action. If defending a theory, like rule-consequentialist
accounts, which refer to principles, I suggest that translating my discussion
into their vocabulary would be relatively simple. As Scanlon notes:
“To justify an action to others is to offer reasons supporting
it and to claim that they are sufficient to defeat any objections
that others may have. To do this, however, is to also defend a
principle, namely one that claiming that such reasons are suffi-
cient grounds for so acting under the prevailing conditions.”
(1998, p.197)
Moral particularists, like Dancy (e.g. 2004), will disagree with this char-
acterisation, so a depiction of conditions of rightness in terms of actions
might be more acceptable to people of that ilk. However, if we accepted
something like the Kantian notion of imperfect duties, referring to individ-
ual acts might be problematic, because at one particular time an action
might not be required, but it might be flouting one’s duties never to act
in that way. Regardless, I do not intend to take a commitment to either
position on this matter here.
That said, I propose a condition similar to the first of those listed above.
As a starting point, we know from the various formulations of the objection
that we want morality’s demands to be reasonable. Assuming reasonableness
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is constitutive of moral obligation (as suggested so far), we might suggest
something like:
φ-ing is impermissible if and only if it is reasonable to require an agent
not to φ
where φ-ing is an object of moral judgments.
At this juncture we may note some similarity to Scanlon’s account of
wrong action. Scanlon makes use of principles rather than actions, and
talks of principles “no one could reasonably reject” disallowing an action,
rather than simply it being reasonable to require agents not to perform that
action. However, depending on the interpretations of various terms, these
could be equivalent. The following section examines Scanlon’s account more
thoroughly, ultimately noting significant points of disagreement.
6.3 Reasonableness in Theory: Scanlon’s Contrac-
tualism
In the section 6.1.3, Scanlon’s contractualism was discussed. Given the
prominent role it provides reasonableness, it might seem like a problem for
an account of the sort I have proposed – given that a main aim is to avoid
demandingness objections – if Scanlon’s contractualism is also an overly de-
manding theory. I contend that what leads Scanlon to his overly demanding
theory is his particular conception of reasonableness; in particular, what he
deems required for reasonable rejection.
In this section, I discuss how Scanlon’s contractualism arrives at moral
verdicts, examining the role of reasonableness and how Scanlon’s under-
standing of the notion gives him moral principles which (he thinks) are
justified. I then expose some issues with this method, suggesting that the
assumption of an objectively privileged standard of reasonableness is unjus-
tified and that it is the source of overdemandingness is Scanlon.
6.3.1 How Demanding is Scanlon’s Contractualism?
Elizabeth Ashford (2003) has argued that contractualist theories appear
extremely demanding. In assessing how demanding Scanlon’s account is, we
must examine how verdicts are formed in the theory.
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Beginning with the claim that what we can justify to others determines
our judgements of right and wrong (1998, p.4), Scanlon arrives at the claim
that an “act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be
disallowed by any set of principles for the general regulation of behaviour
that no one could reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced, general
agreement” (1998, p.153).15
It might seem at first glance that this type of theory would be promis-
ing in providing a relatively undemanding account, because there are so
many reasons that agents might reject a principle, including how demand-
ing it is. Ashford herself notes that Scanlon’s account had a “particularly
strong prospect” of providing an account inkeeping with our intuitions (2003,
p.274). A principle may be reasonably rejected if an agent has a reason for
rejection which has “justifiability to others on grounds they could not rea-
sonably reject” (1998, p.218).
The reason must be held by some particular individual – an objection
is not made stronger by being a reason for several individuals. Scanlon
elucidates this with the case of Jones, an worker at a television broadcasting
station (1998, p.235). Some electrical equipment falls on Jones during a
World Cup match, causing him extreme pain. The equipment could be
moved, but doing so would require stopping the transmission for fifteen
minutes, possibly causing frustration to hundreds of millions of people. A
simple utilitarian theory would suggest we should leave Jones to suffer until
after the match is over because the aggregate enjoyment of the viewers (if
there enough of them) could outweigh Jones’s suffering. Because of Scanlon’s
constraint that objections be personal, he is able to give the verdict that
regardless of the amount of people watching, that Jones should be saved
immediately. Jones has a strong reason (based on his intense suffering)
to reject any principle that does not lead to him being saved immediately.
Each viewer has an objection to principles that lead to Jones being saved
immediately – because their amusement would be stifled – but the reason
of each is outweighed by Jones’s objection, so the viewers do not have a
reasonable rejection.
Reasonable rejection can be on many grounds, and while Scanlon does
15Scanlon’s discussion in What We Owe to Each Other is largely limited to a narrow
‘inter-personal morality’, i.e. obligations that people have towards each other. This does
not include things like obligations to animals, plants or artworks (1998, p.180), though he
does acknowledge that those things could be wronged in the broad sense of morality.
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not provide a list of potential grounds for rejection, a principle’s demanding-
ness seems like a plausible candidate. He does say, for instance, in relation
to principles requiring giving one’s own interests no additional weight than
those of others, that one ground of reasonable rejection could be a person’s
“not wanting to be bound, in general, by such a strict requirement” (1998,
p.225). The legitimacy of reasons like this under Scanlon’s account seem to
make room for a denial of demanding principles.
However, though it is not the only reason, often “the gains and losses in
well-being (relief from suffering, for example) are clearly the most relevant
factors in determining whether a principle could or could not be reasonably
rejected” (1998, p.215). As any burdens must be deemed to be acceptable
to those who would bear them, Scanlon himself notes that “the principles
that meet this test may still be very demanding, and they go as far in
recognizing the claims of each as is compatible with similar recognition of
the claims of all” (1998, p.171). If we consider principles of beneficence, it
seems that principles which make it optional to give to effective charities (in
situations like those that aﬄuent westerners find themselves in today) will
be extremely burdensome on those who would not receive the benefits those
charities would provide – they would suffer the burdens of disease/starvation
and perhaps premature death.
Ashford actually suggests that contractualism may fare even worse than
consequentialism (in terms of demandingness) as the extreme demands seem
to persist in any “practically realizable state of the world” (2003, p.294).16
In addition to rejecting many principles which would be less demanding for
us on the grounds that they would give a stronger objection to members of
the global poor, Ashford suggests that Scanlon’s contractualism also would
prohibit things that consequentialism typically would not, like personal air
travel. This is because principles permitting actions which have a chance –
even a very remote one – of being harmful may be reasonably rejected by
agents who cannot benefit (or expect to benefit) from those actions (2003,
p.208). 17 Whether or not contractualism is actually in a worse position with
regards to the objection, if we think consequentialism is overly demanding,
16This claim is specific to Scanlon’s contractualism, due to the way probabilities of
burdens are accounted when considered for rejection.
17This claim has been disputed by Alison Hills, who suggests that when obligations
towards animals are taken into consideration the demands of contractualism become less
demanding and more plausible than those issued by consequentialism (2010, p.241).
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contractualism appears susceptible to the same criticism.
Let us consider the type of case which is often the focus of demanding-
ness; obligations to the world’s poor. As a test case, take Singer’s Sacrifice
principle,18 which states:
“if it is in our power to prevent something very bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable
moral importance, we ought, morally, to do it.”
(Singer, 1972, p.231)19
In order to determine whether or not this principle can be reasonably
rejected, Scanlon states that we must consider various standpoints. Primar-
ily, we focus on the “specific individuals affected by specific actions” (1998,
p.202). With regards to this principle, this would presumably include the
would-be victims of the very bad result and the would-be sacrificers. In
addition, we must consider a broader picture, taking into account “the con-
sequences of general performance or nonperformance of such actions and
other implications (for both agents and others) of having agents be licensed
and directed to think in the way that that principle requires” (1998, p.203).
This requires us to think of how the general rule may affect others who could
be affected by the principle outside of those immediately affected.
If Sacrifice is accepted, many aﬄuent western people will be required to
sacrifice goods to the extent that their sacrifice is not comparably morally
important. This will presumably require at least the sacrifice of goods which
have no (or negligible) affects on their wellbeing. Accepting that this will
be considerably more sacrifice for many people than already takes place, the
acceptance of this principle would result in many people in the developing
world not suffering premature deaths and lower quality of life.
Because their interests would be harmed by the principle being imposed
(even though it must be to a non-comparable degree), the aﬄuent westerners
18Scanlon actually discusses this principle explicitly, calling it the “Rescue Principle”
(1998, p.224). He claims that – once supplemented by a clause preventing iterations – it
seems plausible that this could not be reasonably rejected.
19Obviously, what is demanded by this principle will depend entirely on what is re-
garded as morally significant, and if possession of even slightly more wealth is regarded
as morally significant, it will only be negligibly demanding. In what follows I will assume,
as Singer does, that this principle would require “a great change in our way of life” (1972,
p.241) for typical western agents.
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would have an objection to Sacrifice. Having an objection does not auto-
matically provide a reasonable rejection though, as reasonable rejection is
a comparative notion. If all other candidate principles gave others stronger
objections, where those others must be understood as individuals (i.e. any
would-be beneficiary of the donations required by the principle), then the
westerners would not have a reasonable rejection.
As the types of objections to less demanding principles – those that do
not require substantial donations – from those in the developing world seem
to be far more burdensome than the objections that the aﬄuent westerners
have to the more demanding principles (like Moderate Sacrifice, or Miller’s
Sympathy), contractualism seems to favour the demanding principles.
Reasonableness, in some of the ways described in section 6.1.5, does play
a big role in determining what counts as a good objection. If we recall how
reasonableness requires acknowledgement of the moral force of any individ-
ual agent’s goals or desires, this is clearly catered for in Scanlon’s account.
It is the way the values of individuals are recognised by contractualism that
leads to its denial of aggregation. Treating the interests of an individual as
only a part of a group’s interests fails, in the eyes of the contractualist, to
see each agent’s interest as important qua their interest.
One advantage that contractualism claims over utilitarianism (as well
as its ease in recognition of the separateness of persons) is its ability to
acknowledge reasons other than those pertaining to pleasure or pain (or
welfare simpliciter). We might assume that acknowledging other reasons
could provide grounds for rejecting other principles. As well as the burdens
to welfare of donating resources to charity, the western agents find their
property rights threatened and a burden of obligations supposedly incurred.
However, the reasons held by each potential westerner for rejecting a de-
manding principle like Sacrifice would – in order to ground a reasonable
rejection – need to be judged to ground a stronger complaint than that
held by those suffering from easily curable illnesses in the developing world
as a result of a less demanding principle. If, like Ashford, we accept that
a “cost to an agent imposed by all but exceedingly demanding principles
of aid will be outweighed by the cost to individuals” in dire straits (2003,
p.288), Scanlon’s account still seems very demanding.
Despite accepting this feature of reasonableness into the account, it ap-
pears that Scanlon’s contractualism still leads to extremism. In the next
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section, I attempt to demonstrate that an appreciation for the context-
sensitivity of reasonableness can help to prevent this.
6.3.2 Problems in Scanlon’s Contractualism
If a reasonableness-based account of obligation is able to contribute to a
moral theory immune (or at least more resistant) to accusations of overde-
mandingness, then there must be an explanation for why the most prominent
such account is unable to do so. After all, if I intend to suggest (as I do)
that an account of moral obligation based on reasonableness can avoid the
demandingness objection, why does Scanlon’s – an obvious candidate as a
sophisticated account which explicitly places reasonableness at its forefront
– fail to do so?
I suggest that one reason this fails is due to the account of reasonableness
that Scanlon provides.20 Scanlon requires that all parties want to make an
agreement, and that they hold a similar notion of what is reasonable. This
raises a problem which is discussed by Margaret Moore, who notes:
“[Scanlon’s] assumption that each person constrains her first-
order desires according to what satisfies the ‘reasonably reject’
test is functionally equivalent to assuming a common standpoint
for all moral subjects, which serves as the basis of agreement.
The assumption is that each person reasons in the same way,
and indeed that this reasoning is contractarian in form; thus,
the contractarian argument makes sense because it mirrors the
form of moral reasoning which occurs in each of us.”
(1996, p.176)
Moore contends that the presumptions that all parties reason similarly
and want to reach agreements are unwarranted. Expanding and unpacking
this critique further, we might consider two assumptions that Scanlon makes:
1. The assumption about what particular features make an complaint
reasonable.
20This section draws partially upon criticisms of Scanlon (as well as Rawls and Barry)
made by Margaret Moore (1996). While she made these criticisms several years before
the publication of What We Owe To Each Other, they still apply. The same criticisms
apply for Rawls’s account, so I shall not argue separately for the claim that his account
should also be rejected.
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2. The assumption that all reasonable parties seek agreement with one
another.
Let us begin with a cursory remark on the second of these. Moore
seems to deem this a particular problem for Scanlon. She considers some of
the biggest moral dilemmas facing contemporary society, like whether abor-
tion is permissible or whether racially divided societies should permit group
rights/protections or pursue an assimilationist agenda. Moore suggests that
in such cases. . .
“it seems plausible to argue that [according to Scanlon’s ac-
count] one or both sides would be conceived of as unreasonable
because unable to arrive at a compromise or policy which incor-
porates the desires of the other side”
(1996, pp.175-176)
When two parties are diametrically opposed with regards to an issue, it
might be the case that they do not seek a justification that would appease
the other side at all. One side may realise that any principle they would
be willing to accept would upset the other side, and vice versa. Because
“people have aims and interests and desires which they seek to advance in
an agreement, and may reasonably disagree over what should be agreed to”
(1996, p.176), but Scanlon requires for a person to be reasonable that they
seek universal justifiability, Scanlon’s position must regard such people as
unreasonable. As we all may have ‘red lines’ on some areas where we may
not consider any compromise, Scanlon’s requirements appear problematic.
Rather than viewing parties like these as being unreasonable, we could
suggest that they are being reasonable – they are attempting to justify prin-
ciples in ways they think others should accept – but that there might not be
a suitable principle about, say, abortion, such that “no one could reasonably
reject” it. It might be noted that the implication of this, considering Scan-
lon’s account of wrongness, would be that morality (in Scanlon’s narrow
sense) would simply be silent on issues of this sort. That response, however,
seems unsatisfying, potentially excluding a vast amount of morality (and it
does seem to be the ‘morality of obligation’, as Scanlon calls it).
Perhaps this is a resolvable issue. Scanlon could perhaps resort to higher-
order principles about how people should act in these situations in order to
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select the best first-order principles.21 Regardless, I think the first type of
problem may be more serious, so will set aside problems of the first type.
Returning to the first of the above reasons, Scanlon accepts that ac-
cording to his account, “whether an action is right or wrong requires a
substantive judgement on our part about whether certain objections to pos-
sible moral principles would be reasonable” (1998, p.194). In this respect, he
seems to follow W. D. Ross, in thinking that even once all the empirical facts
are settled, an element of judgment (perhaps something like intuition) is still
required to find the correct verdict.22 Because Scanlon requires there to be
principles no one could reasonably reject, those reasons that can ground rea-
sonable rejections must be accessible to all and everyone must be capable
of making the same judgments.
Scanlon declines to specify particular features which may ground com-
plaints, leaving these generally open, though acknowledges that well-being,
will, in any good interpretation prove to be very important.
What other reasons may ground a rejection? Scanlon notes that unfair-
ness is one such reason. A principle which arbitrarily favour one individual
over another would be unreasonable. For instance, a principle which singles
out a person by name would be unfair (1998, p.212). This seems in-keeping
with the account of reasonableness given previously.
Scanlon also suggests that an agent’s previous contributions/efforts may
make a difference, at least in providing a reason not to give up what one has
achieved through those efforts.23 We might note that this type of reason
provides one way Scanlon could respond to the issue of iterative demands.
Another type of reason might be based on promises or agreements. If
21For example, Scanlon discusses the Principle of Established Practices (1998, p.339),
which dictates that the status quo wins out when there is nothing else to decide between
principles. This principle is discussed further in 6.3.3. Higher-order principles could
provide a decision-procedure in cases like this, but challenges remain for justifying those
principles, and ensuring that they give answers in each case (the Principle of Established
Practices presumably is of no help when a new problem arises). While I do not consider
this problem further, I am unconvinced that higher-order principles like this could give
satisfactory answers here, and generally about the prospects of Scanlon being able to
provide a satisfactory response.
22Ross elucidates this with the example of a poem. A poem can be beautiful or unpleas-
ant on the basis of a variety of its features, but “our judgement as to the degree of beauty
it possesses on the whole is never reached by logical reasoning from the apprehension of
its particular beauties or particular defects” (2002, p.31).
23This is implied in the life jacket example (1998, p.196). Scanlon claims that of two
agents deciding who should get a life jacket, it might make a difference to their objections
that one already has the jacket, saying “perhaps he has looked hard to find it.”
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one has agreed or promised to φ in the past, this is also something that
should bear on whether an agent has a reasonable rejection against one’s
φ-ing or not φ-ing (1998, p.200).24
All sorts of reasons could seemingly give an agent an objection, but there
are restrictions. Scanlon claims that objections must be based on ‘generic
reasons’. These are reasons based on “commonly available information about
what people have reason to want” (1998, p.204). The reasons must be
based on what everyone has reason to want (in a general form), because
Scanlon regards justifiability as crucial in accounting for the normative force
of morality, and if the reasons were not available to some agent, they would
not be able to provide a reason for them. Generic reasons for a person must
be . . .
“. . . based on the ways in which they would be affected by it:
the ways their lives would be affected by living with the conse-
quences of the actions it would permit and with the possibility
that agents may perform such actions, since they would be per-
mitted to do so.”
(2014, p.96)
When discussing such reasons, Scanlon mentions that they obviously in-
clude “reasons to avoid bodily injury, to be able to rely on assurances. . . to
have control over their own bodies” (1998, p.204). These seem largely un-
controversial. When we consider how generic reasons might feature in diffi-
cult moral dilemmas, however, it is unclear just what may be regarded as a
generic reason.
Clearly Scanlon regards costs to welfare as extremely important. These
certainly seem easily accommodated as ‘generic reasons’, as we take these
to be based on “commonly available information about what people have
reason to want”, i.e. we know people have reasons to want to promote their
welfare. We have already mentioned Scanlon’s claim that an agent’s having
gained something through previous efforts may give them an objection to
principles requiring that they relinquish it. Perhaps we can readily accept
that by having committed significant energies to achieve or attain something,
24While Scanlon does think that promising can provide reasons of this sort, he does not
think the practice of promise-making is special, rather seeing it as obligation-generating
as a broader form of expectation-generating behaviours (1998, p.309).
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that we have additional reason not to want to give it up (though I find even
this extremely contentious).
Let us consider a difficult case. Two agents, A and B, have a moral
dispute about the permissibility of some action. A has a generic reason
which gives her an objection to principle x, and B has a generic reason
which gives her an objection to principle y. For simplicity, assume these are
the only two candidate principles. If A’s objection is stronger, we should
accept principle y. If B’s is stronger, we should accept principle x.
Scanlon suggests that some cases like this might require a judgement
from an agent. He gives an example of whether an agent would be required
to sacrifice an arm to save the life of a stranger, and says he does not think
“that any plausible theory could eliminate the need for judgements of this
kind” (1998, p.225).
In the arm sacrifice case, Scanlon actually does not think the sacrifice of
the arm is required, but offers no justification for this. The only considera-
tion offered in favour of not requiring extreme sacrifice is the generic reason
of intrusiveness. We can thereby reconstruct our dilemma. Agent A, whose
life is at stake, has an objection to principle x, which states “If one can save
the life of another by sacrificing one’s arm, it is permissible not to do so.”25
A’s objection is based on the reason that their life is at stake. Agent B,
however, has an objection to the contrary principle “If one can save the life
of another only by sacrificing one’s arm, one must do so.” B’s objection is
based on the loss of welfare from losing an arm and its being “intolerably
intrusive” (1998, p.225). Perhaps B could also lodge an objection on the
grounds of bodily integrity. Scanlon’s contractualism then requires us to
decide which of the objections is stronger. If, say, A’s objection is stronger,
principle x can be reasonably rejected. Scanlon takes it as given that this
would entail that principle y could not be reasonably rejected, therefore it
would be wrong to fail to sacrifice an arm in this type of case.
It is not fatal if Scanlon cannot provide a verdict in all of these cases.
We could claim that in cases where it seems too close to call, or when the
options are of similar magnitudes of importance,26 no principle should be
25The principle would really need to be specified in various ways. We might want to
specify things like the sacrifice being painless, that the agent’s life would be worth living
after losing the arm, that the other person is innocent and would probably live a long full
life otherwise, etc.
26I add this caveat intending recognise cases with ‘sweeteners’, and not regard them
183
accepted and, as Scanlon suggests, an agent must simply make a judgement.
It would be fatal, however, if it cannot provide a verdict in any case, or cases
that we typically see as extremely obvious.
Let us now consider an apparently obvious case: gratuitous torture.27
By this I mean torturing purely for the purpose of satisfying a sadistic urge
of the would-be torturer. We might consider The Torture Principle:
The Torture Principle It is forbidden to torture any person merely for
pleasure.
In order for it to be wrong to torture a person merely for pleasure, accord-
ing to Scanlon, this principle needs to be such that no one could reasonably
reject it (or that no one could reasonably refuse to accept it).28 According
to Scanlon’s method, we must examine various standpoints, primarily those
of the individuals affected by specific actions. The would-be victims of the
torture are the main example here. Their welfare would presumably be in-
credibly enhanced by such a principle. Many people who might otherwise
fear being tortured would also benefit from the security that acceptance of
this principle would grant them. On the other hand, those would-be tortur-
ers will suffer from not being able to make themselves happier by torturing.
The option to attempt to torture is also closed off, so even if someone did
not really want to torture anyone, they might – and admittedly, I am con-
sidering people of particularly unusual psychological makeups here – feel
constrained by the principle anyway.
Communities of people who love torturing and where this practice is
accepted obviously are not commonplace, but we might imagine a civilization
where a lot of people really enjoy occasionally torturing someone. Maybe
the torturing takes a particular form which is deemed acceptable (but is still
a horrific experience for anyone undergoing it).29 People still dislike being
tortured just like we do, but maybe they take extra relish in knowing that
as relevant. If, for example, the reasons in a situation seem to generate equally strong
reasons in favour of saving one person rather than another, a discovery that one person
is wearing a nicer shirt which would not be ruined if they are saved should not make the
decision an obvious one. Many discussions of this sort are discussed in Caspar Hare’s The
Limits of Kindness (2013).
27Scanlon does include torture as something there is “no doubt” is wrong, so presum-
ably he should be able to account for this (1998, p.357).
28Scanlon implicitly accepts that these are equivalent (1998, p.195).
29Perhaps we could imagine some strange regulations about the torturing, restricting
its time or type, like in the film, The Purge, for example.
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being tortured is horrific and everyone there (for simplicity) thinks it should
be permissible because the prospect of getting to torture someone is just so
appealing. Perhaps, we can even imagine some people in that community
who do not plan on ever torturing anyone, upon hearing a proposal that a
principle banning torturing was being considered, seeing this as overstepping
upon individuals’ freedoms. If they judge certain positive freedoms, like
the freedom to occasionally torture someone in a particular way simply for
the sadistic pleasure, to outweigh the cost of being (or potentially being)
tortured, it seems that people in this community would want to reject the
Torture Principle.
Given that the types of justification for rejecting the principle are similar
in this case and the arm case (welfare and intrusion on freedom),30 it might
seem difficult to come to the apparently obvious conclusion prohibiting tor-
ture in one case, and not require sacrifice in the arm case (as Scanlon thinks
is the case).
Many people will deny that this type of story I have given here is plau-
sible, or choose to restrict our moral principles to circumstances that are
sufficiently like the actual world, where torture-sympathisers are clearly not
widespread. I picked an extreme type of example deliberately. For those
who accept that this demonstrates my claim, that Scanlon’s account can-
not even tell us that gratuitous torture is wrong, my work is done. If his
account fails to demonstrate this, it is unable to provide us with even the
most uncontroversial moral principles, and must be deemed a failure.
For those who deny that the type of society I have described is possible,
or think it is too removed from typical human relations to be useful, I offer
a the following challenge. Consider the wide range of practices most of us
judge to be abhorrent that have been deemed permissible throughout human
history, such as slavery, subjugation of women and many cruel practices
towards non-human animals. Some of these views plausibly were deemed
permissible because of some factual mistakes, like the views that animals do
not feel pain (or feel it differently in some important respect). Alternatively,
with regards to some of these cases, we might think that the practitioners
30We could claim that the loss of welfare through losing limbs/life is different in kind
to – and providing different reasons to — the loss of welfare through being tortured or not
being able to partake in torture. While this might be the case, I do not think it detracts
from the argument here, as the conclusions Scanlon wants to reach still require that we
reason the same way.
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did not really think what they were doing was permissible. In some of
these cases, it seems that explanations of this sort are appropriate, but
this does not always seem to do the work. Consider some instances of
particularly unpleasant battery farming. It seems very plausible that some
of the people who understand what these practices entail think that this
confers an obligation to not be complicit in this process (not consuming those
goods and possibly some activism to prevent), whereas others – seemingly
given the very same facts – do not accept such an obligation. If we accept
that people have the same information, and that they genuinely do have
different permissibility-judgments, why would we not accept that this could
be the case with principles like The Torture Principle?31
It seems problematic for Scanlon if even one person, on the basis only of
generic reasons, judges that this principle should be rejected. There seem
to be three responses which could allow Scanlon’s view to give the verdict
he wants. Firstly, the would-be torturer might have some reasons which
are not generic reasons. Secondly, we could suggest that there are some
additional generic reasons in any instance like this, which allow us to reject
one principle. Finally, Scanlon might suggest that in each of these there is
some way we might determine which principle should be rejected, and that
it would be impossible to reasonably accept obviously mistaken principles.
The first two of these options do not seem viable. The reasons in play
seem like those based on “commonly available information about what peo-
ple have reason to want”; pursuit of welfare and freedom from excessive
intrusion from morality. We might well imagine that there could be addi-
tional reasons in cases like those mentioned, but those would be artefacts of
the examples, and could presumably be eliminated with more detailed cases.
The best option for Scanlon thus seems to claim that it should be discov-
erable, simply from considerations of the principles, and the standpoints of
those who could be affected by them, which principles must be accepted.
To achieve this, it seems that Scanlon requires “a common moral stand-
point”, as Moore puts it (1996, p.176). The assumption is that each person
31This response is admittedly brief, and I do not expect that this will be convincing to
everyone. However, at very least I think it offers a challenge. It does seem like people with
the same information do arrive at different verdicts in this type of case. My opponent must
either demonstrate that people who arrive at different verdicts either deny that these cases
are possible (that agents must have different information, be engaging in faulty reasoning,
or being disingenuous about their verdicts in these cases) or provide some explanation for
why these cases are different to The Torture Principle.
186
reasons in the same way, insofar as they judge obligations to arise from
reasons, is what I dispute. Fiona Woollard labels this – a “given way of as-
signing force to reasons in deliberating” – the Reasons Weighting (2016a). If
what obligations are reasonable considering certain reasons varies, between
communities for example, there will be no such common moral standpoint;
there will not be a universal Reasons Weighting.
Scanlon argues that his account is no more problematic than one which
involves only one type of reason (e.g. pleasure in hedonic consequentialism),
extolling the benefit that he need not reduce a wide variety of moral ex-
planations to one idea.32 Even if he is correct – that weighing reasons of,
say, welfare against freedom, provides no additional problems – this type
of problem can persist even if we held a monistic theory. It is an addi-
tional question, after all, if one accepts that only welfare can provide moral
reasons, when those reasons can incur moral obligations upon individuals.
Maximising act utilitarians give one answer to this, that an act’s causing
the most happiness makes it obligatory, making a theory of obligation easily
derived from their axiology (a route I have suggested, e.g. in section 5.2.4,
that we should reject). Satisficing utilitarians, however, give a different an-
swer setting a standard one has an obligation to meet, and scalar utilitarians
give yet another answer.
What does complicate matters in an account, like Scanlon’s, which em-
braces a pluralism of types of reasons which may contribute to the accept-
ability of a principle, is that before even arriving at the question of whether
an obligation is formed, some weighing of these reasons against each other
needs to take place before we can even know which actions are best. This
is a problem faced by any pluralistic account, but even if it is resolved –
and this would also seem to rely upon a common Reasons Weighting – the
question of when obligations result remains.33
32Notably, Singer and de Lazari-Radek do think this is a benefit for monistic theories.
They suggest that an account with simply one type of good, like a Sidgwickian hedonistic
utilitarianism, does have an advantage – at least in principle – over pluralistic accounts like
Ross’s because it can “give a definite answer to the question of what I ought to do, whereas
on Ross’s view, when duties conflict, one can only intuit, in each set of circumstances,
which duty or duties carry more weight” (2016, p.206).
33Some accounts can avoid these problems. If we hold that some reasons are conclu-
sive, then they will override other reasons in the first stage of this and guarantee some
obligation. This would be the Kantian position. Kant holds that there can be no conflicts
of duties, because in situations where are multiple grounds of obligation, the “stronger
ground of obligation prevails”. The weaker ground therefore can not form a duty, and is
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If there is no common Reasons Weighting – no objectively privileged
weighting and obligation-generating method34 – there may be no principles
such that no one could reasonably reject them.35
It should be noted, however, that a relativised notion of reasonable re-
jection – which could be shared among agents who accept similar interests
as grounding rejections and similar force for these reasons – would still be
a live option. This shall be returned to in section 6.4.
6.3.3 Why this matters for Demandingness
As has previously been discussed, because of problems of iteration (section
2.2.1), accepting a principle like Singer’s Sacrifice makes a theory extremely
demanding. Scanlon suggests that a similar principle to Sacrifice would
be acceptable under his contractualism. However, he adds a caveat that
previous contributions are a factor that should be taken into account, so
that such a principle could not require “unlimited sacrifice” (1998, p.224).
Ashford argues that through the same reasoning Scanlon makes use of justi-
fying Sacrifice, we could also be committed to accepting what she calls ‘The
Stringent Principle’:
The Stringent Principle If we can prevent something very bad from hap-
pening to someone by making a great sacrifice (e.g. giving most of our
income to aid agencies and spending a lot of our spare time on cam-
paigning and fund-raising), it would be wrong not to do so.
(Ashford and Mulgan, 2012)36
This would make Scanlon’s account extremely demanding without even
requiring iterations. Ashford suggests that the contractualist should be com-
mitted to this stronger principle because the “sacrifice imposed on an agent
thus excluded from the moral calculus (1996, VI:224). Of course, this type of picture needs
a way of determining the ‘stronger ground’, and similar difficulties are likely to ensue in
that project.
34I use the term “method” to be as theory-neutral as possible here. For instance,
particularists like Dancy (2004) or anti-theorists like Williams (1973), would reject the
notion that any sort of algorithmic system would be possible, but would accept that we
have some method of evaluating
35Thomas Nagel suggests that this might be the case, and that in situations where there
are no solutions that “no one could reasonably reject, neither party. . . can be reproached
for trying to impose a solution acceptable to him, but unacceptable to his opponent”
(1991, p.173).
36Originally argued for in Ashford (2003, p.287).
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by a principle of aid to those in need will have to be extreme before it bal-
ances the cost faced by individuals in dire straits who are not helped and
otherwise would have been” (2003, p.288).
At this point however, it seems that the strength of the complaint –
generated by the generic reason based on welfare – is equated with the
severity of the costs. It is natural for us to be lured into this manner of
evaluation because accounting for costs to welfare is such an important part
of our moral deliberations.
Herein lies how contractualism often appears extremely demanding. Ab-
sent some weighting criteria for how various reasons should come together
to form our obligations, we may simply consider what is most important. I
want to suggest that this drives us in a different direction than when we con-
sider what obligations we think are reasonable. Some principles/practices
are internalised within a moral community, and these play a role in what is
deemed obligatory. If we want an account that corresponds – even loosely
– to our intuitions, we need to appreciate how the moral significance which
we might place on them relates to these principles/practices.
Thus far, I have noted a challenge to Scanlon’s account, namely that of
justifying the claim that there exists some objectively privileged Reasons
Weighting which grounds our obligations. An argument can be made that
the existence of such an objectively privileged weighting (at least alongside
some other assumptions Scanlon makes) is incompatible with some of our
moral intuitions. If this is the case, we are confronted with the choice of
either rejecting part of Scanlon’s framework (which I suggest) or accepting
that our intuitions are extremely mistaken.37
I contend that Scanlon’s account leaves us unable to explain some of the
moral phenomenology previously discussed. Let us suppose that Scanlon’s
account could give us a good Reasons Weighting that allows for an evaluation
of a plurality of morally relevant factors. Even then, could an account
like Scanlon’s satisfactorily explain the different obligation phenomenology
across moral communities?
If we consider the intuitions in Le Chambon compared with our own, they
judge that some behaviour (harbouring refugees) is obligatory, whereas we
judge it as optional (supererogatory). It could be suggested that one of the
groups is simply mistaken about what is obligatory. I take it that this is an
37The latter of these options is considered in section 6.4.5.
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undesirable conclusion. If we accept that we are mistaken about this, we
are likely to deem the demandingness objection unproblematic.38 It seems
chauvinistic to suggest that we are correct and villagers of Le Chambon are
mistaken, particularly since the types of evidence available to us seem to be
the same as the evidence which was available to them (considerations of the
values in question and their moral intuitions).
It seems plausible that there are similar (though perhaps often less dras-
tic) differences between a great many communities. We might again consider
the example of a community that regards recycling plastics as compulsory.
Another might accept all the good-making features of doing so, and have
similar facilities, but not regard this as obligatory. Considering that changes
in our judgements of the moral landscape – what we judge to be accept-
able/unacceptable behaviour – are fairly frequent,39 it also seems difficult
to claim that our obligation-intuitions are the right ones.40 At first glance, it
might appear that Scanlon is unable to explain this other than by claiming
that one of these communities is mistaken.
However, there are a few potential options for Scanlon. Firstly, he does
offer an explanation for how conventions can affect what is required in a
situation. One such explanation comes in the form of the “Principle of
Established Practices” (1998, p.339). This holds that in certain situations,
where there would be no way to decide between numerous otherwise non-
rejectable principles, if one is generally accepted within a community (which
need not be unanimous), this gives an additional reason not to reject that
principle, i.e. it would be wrong to violate the generally accepted principle
in favour of some other.
While this higher-order principle would allow for acceptance of different
principles in different communities, it does not seem to help in situations
like Le Chambonnais case. This is because, presumably, the refugees facing
very likely death have a stronger objection to the principles that permit not
38Chapter 2 discusses why I reject this option.
39Lindstro¨m et al. provide many examples of changes in permissibility verdicts in a
range of issues, from tax-dodging to free-riding on public transport (2017).
40We might be tempted to think that something like scientific progress has occurred in
the moral domain, and that we could reject former moral verdicts the same way that we
would now reject bad scientific theories. This option, however, is problematised by the
feature that in some of the moral cases it is agreed exactly what the evidence is, and we
may have no way of demonstrating why our Reasons Weighting is superior – we might
think that in instances like the Chambonnais case, their weightings seem preferable in
some sense.
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coming to their aid than do the locals, so the higher-order principle would
not come into play.
Alternatively, we could find another way that Scanlon might respond to
the (apparently) contrasting verdicts about obligations here in his contrac-
tualist formulation of wrongness:
“It holds that an act is wrong if its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any set of principles for
the general regulation of behaviour that no one could reasonably
reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.”
(1998, p.153)
If we take the restriction of under the circumstances very broadly that
could make a difference here. He discusses this option for how the same types
of act might be permissible in one community, but forbidden in others. He
does this by reference to the reasons people have, noting that “what people
have reasons to want depends on the conditions in which they are placed,
and among these conditions are facts about what most people around them
want, believe and expect” (1998, p.341). This certainly coheres with the
considerations raised in chapter 3 about how these could be morally relevant.
The type of variation in what is required by principles which Scanlon
permits is accordance with what he calls parametric universalism, which is
compatible with his form of contractualism. Parametric universalism con-
sists of two claims:
1. There is one single set of standards with moral authority.
2. These standards allow for variation of what conduct is right depending
on circumstance.
(Scanlon, 1998, p.329)
While parametric universalism permits variation in right conduct, the
differences in obligations must result from differences in reasons. He eluci-
dates how different circumstances could lead to different actions being oblig-
atory in different societies with an example about privacy. Scanlon notes
that in societies with different forms of commerce, or where there are differ-
ent ideas about dignity accepted, people will have different reasons available
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to them. In our society where it is deemed embarrassing to be watched do-
ing certain activities and where it is financially disadvantageous for people
to know various personal financial details, we have reason to desire “forms
of protection of the sort that rules of privacy provide,” but societies lacking
these features do not (1998, p.341).
We might therefore think that varyingly demanding moral prescriptions
could be accounted for similarly, by people in different communities hav-
ing different reasons. For example, he could say that in Le Chambon, the
circumstance that people typically think ‘one should help in these situa-
tions’ contributes to the evaluation, giving the members additional reasons
to assist, making it obligatory.
However, this is not available to Scanlon for at least two reasons. First,
he sees it as a problem of relativism that should be avoided that obliga-
tions and moral entitlements might not properly match up (1998, p.332).
If he allowed for this interpretation of his account, it seems like it would
be possible to have, for example, refugees entitled to help – that is, able to
legitimately claim to be owed assistance – in Le Chambon and in a neigh-
bouring village, but the locals only under an obligation to help in one of
these villages. Scanlon regards it as a problem if we can accept that an
individual legitimate claim on another to be owed something, but the other
has no such obligation.
Secondly, Scanlon requires that the agents have different reasons in order
for the different obligations to obtain. While he accepts that identifying
with different ‘ways of life’ could provide these reasons, Scanlon explicitly
rejects the notion that such a reason could be of the form “I have to do
this because the custom in my community requires aiding refugees in this
case, so I am obligated to help here”. Scanlon regards this as failing to
capture the moral motivations, noting that when people give justifications
derived from on customs or tradition “reasons of the kind in question lose
their force” (1998, p.336). The reasons would have to come from a special
meaning or value, not merely a recognition of custom, to be regarded as
providing the appropriate moral motivation. However, it seems implausible
to suggest that, were we placed in a situation like those in Le Chambon,
we would have significantly different reasons available to us. The reasons
to help (to prevent the suffering of the unfairly persecuted) and not to help
(not wanting to accept the risk to one’s personal safety) seem the same in
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these cases.
If we accept a pluralism of systems of how reasons (even accepting Scan-
lon’s generic reasons) could be weighted in the generation of obligations, we
could escape the demanding conclusion. Providing a schema for how such a
system might operate and attempting to defend something of that form is
the aim of the remainder of this chapter.
6.4 Relative Reasonableness
The main problem in Scanlon’s contractualism, in terms of demandingness,
was that it asks us to act in accordance with principles no one could rea-
sonably reject, and assumes we can discover those principles based on the
strength of generic reasons. I claimed that when evaluating what obliga-
tions are prescribed by a theory, in lieu of some ‘real’ objective strength of
these reasons, we are likely to select principles likely to avoid certain features
which strike us as particularly bad. Scanlon does place some restrictions on
these – for instance, impersonal reasons cannot count, and the reasons must
be reasons for an individual – but we are still making evaluations based on
judgements of value, rather than about justifications.
That we fall into a trap of considering welfare is indicated by the way
people (including Scanlon) talk about these cases – the discussion often
looks more about cost. For example, when considering whether a potentially
intrusive principle could be rejected, Scanlon says we . . .
“. . . do not just compare the costs . . . of abiding by it, or not
doing so, on a specific occasion. We have to consider also the
general costs (and benefits) of its acceptance.”
(1998, p.225)
While some generic reasons are easily understood as costs – like a loss
of money or bodily integrity – not all are. Just as difficulty is different to
cost, many of Scanlon’s reasons can not easily be regarded as costs. Having
already contributed a significant amount, for instance, seems difficult to
understand as making giving more now costly. Even fairly clear reasons,
like having made a promise, seem strange to understand in terms of cost. If
we do try to understand them as costs, they seem less obviously burdensome
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than the truly obvious costs – like loss of life or suffering through ill-health.
Because of this, we might fail to do justice to our actual Reasons Weightings
when we think this way. Ashford also talks largely in terms of costs when she
tries to replicate Scanlon’s reasoning to reach her Stringent Principle. For
example, she claims that “the cost to an agent imposed by all but exceedingly
demanding principles of aid will be outweighed by the cost to individuals
in need imposed by less demanding principles of aid” (2003, p.288). In
addition, thinking in terms of cost-benefit analysis and accepting ‘the best’
seems in danger of leading us to the type of presumption of maximisation
that was identified as problematic in the previous chapter.
I suggest that because of a lack of an obvious method, we consider obvi-
ous costs, and might be misled into overly demanding accounts. Of course,
Scanlon could respond that there is a true Reasons Weighting, and that when
this is adopted, and we think about cases properly, we will get the right ver-
dicts. However, if there is an objectively privileged Reasons Weighting, we
are left with a puzzle. Consider a case where we hold that some behaviour
(in some circumstance) has a certain obligation-status. We also know that
other people, from a different moral community, believe the same behaviour
has a different moral status – we might consider saving refugees in Le Cham-
bon, which we deem supererogatory, but the residents of the village deemed
obligatory. It also seems that we do not have any better access to the truth
of the matter than our rival moral community does. The problem is how to
reconcile our belief about the moral status of the behaviour with our appar-
ently conflicting belief that the other community is just as likely to be right
as we are.41
One solution is to accept that obligations are generated by Reasons
Weightings, but that no Reasons Weighting is correct. This is to accept
some relativism into our verdicts of moral obligation. In the remainder of
this chapter, I attempt to flesh out further how such an account might work.
This is still a superficial sketch, but I hope to demonstrate some advantages
that such an account might possess.
Let us reconsider the example of Le Chambonnais from chapter 3. If we
41Of course, one could simply deny that the townspeople were under an obligation
in this case, and suggest either that they were mistaken (that the acts were actually
supererogatory) or that they were being disingenuous in their reports of how they viewed
their acts. I do not consider this in this section, but this option does seem hard to
maintain.
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make the move – which I previously endorsed – of accepting that the actions
and expectations of the moral community served to modify the obligations
of the townspeople, how might we explain this?
One explanation offered in that chapter was that the compliance and ex-
pectation of the community changed how difficult those actions were. Once
everyone else acted in a certain way, mental barriers against the noble be-
haviour were removed and/or it became more difficult to not act nobly when
this was the more readily accepted behaviour.
In the chapter 5, this explanation was rejected, as difficulty was argued
to only play a role in providing an excuse condition. We could still suggest
that what occurred as more and more of the village accepted the burdens
of aiding fleeing Jews, was that it would have been less difficult, so failing
to do so would have been less excusable for them than for us. This still fails
to capture some important phenomenology though, because we do not even
judge that failing to help in this case needs an excuse. Unlike the villagers
of Le Chambon, we simply do not see this as obligatory. Also, from our
perspective, when told of the villagers who did not risk their livelihoods,
we are likely to judge them no more harshly than the villagers of any other
village.
Instead, I suggest an explanation incorporating reasonableness. We have
noted that the reasonableness of certain other-regarding behaviours depends
on what is “ordinary” or “customary”. This will allow us to accept that so-
cial factors like expectation and compliance affect moral obligations. How-
ever, whereas in chapter 5, we attempted to identify the way these factors
operate via difficulty, a more successful approach may be through our no-
tion of reasonableness, which seems partly constituted by what is ordinary
or customary (in some sense).
If, in Le Chambon, it was ordinary or typical (or even perceived as such
by a large enough number of villagers) to risk one’s life in situations like
those that obtained, could that make it reasonable to require that behaviour?
Recall the tentative definitions offered earlier:
φ-ing is impermissible if and only if it is reasonable to require an agent
not to φ
where φ-ing is an object of moral judgments.
Rather than making use of generic reasons to explain what it is rea-
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sonable to require agents to do (or not do), we can thoroughly exploit the
notion of reasonableness depicted throughout this chapter.42 What it is rea-
sonable to require people to do will depend upon many contextual factors,
but these factors will be those accepted by the moral community. For ex-
ample, if one’s moral community judges that the dire situations of refugees
impute moral obligations upon those able to assist, it might be obligatory
in that community to offer assistance (as might explain the phenomenology
in Le Chambon). Similarly, if in a given moral community, having rendered
assistance many times already is accepted as alleviating some obligations to
help in future, iterative demands might not make result in the extremely
demanding burdens suggested by Singer et al.
This account does not need to permit a total moral ‘free-for-all’, wherein
any rules, no matter how unfair or absurd can be accepted. There will be
constraints concerning what principles can be adopted, based upon what is
accepted as grounding obligations. If one accepts something like a nearby
rescue principle43 then they must accept the verdicts this entails regardless
of whether they are the one in need of rescue or the one in a position to do
the rescuing. Reasonableness seems to require that all principles governing
obligations can be justified agent-neutrally.
There are many questions to be answered with an account like this. Many
concern the nature of the moral communities. For example, one might ask:
• How big are moral communities? (Can there be a moral community
of one?)
• How are moral communities formed?
• Is a moral agent in one moral community, or can they be within sev-
eral?
• How do people from different moral communities engage in moral dis-
course?
42The use of generic reasons could be preserved if this were deemed desirable, but where
the differences in verdicts is accounted for entirely by the Reasons Weightings. However,
I will not take this option here, so to allow for contextual features to play a role in what
is deemed to have value.
43For example, Richard Miller offers a plausible nearby rescue principle he thinks ev-
eryone must accept, that an agent “has a duty to rescue someone encountered closeby who
is in imminent peril of severe harm and whom one can help to rescue with means at hand,
if the sacrifice of rescue does not itself involve a grave risk of harm of similar seriousness
or of serious physical harm, and does not involve wrongdoing” (2004, p.378).
196
• How complete will the theory of requirements be within a moral com-
munity?
Each of these questions has many plausible answers, which merit inde-
pendent exploration, and much more discussion than I can provide here.
To provide a thoroughly unsatisfying snapshot of how I would envisage the
moral communities, here are some brief answers: I think the moral communi-
ties may be of any size (even one), so long as blaming and praising practices
can take place. I also suppose it is via these practices that moral communi-
ties emerge. The notion of moral sub-communities seems entirely plausible.
We might consider certain religious sects or groups of vegan friends within a
wider community who would blame and praise each other differently (either
more/less stringently, or for different behaviours). How moral communities
might interact is a problem, but typically these communities will have sig-
nificant overlaps in what they expect/require. Communities will typically
have an ‘open-textured’ moral theory. By this, I mean that there will be
possible cases outside the standard domains where the theory does not give a
determinate answer;44 their theories will include requirements/prohibitions
mainly for common occurrences, and when new situations arise, perhaps
with scientific developments which create new moral dilemmas, moral com-
munities must adapt accordingly.
The relativism entailed by this proposal is often deemed undesirable.
I argue why I think some of these problems are less of a problem in this
picture in section 6.4.3. First, we can examine how this type of account can
resolve the issues relating to demandingness that we have come across with
regards to alternative theories.
6.4.1 Conclusions so far
In this chapter so far, I have suggested that incorporating the notion of
reasonableness into our accounts of obligation-generation might be helpful
in giving an accurate – and not overly demanding – picture of what we
take our obligations to be. Given that Scanlon provides an account that
relies heavily on reasonableness, I explored his contractualism in particular.
44The term “open-textured” is attributed to Waismann (1968), though he does not
give an explicit definition. Tanswell offers the following definition, which I will accept: “A
concept or term displays open texture iff there are cases for which a competent, rational
agent may acceptably assert either that the concept applies or that it disapplies” (2017).
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I claimed that the assumption of an objective Reasons Weighting – which
his account requires – is unjustified. I speculated that because ‘strength of
reasons’ is a fairly opaque notion, and because we have no obvious method
for comparing complaints, we are often compelled to think in more obvious
axiological terms, which leads us to consider costs to welfare, rather than
many features we do ordinarily take to be morally relevant. I suggested that
this is implied by the way that talk about ‘strength of reasons’ often makes
way for talk of costs, which does easily accommodate taking a variety of
reasons as important.
Acceptance of an objective Reasons Weighting also leads us to a diffi-
culty in explaining cases where different moral communities have different
obligation-verdicts, despite seemingly having the same evidence. There are
certainly ways that Scanlon’s account could be modified in order to avoid
this problem, but I have instead suggested that we consider a relativistic
Reasons Weighting; that different moral communities view the obligation-
generating powers of certain reasons differently. What it is reasonable to
demand in a community will depend, at least in part, upon issues of expec-
tation and compliance. This is motivated by cases like Le Chambon and the
recycling case.
We may then say that some act, φ is impermissible (morally wrong)
within a moral community if, within that community it is reasonable to
require them not to φ. What is impermissible in one community may be
permissible (or potentially even required) in another, depending on their
Reasons Weighting (which in turn is dependent on factors relating to com-
pliance and expectation). This accepts an element of relativism, which I
address in section 6.4.3. Prior to that, I attempt to demonstrate how the
picture I have provided is able to respond to some of the challenges of de-
mandingness.
6.4.2 Other Issues of Demandingness
Having given a schematic for an account of this sort in order to avoid overde-
mandingness, an obvious question is whether it actually does succeed in do-
ing so. Because what a given moral community deems reasonable dictates
what it judges to be required of a moral agent, there is a neat tie-up ensur-
ing that agents are not systematically under what they view as unreasonable
obligations (they in fact, definitionally, cannot be under unreasonable obli-
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gations).
Underdemandingness?
This answer might seem a little unsatisfying. An uncharitable reading of this
might seem to suggest that whatever you believe about your obligations, you
are correct, and that this might actually make the theory underdemanding!
In response to that it should be reiterated that this is not an ‘anything goes’
account. For instance, it does not entail that people are always correct about
their obligations, because the picture is compatible with moral mistakes.
These could come about in a variety of ways. People may make mistakes
about facts. They might believe, for instance, that a member of another
race does not have feelings of the same kind as them. From this, they may
believe that the desires of those people count for less (in terms of generating
obligations) than their own do. It might be that they are culpable for this
mistake, even by their own lights, as people sometimes fail to scrutinise their
beliefs sufficiently.
Another way people may make moral mistakes is via what Kant called
rationalising [vernu¨nfteln]. Sticker and van Ackeren claim that Kant saw
rationalising as. . .
“. . . an abuse of rational capacities, which finds or invents
apparent justifications or apparent excuses for violations of the
moral law.”
(2015, p.86)
We could imagine agents rationalising by overestimating how important
something is to them, fabricating reasons that or underestimating how much
others value something.45 This seems conceivable as a deliberate (or even
semi-deliberate) way that people might come to moral mistakes. Something
similar might happen entirely accidentally though. Because we have much
greater access to our own needs and desires, and each of us is particularly
focused on our own lives, we may (blamelessly or not) fail to appreciate the
needs or wants of others, and how we should (given our Reasons Weighting)
45The ways Kant discussed the possibility of rationalising seemed to focus more ex-
plicitly on the nature of morality. Sticker and van Ackeren included questions whether
morality is overriding, doubting the purity of morality or challenging the normative force
of the moral law (2015, pp.85-86).
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see this as affecting our obligations. This may also lead us to making moral
mistakes about what is required of us.
Another way a moral mistake may arise is if the standards one takes to
determine what is reasonable are inconsistent. If an agent held the belief
that lying was wrong (that the reasons against lying were always concluding
reasons), but also that doing anything to bring about the deaths of many
people was wrong (also as a conclusive reason), they could fall into an incon-
sistency if placed in a situation where the only way to avoid causing deaths
to many people is by lying. I provide an example like this to demonstrate
that such inconsistencies might be mere ‘practical inconsistencies’ – most
people will never encounter a situation like this, so might operate with an
inconsistent view of obligation forever. I suggest that holding these views
without noticing that they are inconsistent, even though the inconsistency
is usually harmless, is still a type of moral mistake.
Of course, it is possible, within the framework I have provided, to have a
moral community for which no reasons are deemed to generate any obliga-
tions. Such a community would regard no actions (or omissions) as morally
wrong. This definitely would be an undemanding. However, while concep-
tually possible, such a community would be extremely different to anything
we are familiar with. Due to the conceptual link between wrongness and
blameworthiness, such a society could not regard any acts as blamewor-
thy.46 They could still make assessments, e.g. that some action is better
or worse than another, but moral discourse of this sort would be, by our
standards, extremely impoverished.
Cullity’s Iteration Problem
In earlier chapters we discussed a problem posed by Cullity. I suggested
that this poses a serious problem to certain theories, including those incor-
porating Scheﬄer’s agent centered prerogatives. The problem facing that
sort of theory was that no matter what weighting I give my own interests,
either the weighting will be wildly implausible – I will practically regard my
interests as far more important than the interests of others – or I will still
be left with a very demanding conclusion.
Our typical pre-theoretic intuition suggests that people have to con-
46At least, not if we maintain the independently plausible thought that an act can only
be blameworthy if it is morally wrong, discussed in section 5.1.
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tribute something towards certain needy charities (if they can afford to),
but that once they have given a certain – and not extremely demanding –
amount, they can stop (at least for a time), and that doing more than this
is supererogatory. Scanlon’s account seemed able to deliver this verdict if
some weight is given to the reason of having previously contributed (so long
as an appropriate Reasons Weighting is given).
Some moral communities might accept that an agent who has already
contributed significantly to some project (in time, effort or resources) is
under no obligation to do any more. This certainly seems true of the moral
community we are in. There are definitely situations where we accept that
people can sit back having “done their bit”. This of course does not mean
that obligations would be alleviated in every domain. While we might say of
a soldier who has spent several years at the front line, that they are under no
obligation to go back, we might always expect people to do their recycling,
regardless of how much recycling they have done in the past. Similarly,
if someone has just given a large portion of their money to an effective
charity, we may judge that they need not contribute more (for at least some
time), but if an agent is walking home and finds a stranger in dire need of
medical attention, we judge that they have some obligation to help, even
if it so happens that they just saved a similarly maligned person just the
day before. What counts will be what reasons are in play and the extent to
which one’s moral community sees those reasons as generating obligations.
Other moral communities, of course, might have different requirements, but
these do not govern our conceptions of obligation, or the blaming/praising
practices that go along with them.
Singer’s challenge?
Singer suggests that his principle, which he notes appears “uncontrover-
sial” (1972, p.231), demands significantly more of people than ordinarily
expected. We are then left with a dilemma of either rejecting Singer’s prin-
ciple, or accepting that morality is much more demanding than we intuitively
expect. In section 2.2.2, I suggested several reasons why we should reject
Singer’s principle. I claimed that it was poorly motivated and that it leads
to counterintuitive verdicts in a wide variety of cases, in addition to the case
of our obligations to the global poor.
The blueprints provided above provide resources for not only why Singer’s
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principle should be rejected (or at least, need not be obviously accepted),
but also why any ad hoc revisions to the principle will also fail. If what is
obligatory within a moral community depends in part upon what is typi-
cal, customary or accepted in that community, then it is no surprise that
extremely unusual acts of beneficence (like those Singer judges as required)
are not obligatory. If an agent’s community do not view the existence of
suffering that can easily be prevented as generating an obligation to help –
if the Reasons Weighting of this type of reason is insufficient – that agent
will not judge that they are required to aid. It is of course possible that
some moral community could accept some very demanding moral principles
(and by their standards, what we regard as ordinary behaviour might well
involve flouting obligations), but we are not in a moral community like that.
Singer could reply that there is an inconsistency in our attitudes between
cases like saving drowning children in ponds and those regarding our ability
to help the global poor. The purported inconsistency here would be an
inconsistency of responses to a certain type of value. However, there are
other factors we may regard as important in generating obligations, which
an analysis of that sort will not capture. Our community may deem that
some sort of connection (social, psychological or causal) that holds between
us and the drowning child is of the sort that has additional obligation-
generating power. Alternatively,47 our community might value our ability
to plan our lives, perhaps seeing this as integral to our autonomy, and thus
judge that events we can typically expect to occur either never or rarely
have a greater pull on us.
The drowning child and the child dying of the preventable illness may be
accepted to be equally bad in terms of sheer welfare,48 but the norms and
conventions we identify with in our moral community mean that we find
allowing the former forbidden, but the latter permissible. Because of the
conventions in our moral community, obligations are generated in typical
nearby rescue cases – it is reasonable to require agents to act – but not
(normally) in distant poverty cases.
47As was suggested in the discussion of Unger in section 2.3.2
48Again, I do not want to commit to any axiology here. A simple hedonistic axi-
ology will only count the welfare differences, so would determine simply based on the
pleasures/pains in question. If, we have even a slightly more complicated axiology, for
example seeing pleasure and virtues as intrinsically valuable, as discussed by McElwee
(2015), would complicate matters. Rival axiologies will provide different verdicts to what
acts (or states of affairs) are morally better/worse.
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6.4.3 Relativistic Problems
Moral relativism is often seen as objectionable, abhorrent or even scary.
Scanlon describes three worries that are taken by its opponents to be rea-
sons that we should fear or resist moral relativism. These are that moral
relativism:
1. creates moral monsters
2. delegitimises moral condemnations
3. undermines moral authority
(Scanlon 1998, pp.330-333)
Scanlon suggests that the first of these should not really worry us. The
worry that moral relativism creates moral monsters follows from the thought
that if some of (what we judge to be) the most obvious moral verdicts
fail to apply in all cases, then everything must be permissible (to at least
some people). The people within those context where, for example, the
prohibition against torture does not apply, would have no reason not to
torture. If moral relativism were to spread as a doctrine around the world,
one might worry that more ‘moral monsters’ would be created, judging that
moral requirements – not being universal – do not apply to them. Scanlon
seems unconcerned by this worry, claiming that historically the “worst mass
murderers have not been relativists, and many relativists accept, perhaps
for varying reasons, the basic contents of ordinary morality” (1998, p.331).
Of course, this is an empirical matter and might be speculated about, but
regardless, this worry seems more to do with the desirability of sharing moral
relativism with the masses, rather than the merits of the account.
The worry that moral relativism makes moral condemnations less legiti-
mate becomes apparent when we consider agents who have committed (what
we take to be) horrible acts at various points in history or other geograph-
ical locations (some time/place the acts would not be forbidden). If moral
relativism is true, it seem that those agents had no reason not to act as
they did, and if that is the case, it seems inappropriate to criticise them for
their actions. More worrying, Scanlon suggests, is that if we are unable to
criticise an agent for violating some supposed right of another, we are not
able to defend the claim that the other was entitled not to be treated in
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that way. A form of relativism must be able to either [1] explain why losing
(or, more accurately, that we do not possess) the ability to legitimately con-
demn such actions is not theoretically problematic, or [2] demonstrate that
legitimate condemnation is possible under the relativistic framework. I opt
for the second of these options in the next subsection.
The third concern about moral relativism relates to the authority of
morality. Under the framework I have described, it is possible that a practice
which is forbidden in one moral community is permitted (or perhaps even
required) in another. There is no inconsistency between an agent in the
first community saying “φ-ing is wrong” and an agent from the other other
saying “φ-ing is not wrong”, but the prescriptions offered do differ. In those
cases it is difficult to see what determines which commands are correct in
which contexts. Scanlon notes that if, as is the case for many relativists, the
correct set of moral standards is determined by the society, relativism may
be seen as a. . .
“. . . debunking doctrine, according to which morality is is
merely a matter of social convention – where the ‘merely’ re-
flects the assumption that being generally accepted in a society
could not, by itself, confer anything like the authority that moral
judgements are commonly supposed to have.”
(Scanlon, 1998, p.333)
Here the relativist is left with another dilemma. They must either [1]
accept the debunking, and concede that morality does not have the moral
authority typically associated with it, or [2] give an explanation why the
moral judgements can still confer that authority. Again, I opt for the second
of these two routes.
Scanlon describes types of relativism which aim to preserve the moral
authority of morality – those rejecting the debunking claims, even if they
accept that the moral standards in play may depend on social convention –
as varieties of ‘benign relativism’. The position I am advocating is of this
sort.
Responding to Relativistic Worries
Turning to the complaint that a relativistic approach delegitimises moral
condemnation. There are three types of cases that might occur where it
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could seem appropriate to morally condemn someone.49 It could be some-
one in our moral community, doing something deemed impermissible in our
moral community. Secondly, someone outside of our moral community could
be doing something deemed impermissible in both our and their moral com-
munities. Thirdly, we could have someone outside of our moral community
doing something judged impermissible in our moral community, but ac-
cepted as permissible in theirs. In the first two cases, there seems to be
no problem. Both agents accept that the conduct is unacceptable, so both
could accept that condemnation might be appropriate.
The third case does provide a case where reasonable agents will disagree
about the legitimacy of condemnation. If there is no objectively privileged
method of discerning what obligations people have – rather, that there are
many rival ways such verdicts might be reached – this type of case, of gen-
uine moral disagreement about obligations, is to be expected. Agents may
appeal to considerations of various values, as presumably there will some
common ground in the acceptance of certain good-making features, in order
to engage in a second-order moral discourse. For example, consider a conflict
between two communities which see the same things as valuable, the first
of which accepts a minimal picture of obligations and the second which has
a significantly more burdensome picture. Each could point to values which
are better promoted under their framework – perhaps freedom from infringe-
ment of morality in the first, and typical aggregate welfare in the second. If
the communities do recognise the values pointed to by each other, they will
see some legitimacy to the claims of the other, as the Reasons Weighting of
the other would better promote some value.
A more difficult situation would obtain if the goods that one community
sees as having a Reasons Weighting are not acknowledged as valuable at
all by another community. In these situations, communities will not even
really be able to communicate their moral reasons; they may understand
the ‘rules’ but may see them as bizarre or fetishistic.
When there is sufficient common ground, moral discourse can take place.
Each party can attempt to convince the other to change, adopting a more
(or less) demanding Reasons Weighting system, but so long as both parties
49Of course, there will be cases where people condemn others inappropriately, i.e. when
it would not be reasonable to require them to behave otherwise, but this does not seem
to offer any special problem.
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have a consistent picture of obligation – one that meets the standards of
reasonableness – each can only appreciate reasons given by their perceptions
of value.
With regards to Scanlon’s third problem for relativism, that it under-
mines the authority of morality, I do not think this is as grave an issue as
Scanlon suggests. At the heart of this objection seems to be the claim that
morality is not taken seriously enough. Morality has, so the objection to
relativism goes, an authority that we are clearly not giving proper due if we
think it so restricted (to various moral communities) or flimsy (given that
what one judges as required in a situation could have been so different).
Contrary to this claim, I think the opponents are actually the ones failing to
give morality its due. If the extremists (or even Scanlon, apparently, given
how demanding his contractualism seems to be) are correct, the vast major-
ity of people are rampantly flouting their moral obligations, mostly without
concern. It seems puzzling to assert that morality has ultimate authority,
that we accept that it has this authority, and yet agents flouting morality’s
requirements are ubiquitous. However, an account of the sort I have pro-
vided can give morality serious authority over an agent’s actions, because
the agent identifies with the standard of reasonableness they accept. In
a vaguely Kantian move, we might suggest that the authority of morality
comes from the notion that we impose it upon ourselves.
In addition to the reasons for resisting relativism Scanlon provides, we
might also suggest that the correctness of relativism presumes a widespread
misunderstanding of morality. It is often supposed that claims about what
an agent is required to do are universal in some important sense. If the
proposal I have offered is accurate, this belief is fundamentally mistaken;
we are systematically wrong about what our claims and judgements about
moral obligation actually mean. Is this a problem?
Prima facie, this does appear to be a difficulty. The purported gener-
ality of morality is something that seems to have widespread acceptance.
Most proponents of moral theories take themselves to be saying something
universal. This is clear in the work of Kant, with his taking generality to be
a requirement of moral laws, but this presumption is clear in any attempts
to provide a theory of obligation.
I would reply that some similar error is required in most, if not all,
competing views. As was discussed in chapter 1, most plausible theories of
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obligation seem susceptible to demandingness objections.50 If any of these
theories were true, they would require that agents are significantly (and
probably systematically) mistaken about the extent of their moral obliga-
tions. When faced with a choice between positions which claim that seem-
ingly well-informed agents are wildly mistaken about the extent of their
moral obligations, and a position claiming those same agents are mistaken
about who falls under the purview of those obligations, it is unclear if one
side wins out. At least, for the position I am arguing for, people typically
have access to their own obligations, which, given the picture I have pre-
sented, is what they would be considerably more familiar with anyway. We
might not see it as surprising that – given widespread moral agreement – it
is often taken that the normative force of certain reasons is universal.
6.4.4 Success Evaluation
During the previous chapter I introduced some success criteria for theories
of moral obligation. Now that this theory has been cashed out somewhat,
we can consider how well it is able to respond to these criteria. The criteria
arrived at were that a suitable theory should:
1. Conform to most/all strong intuitions
a) Provide ‘moderate’ verdicts.
b) Support intuitions about moral progress.
c) Must be able to satisfactorily respond to Cullity’s iterative de-
mands problem.
2. Allow for moral discourse.
3. Allow for the possibility of moral mistakes.
Moral mistakes are possible in all the ways previously mentioned.51
As has been mentioned already, that the account provided will conform
with most (or all) of our intuitions is guaranteed by its incorporation of a
community’s own notions of reasonableness. Those determine the extent of
50An obvious exception being Norcross’s scalar utilitarianism, but this seems to require
that we make what seems like an even more serious error – mistakenly believing in the
existence of moral obligations.
51In section 6.4.2.
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the moral obligations, and as they are accepted by members of the moral
community (definitionally), the intuitions of the members will conform to
the obligations.
More specifically, the picture described seems to support a moderate
view: our obligations might demand more of agents – perhaps significantly
more – than most of us actually do. Many of us do think that, in terms of
time spent on beneficent activities and our monetary contributions to the
world’s poor, we ought to do a lot better. At a given time, people might
rationalise their behaviour – unfairly treat their reasons as granting justifi-
cations or excuses, when they would not for others – to mitigate or alleviate
feelings of guilt. They may, for example, tell themselves that they really
need the money right now, exaggerate how much worse their lives would
be without some luxury good, or convince themselves they have discharged
their obligation in some other way (“I already gave quite a lot last week,
so it’s okay not to this time”). The general thought that we are not doing
enough does seem commonplace.
One commonly accepted belief is that there has, over human history,
been considerable moral progress. We can look back to fairly recent history
and see that slavery was rife, even in the supposedly developed countries.
While things are by no means perfect now, we accept that there has been
moral progress – the moral landscape is better now than it was when when
the UK and USA were exploiting slaves en masse. Unger contends that the
“idea of moral progress” has something we’re greatly influenced by in our
typical moral thinking (1996, p.18). A relativistic picture might be seen
to struggle with justifying that moral progress can occur. If there are no
objectively right or wrong verdicts about our obligations, it could be asked,
how can we be said to improve? A typical, non-relativistic picture could
suggest that there are objective moral truths about what our obligations
are and that getting closer to understanding and fulfilling them is progress.
In response to this, I claim that distinguishing between axiology-talk
and obligation-talk can help us. While I have not endorsed a particular
axiology here, so long as the picture is supplemented by an axiology where
we can accurately compare moral states of affairs52 it will be possible to talk
of progress. If, for example, we accepted a purely hedonic evaluation, we
52By this, I do not intend anything philosophically deep, but rather some way of eval-
uating the world morally.
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could say that we have exhibited moral progress if the obligations we now
accept result in more pleasure. Things would be more complicated with a
pluralistic picture, but I see no reason why, in principle, we could not reach
a view of moral progress with this account just as easily as in any other
account.
Additionally, to explain moral progress, we may point to various mistakes
that have been made by previous moral communities. They may have made
a variety of mistakes we have since learnt from.53 Correcting moral mistakes
clearly seems like progress. Alternatively, they may have accepted rules that
failed to meet the reasonableness constraint, i.e. regarding bodily integrity
as very important, but only for certain people. Systems that permit slavery
are likely to be unreasonable.54
As was discussed previously, Scanlon has a difficulty when people from
(what I would term) different moral communities discuss a practice, where
both are considering the same reasons, but they arrive at a different conclu-
sion. This problem does not arise the same way with the type of account
I have described, but similar worries may result. When one agent from
Moral Community A says that practice φ is forbidden, and an individual
from Moral Community B says φ is not forbidden (both earnestly), there
are several options for what might be happening. First, it is possible that
one of the agents has made a moral mistake. It could be that an individual
from either community is ignorant of some fact, rationalising, or not paying
sufficient attention, and has arrived at a mistaken verdict. This would be
easily characterised as a moral disagreement, where one agent is correct and
the other mistaken.
Alternatively, their Reasons Weightings might actually lead them to dif-
ferent verdicts. Perhaps φ-ing really is impermissible by the lights of those
in Moral Community A, but permissible by those in Moral Community B.
From what I have said so far, it is not obvious that we can actually charac-
53Of the sort discussed in section 6.4.2.
54I say likely to because depending upon the goods valued by the society, it is possible
to allow for slavery to be permitted. Systems like this would be quite alien to us, however,
as the grounding for rights of bodily integrity would have to be devised in some strange
way, so that the reasons we judge it to be important would need to be accompanied
by some factor we would deem arbitrary (like membership of some race or social class)
in order to be generated. With regards to the slavery-permitting systems in our actual
history, however, it does seem like either the system must have been unreasonable or some
mistakes in application were made.
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terise this as a disagreement. To elucidate, we could describe φ as wrongA
but permissibleB, which, in itself, involves no disagreement. In some cases
this might be what is going on. The agents might simply be talking past
each other.
In most of these cases, however, a disagreement (or something like a
disagreement) does seem to be happening. There are a wide range of options
for explaining this available. To explore them properly would require far
more space than I have here, but here are some suggestions.
We might think that when an agent is engaged in moral talk with another
they endorse some imperative in such a way that implies that the audience
has a reason to also accept that imperative.55 When a person is trying to
convince another to change their perspective on a moral issue – trying to
convince a meat-eater that eating meat is wrong, for example – there are a
number of ways this could be explained.
First, they may think that the other person has a sufficiently similar
Reasons Weighting but is making a moral mistake. They might think that
presenting the issue in a slightly different way could reveal a tension or incon-
sistency in the interlocutor’s position and convince them that way. A moral
mistake could also easily result from a factual one. Consider two people dis-
agreeing about the permissibility of eating fish because they disagree about
whether fish can feel pain. Second, they might accept that the other person
does not currently adopt a Reasons Weighting that forbids meat-eating, but
want to convince them that they should adopt a new Reasons Weighting.
Some of this convincing might require alerting to axiological considerations.
Praising and blaming practices may also cause people to make some sort of
moral shift. This might be particularly successful if they think the other
person is rationalising, as it would inform them that their deception (or
self-deception) is noted and subject to some form of sanction. Third, they
might be mistaken about what is entailed by their interlocutor’s notion of
reasonableness, thinking they are pointing out a mistake, when actually they
are not.
While I have not been able to give a fully detailed account here – doing
so would require an entire new thesis(!) – I have gestured towards some
55Gilbert Harman makes a similar move with regards to his “inner judgments” which
require that a speaker endorse the position held and that they believe that the audience
also does (1975, p.8).
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ways the schematic could be developed.
6.4.5 A Concession to the Extremists
Despite these claims that an account of this sort might not be quite as ex-
treme as could be suggested, it certainly contains features that some theo-
rists would be reluctant to endorse – like its relativism. However, even if one
is dissuaded by the relativism about moral obligation, it might still be the
case that this account offers something appealing. Consider the extremists
discussed in 2. These theorists must face the challenge of explaining away
many of our strong intuitions. One potential explanation for why intuitions
provide some judgements would be given by the account discussed.
Recent psychological literature has suggested that our judgements of
moral obligation operate in a way strongly connected to common practice.
The “Common is Moral” Heuristic, observed by Lindstro¨m et al. holds that
when making judgements about the social behaviour of others, people typi-
cally “substitute the target attribute “moral value” with the more accessible
attribute “behavioral frequency” ” (2017). This means that when consid-
ering whether something is morally permissible, an agent will, due to a
cognitive association between commonness and moral values, often judge
the behaviour acceptable if they judge it to be common.
An extremist may accept that the type of picture I have provided, of
obligation-statuses of actions being judged based on whether it seems rea-
sonable (which is in turn informed by what is common), as providing evi-
dence for how our intuitions mislead us. They could take (at least elements
of) this account to provide a descriptive model for how people often judge
moral obligations. This would leave the extremist with the task of explaining
why the moral data they make use of is immune to this type of error.
Of course, I have argued here that the demandingness objection is a good
one, and therefore that we can rely on the underlying intuitions. For my
dialectic opponents, however, understanding our moral judgements as being
formed in a way similar to the present proposal may prove fruitful.
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